The Dominion. MONDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1942. ARMY TRAINING PROBLEMS

Dominion, Volume 36, Issue 26, 26 October 1942, Page 4

The Dominion. MONDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1942. ARMY TRAINING PROBLEMS

The informative review of Army training problems in New Zealand, given by the General Officer Commanding (Lieut.-General Puttick) last week in the course of an interview, will have been keenly studied by the public. It throws helpful and revealing light on several questions which have bearing on the vital matter of the country’s military efficiency—questions- which are being widely discussed among the people'with a steadily-growing appreciation of their significance. For some time past there has existed a widespread feeling that the capacity of the Army organization to train men rapidly and thoroughly has not kept pace with the expansion of the forces in this country. General Puttick has pointed to some, of the difficulties and delays encountered in increasing this capacity. At the same time he has disclosed certain weaknesses, which call for remedy. It seems apparent that systematic military training of the modern, intensive type has been interfered with to a considerable extent by. the diversion of recruits to constructional and other work. Admittedly, as General Puttick has emphasized, this work has been urgent, and either directly or. indirectly essential to the Army itself. Surely it is necessary, however, that expedients of this kind be regarded as emergency measures, to be replaced with the least possible delay by an efficient grouping of labour for the expansion of Army establishments and facilities. This is a responsibility for the national administration. If civil labour cannot cope with military requirements, the Army must) in an emergency fend for itself with its own manpower. But such a course, is a makeshift, and after three years of war organization this Dominion'should be beyond makeshifts. The military authorities of New Zealand are confronting a training task which has grown to very formidable dimensions. They should be freed to concentrate upon it, in order that the risk of troops’ being engaged in battle before they have had the necessary training—a risk which the authorities have found themselves obliged, to take—be reduced to a minimum. It is time the establishment strength of the Army in New Zealand were fixed and adhered to, in order that the necessary proportion of military. and civilian manpower may be ( attained. The G.0.C., speaking from a military standpoint, has said that the only safe aim is “the maximum” of recruitment. But for efficiency’s sake the maximum must be balanced. The ideal must necessarily be, z not the largest numerical force which it is possible to assemble, but the largest which can be efficiently trained, and economically serviced by the remainder of the community —maintained with a compact national effort rid of constant interchange, overlapping and hindrance. . Interference with the development of the Army training system either by the obtrusion of sectional policies or individual interests will have to be eliminated from the military scene. Once a given establishment has been fixed, with due regard for the balance of essential; national effort, it should be the duty and right of the General Staff to carry through, its programme free from all handicap, and with the organized support of the community as a whole. This programme, moreover, should—and indeed must- —come under the personal supervision of the General Officer Commanding, who should be freed from the multitude of formal and social obligations unthinkingly thrust .upon him. These conventions, dating, from peace time, have no legitimate place in Army leadership in war. The G.O.C. has an immense field of authority, which, as he says, no one man could exercise in any detail. But his continual oversight of the Army developmental and training programme as a whole is looked to by the people, who would understand and appreciate his refusal to permit matters of secondary ccfnsequence, including the harassment of administrative politics-, to lessen or hinder-his contacts with his--Command.