The Dominion THURSDAY, MAY 9, 1940. MR. CHAMBERLAIN AND HIS CRITICS

Dominion, Volume 33, Issue 191, 9 May 1940, Page 8

The Dominion THURSDAY, MAY 9, 1940. MR. CHAMBERLAIN AND HIS CRITICS

Air. Chamberlain in his further statement on the operations i Norway has added little to what he has said previously. In certain respects, however, he has.made clearer the circumstances under which E’expidita decided upon., and the factors.» uch compekd the withdrawal from the Trondheim area. The British Government in the first instance could not embark upon this enterprise on its own initiative. It was obliged to wait until it was asked a ndffiecal when it came was an appeal for assistance only fhe Bntish exp e tinn had therefore to make the best of a situation in which me Norwegian Government itself had been taken completely by surprise and its armed forces placed at a disadvantage. So far as the Trond heim effort was concerned, this was made in response to anurge request from Norway which, as Mr. Chamberlain pointe o , hardly be refused without inviting the suggestion that British con centration in Narvik alone was dominated by concern about supplies of ore for the Allies rather than for the interests of Norway. From the general tone of the debate it seems that the impressions in the minds of the Prime Minister’s critics was that a great opportunity had been lost through inadequate appreciation of the difficulties involved in the task and of the requirements of the situation. There are many instances in British military histo y enterprises having missed fire through failure for some reason or other to launch them with sufficient weight to capitalize_the success and follow it up. In these cases the difficulties of the task have been greatly augmented by the opportunity thus given the enemy of strengthening his position, and by the additional call upon our troops and resources in order to recover the leeway. The Norwegian expedition, it seemed to them, was another typical instance. But against this is the point made by Mr. Chamberlain, which cannot be lightly thrust aside, that the Allies in existing circumstances could not afford to risk a serious dispersal of. their forces by enlarging an expedition primarily designed to reinforce the Norwegians in threatened areas into a fully-organized major enterprise, lhat is a question which obviously impinges upon the general strategy o the war, and Mr. Chamberlain’s contention .that it would have been imprudent to have been committed to the withdrawal, of large forces from their present strategical distribution for operations in Norway is supported by the evidence of increasing tension in the Mediterranean and the disturbing news from Holland. . It is no doubt true that as one result of the Norwegian episode, the enemy has been enabled to strengthen his position, for the time being at all events, on a flank of the Allies. From this he must necessarily be expelled sooner or later, and at the cost of correspon ingly greater effort. In addition, the prestige of the Allies has undoubtedly suffered a setback in countries where it was desirable that confidence in their strength and efficiency should be maintained and stimulated. The speeches in the House indicated that tlus moral reverse was regarded, as a more serious matter than the actual military significance of the withdrawal. Through the somewhat exaggerated optimism of certain unauthenticated reports of . the operations immediately following the naval successes the public was led to expect further thrilling results, and not unnaturally experienced a shock oi surprise and disappointment at the announcement of the withdrawal. It should assist.people to recover their. sense of proportion to remember that the Germans in this enterprise have suffered most damaging losses in regard to the effects on their naval and merchant shipping resources, and their oosition at sea. These are losses wmen cannot be made good; the moral and material setback to. the Allies, on the other hand, is recoverable. And if one of the direct results of the experience is a sharper edge to the Government’s war poncy and a general tightening-up of the military staff work, that expei lence should be timely, salutary and valuable. It is better that whatever weaknesses exist should be discovered now than later, when the results might be far more serious.