A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR
North African Scene
DEFENCES OF TUNIS AND LIBYA
Strung along the northern seaboard of Africa, between the Mediterranean Sea and the encroaching Sahara Desert, are a batch of territories owned, with the exception of Egypt, by European Bowers.
Always important considerations in any strategical conception, these territories today attract particular attention because of the present doubt about Italy's, intentions. Viewing the position in this light interest centres in the Italian colony of Libya, and the two States which are on either side, French Tunis in the east, Egypt in the west.
Through Tunis and Libya, Mr. G. L. Steer, author of “Judgment on German Africa,” made a tour early last year, and his conclusions are embodied in his latest book, "A Date in the Desert” (Hodder and Stoughton). One of the prime reasons for his tour was to discover what he could of the military preparations in Tunis and Libya. Importance Of Tunis
For France, Tunis is a country of the greatest strategical importance, as it disputes with Sicily and the Italian island of Pantellaria the command of the “waist” of the Mediterranean, the narrowest point of that sea. This partly explains—Tunis is a profitable colony as well—why the French are exceedingly well prepared to defend it against any possible attack from Libya. Backbone of the defences is the Mareth Line, not a second Maginot Line, but constructed with regard to the force of the possible threat that could be brought against it. Flanking and guarding this deep defensive zone, which is partly on high ground overlooking the plain across which attackers woiilB have to approach, are. forts of great strength, with gun positions and men’s quarters hollowed out of the hillside rock so as to be protected against air attack.
Powerful Forces Mr. Steer, not unnaturally, did not discover how many troops the French had in this zone. His conclusion was that thev probably exceeded the number that Italy, with due regard for Libya’s Egyptian frontier, could throw against the defences. He found the French troops, mostly colonials, with a heavy quota of French officers, showing every sign of great efficiency Moreover, Tunisia has a great superiority over Libya in means of communication. Its only inferiority, he found, wab in aircraft. “When one sums all the factors, one s last, impression is that an attack on Tunisia, defended as she is today, would be the final act of an imbecile.”
Defences Of Libya Going on to Libya, the author found that the Italians had also strongly fortified a line of mountains obliquely facing the French fortifications, aud that, for the French to attack them would be a very formidable task. Nearer the coast there are fortresses and a defensive line, “breakable, perhaps,” at one point. lie concedes that the Italian defensive scheme is clever, though it requires a far greater outlay of men and materials than the French one, partly because the coastal gap is twice as long as that which the French have to guard. Nevertheless, Tripoli is not far from Italy aud reinforcements could be obtained overnight. Everywhere along this frontier region Italian preparations were .for defence rather than attack. The ground is too hard for entrenching as the French have done. Instead the Italians have groups of artillery fortresses and anti-aircraft platforms. The fortifications are positional rather than continuous, and make up for lack of cover by excellent communications between the various points in the line. Egyptian Frontier
On the other hand, on Libya’s frontier with Egypt the traveller found defensive preparations not nearly so highly developed as those on the other frontier. Clearly the Italians were not preparing for a land attack from Egypt. On the question of whether Italy was preparing for an attack some day against Egypt, Mr. Steer decided on the signs he saw there against the near possibility of such an offensive, with the proviso that the Italians had perfected themselves in speedy mass manoeuvres, thus allowing for a rapid change in the situation if they thought it necessary.
In addition, an attack on Egypt once the first fortified oasis was taken, would entail an advance over 400 kilometres of waterless desert to the principal Egyptian fortress of Mersa Matruh. Question Of Abyssinia
Viewing the matter from another angle, Mr. Steer points out that “if Italy is dragged into war by the Reich, her first objective must be to save the garrison and the Imperial glory of Ethiopia from destruction by land and sea blockade and native rebellion. Whether she likes it or not, she can only save Ethiopia through Egypt.” Among Italians on the spot, Mr. Steer found no desire for war with Egypt, though the decision, if it ever came, would not be theirs to make. “It (such an attack) can be paralysed, and therefore, given the goodwill and good sense of Marshal Balbo (Governor of Libya), the danger of it. may never arise, if more white troops are injected into Egypt and in particular if the aviation at the disposal of Egypt is enlarged to the level of its interesting and bloodless task.” Young Germans The Worst The Germans sent to live in Warsaw since the German conquest can bo di-' vided into two groups, those between 35 anil -15, and those younger. The younger people arc bold and brutal The older, some of whom have been in Poland before, are inclined to be more lenient, says a Polish newspaper published in Paris. Many of these latter take care to behave with propriety in their requisitioned homes and frequently remind the Poles that they hope their conduct will be remembered when the day conies that they must leave.
'.Phis group is convinced that: Germany will lose the war. They are pessimistic. They are often heard discussing the situation when they think they may safely talk. Their remarks show that they do not expect to be long in Poland. One man remarked that he was in the German Army of occupation at the close of the other war and a washerwoman disarmed him then; he wondered who ’would do it this time.
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Dominion, Volume 33, Issue 192, 10 May 1940, Page 8
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1,018A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR Dominion, Volume 33, Issue 192, 10 May 1940, Page 8
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