The Dominion FRIDAY, AUGUST 7, 1942. WAR STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC

Dominion, Volume 35, Issue 265, 7 August 1942, Page 4

The Dominion FRIDAY, AUGUST 7, 1942. WAR STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC

For the second time in a fortnight Mr. W. M. Hughes, the veteran member of the Commonwealth Advisory War Conned, has uttered strong criticism of the military policy of the Western Pacihc Command. In doing this he has taken upon himself a serious responsibility, for his words cannot fail to cause considerable public anxiety, and the fostering of such a feeling is justified only if his accusation that Australian military leadership “lacks vision, initiative, co-ordina-tion and control” is very soundly based. Such a state of affairs would certainly call for a popular clamour for remedial change. Too much is at stake for national tolerance of undue hesitancy or ineptitude to be anything better than national weakness. But does this state ot affairs exist? In their endeavour to judge the military position the people are given only the interpretation placed on it by Mr. Hughes and those who arc echoing his strictures. The Western Pacihc Command of necessity is silent. . It is true that the Japanese have taken another step in their drive to the south, by establishing themselves, on the northern side of Papua and commencing a campaign of jungle infiltration with tie apparent object of winning possession of the whole peninsula, including Port Moresby. It is therefore correct to say that, in this area at least, the enemy retains the initiative. This may be disappointing to a people impatient for aggressive counter-action, but it is not necessarily a sign that leadership of the United Nations military effort is faulty. On the contrary it may be the evidence of a patient prudence which will have rich eventual reward. In Australia, as eisewhere in the great base camps of the Allies, offensive power is being steadily assembled. The task is enormous geographically as well as materially, and the Axis coterie has attempted to delay it by creating the need for diversions of supply to far-scattered points. But it is going ahead. Precipitate offensive action from Australia or anywhere else, launched before Allied power could be adequately developed, might be a mistake so costly as to be out of all proportion to present concessions to the enemy/ A hasty, half-prepared move north of Australia might well be a false step for which Japan and her still-powerful navy are waiting and hoping. . . , A , Recent sectional demands in both Britain and Austiaha foi eally large-scale offensives have one unreasonable thing in common. Those who voice them speak as though current activities were wholly defensive.' This is a ridiculous and mischievous concept. Britain is waging an unprecedently heavy fight on many fronts—notably in the air and sea. Her North African campaigns, have been—and still are —distinguished by aggressiveness, tenacity and determination. In Northern Australia the United Nations Command, far from sitting down and leaving the initiative to the enemy” (Mr. Hughes’s previous outburst), are conducting constant, hard-hitting air operations. Ko one outside the Western Pacific Command can be aware of the effect of these attacks, or the circumstances that dictate the present limits of our operations. Talk which lacks this background of essential knowledge should be suspqct.