Thank you for correcting the text in this article. Your corrections improve Papers Past searches for everyone. See the latest corrections.

This article contains searchable text which was automatically generated and may contain errors. Join the community and correct any errors you spot to help us improve Papers Past.

Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image

WAR PROBLEMS IN PACIFIC

Allied Relations And Strategy UNITY OF COMMAND (By Telegraph.—Press Assn.—Copyright.) (Special Australian Correspondent.) (Received October 30, 8.50 p.m.) SYDNEY, October 30. The “forthright and manly statement of General MacArthur, magnificently vindicating Australia’s war effort,” has been generally applauded throughout the United States. The New York “Sun” welcomed its publication in the terms quoted. American war news analysts say that it completely offsets the recent ill-conceived criticism of Australia’s war effort. In Australia, war observers have become gravely concerned that, in the words of the “Sydney Morning Herald,” “the nations’ partnership-in-arms must not be weakened by political or other differences which, mirrored or distorted, may misrepresent to either country what the other is doing in the war.”

The costly battle for the Solomon Islands seems now to have fully awakened the United States to the magnitude of the war in the Pacific. Indicative of the Americans’ heightened conception of the Japanese threat is a banner headline in the latest issue of the New York “Journal-American”:

“This war will be won or lost in the Pacific.” Arguing Deprecated. The “Sydney Morning Herald” comments: “There is only one war. The war in the Pacific could be lost —by division among the Allies.” Urging that controversy should be stilled while the battle rages, the paper adds: “The strategy which precipitated the Solomons battle has been questioned and doubts about its issue have been unduly prevalent. These misgivings do less than justice both to the boldness of the United States Navy’s stroke at Japan’s flank in the South Pacific and to the results which have already been achieved.” In Australia and in the United States criticism of the conduct of the war in the South Pacific has crystallized on the urgent need for a unified command in this theatre. Nominating General MacArthur as the original and logical choice as supreme commander, the Sydney “Daily Telegraph” says that if General MacArthur’s plan to drive the Japanese out of New Guinea and to push on to the Netherlands Indies had been implemented the Allies would have cut the flank of Japan’s advance toward India, and eliminated the threat to Australia and New Zealand, and the South Pacific island chain. Congress Move. “The United States naval plan to ‘island-hop’ from the Solomons was excellent,” says the “Telegraph,” “if the Allies had the ships and equipment enough to push north from the Solomons and from New Guinea simultaneously. But there was not enough for both operations. ? “General MacArthur is thwarted because he has not a naval command, and it is possible that Vice-Admiral Halsey may be inhibited through a lack of troops and insufficiency of land-based planes.” In America the loss of the offensive initiative in the Solomons has stirred some sections of Congress to demand a thorough investigation into the conduct of the war in the Pacific. Several Congressmen who have served with the armed forces in this theatre are stated to have brought back “disquieting news.” Leading commentators express the view that, now that General MacArthur has made it plain that he has no political ambitions, admirers in Congress will take an early opportunity to press for a united command in the South Pacific under his control. A denial that the United States island-hopping offensive in the Pacific was a “navy plan,” has been made by the United States Secretary for War, Mr. Stimson, who says that the move was decided on by the service chiefs after close consultation and was upon an agreed strategy. NEWSPAPER CHARGE MacArthur’s Planes Kept From South Solomons (Received October 3()f 10.30 p.m.) NEW YORK, October 29. “General MacArthur’s airmen are apparently not permitted to continue the hammering blows against the southern Solomons, though General MacArthur is obviously anxious to aid the iSolomons campaign wherever possible,” comments the Australian correspondent of the New York “Daily News,’’ Jack Turcott. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that America’s top strategists are not willing to permit General MacArthur to share in the public recognition in participating in the Solomons. “General MacArthur has never publicly complained about the division of command nor ' indicated displeasure when Washington took New Caledonia, New Zealand, the New Hebrides and the Solomons from his jurisdiction, but the aerial activities reflect the result. Since August 7 General MacArthur’s air force has raided bases in the northern Solomons only. Though the pilots are itching to strike the Japanese fleet at Guadalcanal and Tulagi, such assistance is impossible under the divided command.” ANTI-MACARTHUR Political And Military Criticism (Received October 30, 8.10 p.m.r NEW YORK, October 29. Discussing General MacArthur’s disclaimer of political ambitions, Arthur Krock, of the “New York Times,” reports IJmil the General became concerned about the possible effects on his military effectiveness when the Presidential chatter started. “.Some months ago an army officer who was a very important, legal figure in private life returned from Australia bearing word from the General that he was not and would not be a candidate, asking only for the fullest, 'possible scope as a soldier. "The messenger delivered the tidings to President Roosevelt, Mr. .Stimson (the Secretary of War), and others. Later lie told friends that, he was roundly lectured at the While House ami the War Department for carrying a message about politics. Furthermore, severe criticism was expressed against General MacArthur for sending such a message.

“While the political section of the Government, was expressing this form of displeasure, the military section also produced critics who deprecated General MacArthur’s communique as unsoldierly and llambuoyant, and analysed unfavourably his military dispositions in the battle of Bataan. It is perfectly possible for those who are

accused of a iwlitical grudge against General MacArthur to produce professional soldiers who believe that he should not have a command of paramount importance. “Mr. Stimson’s denial that the Solomons is a navy show indicates that General MacArthur’s political disclaimer has not wholly corrected his relations with Washington.”

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19421031.2.46

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Dominion, Volume 36, Issue 31, 31 October 1942, Page 7

Word count
Tapeke kupu
980

WAR PROBLEMS IN PACIFIC Dominion, Volume 36, Issue 31, 31 October 1942, Page 7

WAR PROBLEMS IN PACIFIC Dominion, Volume 36, Issue 31, 31 October 1942, Page 7

Help

Log in or create a Papers Past website account

Use your Papers Past website account to correct newspaper text.

By creating and using this account you agree to our terms of use.

Log in with RealMe®

If you’ve used a RealMe login somewhere else, you can use it here too. If you don’t already have a username and password, just click Log in and you can choose to create one.


Log in again to continue your work

Your session has expired.

Log in again with RealMe®


Alert