A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 35, Issue 257, 29 July 1942, Page 4

A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Attack On Turkey? WHAT MIGHT THE AXIS SEEK TO GAIN Reports from Europe speak of the massing of German forces iu Bulgaria, a move that seems to be causing perturbation in Turkey. If this gathering of troops is in preparation for a further blow toward the treasures of the Middle East it will only be a move that many experts, in their estimates of the campaign, possibilities of 1942 made during the tyast winter, fully canvassed as within the realms of possibility. Two lines of’advance in addition to those prophesied and already in progress—through southern Russia and through Egypt—were suggested. One was that an air-borne assault ou Cyprus, Syria, and Palestine might be launched in parallel with the Caucasus and Egypt attacks. The other foreshadowed a land assault on European Turkey, to be carried across the Dardanelles and Bosphorus to Anatolia and thence to Syria, ‘ Iraq, and Persia, taking the Caucasus iu the rear as well as attacking it from the Ukraine. Advantages Of Move

What would the Axis gain by such an attack on Turkey? There are several answers to this, if the attack should succeed to the extent that control of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus passes to the Axis, then units of the Italian Navy, with such units of the German U-boat forces as have been sent to the Mediterranean, could be passed through to assist in nullifying the supremacy of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, a severe thorn in the Axis side.

In the second place, the attack ou Turkey would call for support to' her from the United Nations forces in the Middle East. It would be, iu effect, the opening of a second front against Egypt as well as agaiust Russia. Iu preparation for such an Axis move the Ninth Army was constituted and stationed in Syria, Palestine, and Iraq. Rommel’s success in Cyren'aica served to weakeu this army, since some of its strength had to be diverted —the Second N.Z.E.F. was among the forces moved —to reinforce the Eighth Army for the defence of Alexandria. Attitude Of Turkey

One of the most reassuring pieces of news that came from the Middle East in the past few mouths was that of the choice of M. Saracoglu to succeed to the Prime Ministership of Turkey when M. Saydam died. M. Saracoglu was prominently associated with the completion of the accord be- • tween Great Britain and Turkey, and has always been favourable to the Allies, and both he and the President, General Inonu, have shown little disposition to fall for Nazi blandishments or bluster. At the time of the Axis success in Cyrenaica there was some apprehension as to its effect on the Turkish strength to withstand pressure from Berlin and Rome, but this seems to have beeu unjustified, aud the successful recovery of the Eighth Army on the El Alamein defence line and its assumption of the initiative seems to have stiffened Turkish opinion against the Axis. A cogent point in the consideration of the position of Turkey seems to be -the state of its army. The Turkish soldier is a good fighter—our men who fought on Gallipoli know that. But the outbreak of war in the Mediterranean in 1940 found the Turkish troops and the Turkish Air Force poorly placed for modern fighting equipment. How far this has been remedied in the interim is difficult to estimate. Great Britain has certainly managed to spare some equipment from her sorely strained resources, aud a lendlease agreement was conceded to Turkey by the United States. The amount landed in Turkey cannot be large, however, aud it would appear that the United Nations forces iu the Middle East would have to provide most of the armoured units aud air units necessary for a successful defence of the Asian shores of the vital Aegean-Black Sea link. Thus, at the expense of a further straining of resources on the internal lines of communication, the Axis, by attacking Turkey, might feel the riskworth while for the extra strain placed on the already strained United Nations forces in the Middle East.