A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 34, Issue 45, 16 November 1940, Page 10

A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Italy Across The Sea

ARMIES IN JEOPARDY

Apart from the minor fighting in the Kassala-Gallabat region on the SudanAbyssinia frontier, military operations in Africa appear to be at a standstill. There is still no indication of any offensive by Marshal Graziani, who has been marking time at Sidi Barron! for about eight weeks. It is quite possible that ho will have to “hold Ins horses" for a long time. The Italian offensive against Greece has gone awry ami. on present appearances, it looks as though the enemy may soon be very much on the defensive in Albania. For the present, the centre of gravity in the Middle East has swung across to the north side of the Mediterranean.

In any case, Italy is now committed to two considerable military operations overseas. Even before the Albanian, adventure. Italy was faced with the prospect of attempting a major offensive from Libya while not holding command of the sea across which supplies and reinforcements had to pass. Now, she is confronted with the equal-ly-grave problem of waging a campaign against Greece, while her only line of communication —that across the Adriatic —Is open to continual attack by British naval and air forces. The destruction at Taranto of one-half of Italy’s battle fleet assumes grave proportions in view of her military commitments- across the sea. The War In Africa Discussing the position in Northern Africa, a writer in the “Manchester Guardian” says most of the environmental advantages are on the side of the defending forces. Egypt and Ethiopia, strongholds of British ami Italian power respectively, are each enclosed and largely isolated from the continental interior by great stretches of desert or poor scrubland where an invading army will find it impossible to live on the country. So far each of these strongholds has proved to be easily defensible, if we except sporadic air-raiding on both sides. In this war, as in those of the past which have involved the Mediterranean Basin, the Lower Nile Valley offers the richest territorial prize. A victorious Power would not merely gain control of the only land in Northeast Africa capable—-because of »adequate water supplies—of intense cultivation throughout the entire year, but would also dominate the canal-and-sea route to the Indian Ocean, thereby strangling the British seaway to the Far East. Italy’s Weak Points Fortunately the enemy’s position is weakened by - the wide separation from each other of the two groups of Italian colonies, and the Anglo-Egyp-tian Sudan interposes a wedge nearly 900 miles wide between the Libyan and Ethiopian frontiers. Moreover, the recent extension of Italian rule over Ethiopia has not much affected the strategical situation because of the enemy’s complete dependence on the home country for reinforcements of men and all war material. No part of Italian Africa produces, even in time of peace, sufficient food and other commodities for the resident European population; virtually everything must be brought across the Mediterranean, and particularly is this true of petrol, coal, and manufactured goods of all types. The Italian Empire was till 1936 an empire of desert only, and the annexation of Ethiopia has been too recent to permit of any important agricultural or industrial development. Italy has found that her air fleet cannot solve her geographical problem. Transport planes are of little use for the carriage of heavy military equipment in view of the enormous distances involved. From the main Italian bases on the coast of Libya to Adis Ababa, capital of Italian East Africa, nearly 2000 miles have to be traversed. Add to this, the difficulty of transporting supplies from Italy to Libya, in the teeth of a relentless naval blockade by Britain, and the reinforcement of armies in .Italian East Africa is. seen to l>e a virtual impossibility. Ethiopia is besieged, and its Italian garrison will be starved out unless Mussolini is able to conquer Egypt. Meanwhile the attack on the Nile Valley hangs lire, and the delay is attributable 'to the difficulties which geography imposes. In face of the British Navy’s supremacy In the Mediterranean—which is now assured—the Italian army in Libya, certainly not less than a quarter of a million strong, cannot be regularly supplied from Italy. Its very size is a burden. Being intended mainly for offensive action, it is too large for garrison purposes only, yet as soon as it moves eastward toward Egypt its problems of supply are multiplied. The Libyan Desert Much the greater part of Libya is irreclaimable desert, and its vast size on the map must not deceive us as to its small economic value. Italian military power there is concentrated within the narrow Mediterranean fringe where a small winter rainfall is received. . • The narrow but eomparatixelj fertile northern margin of Libya provides the obvious route, with the most abundant supplies of water, for an army moving on Egypt, but its maritime position has given the Britisli fleet full opportunity, of hammering its lines of communication. Consequently the enemy s strategy doos not rule out one or two alternative routes farther south, m the desert proper and outside the ■ ran ire of naval guns. All routes to the Xile arc depeuucm upon the oases which occur but rare.y throughout tlw sand*’ and 'vaterle.-.' Libyan Desert. Between ihe'oa>es stretch vast areas of sand-dune, a terrain which provides the hardest peestifle going for an army. and. becauw the going would be slow, waler would have to be carried. In lilc the two main routes the distances between the oases are excessive lot a large, heavily equipiied atm.'- ly>iiorthern and most feasible wav bo from Jaghbub to Suva, just ins urn the desert frontier of L'-r.'Tt- . ou liy various possible tracks lo,na b the Nile downstream from A.slut, the .distance from the Uibymi 1 . 1 ’ 01 ’. tl 5' Iho Nile by this route us nppi oxim.itel.500 mi less. Campaign In Danger

The argument ba.- considered only the Physical difficulties confronting an Italian offensive adventure. AAe na\e not taken into account the strength el the Auglo-Eyptian defending lorces Yet. that strength will grow till by ite verv counter-offensive power the Italian attempt will be doomed, even if tlie enemy’s overseas and tranr>-de-isert. communications were more secure than they actually are. The events of Hie last few days haxe shown in the most decisive manner that Italy's ovenseas communications are in the gravest danger of being cut completely.’ British sea power in the Mediterranean doubtless will ll °cide the fate of Italy's armies in Albania as well as in Africa