The Dominion. SATURDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1942. NEW ZEALAND’S WAR FRONT

Dominion, Volume 36, Issue 31, 31 October 1942, Page 6

The Dominion. SATURDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1942. NEW ZEALAND’S WAR FRONT

In the light of the news which is filtering out of the Solomon Islands battle area it would be idle to ignore the increasing tenseness of the situation. While it is to be noted that official accounts are still meagre, thus denying us a reliable picture of the trend of operations as a whole, reports received in the last day or two from presumably well-informed sources agree on several important points. Qne is that the Japanese have moved larger naval forces into the area and appear to be extending their bid for local mastery of thesea into the waters south-eastward of the Solomons. Another is that the enemy positions in the islands north of Guadalcanal remain strong, and their movements unchecked (though no doubt impeded) by constant United Nations air attacks. A third is that the position of the American holding force on Guadalcanal, with its important advance air base, is giving cause for some anxiety. Obviously the vital factor in the struggle is sea mastery, either by naval power, or from the air, or both. The United Nations forces on Guadalcanal must depend, for the bulk of the reinfol cements, additional equipment and supplies they need either now or eventually, on sea transport. This necessary contact may still be maintained, but the available evidence suggests that, to say the least, there is considerable difficulty in maintaining it adequately. On the other hand it is known that the enemy has been able on more than one recent occasion to land large numbers of men, also heavy war material, on the island. The assumption, therefore, must be that the Japanese have established by numerical weight a temporary advantage at sea. No doubt all possible steps are being taken to rectify this position; but this may occupy some little time, and meanwhile the task for the land forces is to hold on grimly against the increased enemy pressure, and for the aerial arm —reinforced from every available striking base—to keep hammering at the Japanese concentrations and supply lines. The Solomon Islands form New Zealand’s war front. This country is the main base in the South Pacific Area of the United Nations, war operations. The present struggle in the Solomons is to determine whether we or the enemy shall dominate the island group as well as the waters in the north-western extremity of the South Pacific Area. Our success in the Solomons means the possession of a stepping-stone toward the. north—toward our aim of regaining all enemy-occupied territories. Failure in the Solomons would mean longer security for the enemy, as well as his re-establishment at a point which he undoubtedly looks upon as a stepping-stone toward our South Pacific supply lines and bases. Thus the present situation concerns not simply the Solomons but the area as a whole, and this country in particulai. It calls for an acute.and sturdy awareness on the part of all New Zealanders of the need for the maximum of direct impetus and speedy effort in co-operation with our Allies. An additional and important step toward this fuller and more direct co-operation is represented in the announcement, published this morning, that the New Zealand Army and air forces in the Souti Pacific Area have passed under the control of the United States Command. The full implications of this change have yet to be made clear. For example, the authority of the United States Command is not adequately defined by the 'Minister of Qefence insofar as it relates to his statement that “the movement of New Zealand forces of all three Services out of New Zealand for any new commitment was a matter which required the approval of the New Zealand Government. . . .” However, the broad purpose of the move is plain enough, and it will be accepted as a logical means of bringing about closer consolidation of war planning and militaiy effort. The need, in conjunction with this, is for an intensification and speeding-up of all national processes which combine to form our own share of the combined United Nations effort. In the various depaitments of our military development, our manpower adjustment, pur industrial efficiency and production, our civil defence organization, we must re-examine to detect and eliminate weakness. We must remove barriers which make for inadequacy and, above all. rid ourselves of procrastination and needless delay in the implementation of our vaiious plans This last has been in the past—and still remains—a pernicious trait in our national war effort. We waste too much time. The Pacific situation is such that time is becoming increasingly valuable. We must recognize that value, and by so doing leave nothing to chance that we are capable ourselves of creating or performing, or helping to create or perform. ,