RANDOM NOTES

Dominion, Volume 33, Issue 189, 7 May 1940, Page 6

RANDOM NOTES

Sidelights On Current Events

(By

Kickshaws.)

The Norwegian episode, it is claimed, was a side show. Maybe that’s why it has become so important as an Aunt Sally. « # * A millionaire says money does not bring happiness. Nevertheless, the imitation is so good only an ex-millionaire can tell the difference. « , » At a recent fire-fighting test at the dry canteen at a certain air centre, the brigade rushed to the wet canteen. Well, that’s a stout save, anyway. “Mr. S. G. Holland, M.P., speaking over the air one evening from a recruiting rally at Auckland, concluded his address with a recent quotation of Winston Churchill's of which I was able to decipher the first and last lines only, the few intervening were lost by distortion. Can you supply them?” says “E.S." “Here is a clue: ‘Each to your duty ... (last) honour the brave.’ Some of the others may have been: *. . . uplift the fallen, succour the weak.’ I would be pleased to have them, they appear fine thoughts.” [Mr. Holland has kindly provided the quotation as follows: —“Come then, let us to the task, to the battle and the toil —each to our part, each to our station. Fill the armies, rule the air, pour out the munitions, strangle the U-boats, sweep the mines, plough the land, build the ships, guard the streets, succour the wounded, uplift the downeast, honour the brave.”—Winston Churchill.]

If the next military geography lesson is to include the Mediterranean, it is perhaps as well to get a bird’s-eye view of this inland lake. Despite the fact that all the rivers of Southern Europe drain into this lake, there is only one outlet. This outlet is quite incapable of disposing of the surplus waters of Europe. The sun deals with the matter almost exclusively. Weather conditions and climate in the Mediterranean are variable, but on the whole the climate is temperate and in the summer it is hot. Sudden and vicious gales are not uncommon at all seasons of the year. Hot damp winds are prevalent, specially from the south. For the last two or three thousand years the Mediterranean has provided a happy hunt-ing-ground for pirates, buccaneers and the like. There must have been more naval engagements in this sea than in any other sea.

Few people appreciate the vast size of the Mediterranean, which is really the largest lake in the world, but so large that it is called a sea. The distance from Gibraltar to Palestine is about 2300 miles. An average ship takes at least a week to get through the Mediterranean. From the point of view of naval strategy, the Mediterranean is a narrow area of water. It is only 600 miles wide in the widest part. There are, moreover, a number of places where narrow constrictions must cause traffic jams or at least naval complications. Italy juts out into the Mediterranean at its centre, causing a serious traffic jam between Sicily and Tunis. The distance is under 100 miles. Moreover, the Italian island of Pantellaria is situated halfway. This island is now an Italian naval base and is heavily defended. It virtually commands this gap, dividing the Mediterranean strategically into two. Malta lies about 180 miles to the south-east of Pantellaria, and for over a century has provided Britain with an important naval base.

Further constrictions occur in the Mediterranean between Sardinia and Algeria, some 800 miles east of Gibraltar. This constriction involves a distance of 200 miles. Italy has two important naval bases on Sardinia at the northern and southern tips. A further constriction occurs between the Island of Crete belonging to Greece, and situated some 400 miles west of Palestine. The gap here is about 200 miles touching Africa at the boundaries of Libya and Egypt. An important Italian naval base has been built at Leros, some. 200 miles north-east of Crete, in the Dodecanese islands, and only 70 miles from ‘ the Turkish coast This Italian naval base partially guards the entrance to the Aegean Sea, and thence to Istanbul and the Black Sea. Even a brief survey of the Italian naval dispositions in the Mediterranean studied in conjunction with the very probable fact that Britain would take naval action in the Black Sea, as well as the Mediterranean, suggests that a naval action or a series of naval actions would be practically sure to occur if Italy was at war with the Allies. * * *

It is no secret that the Italian policy in the Mediterranean is to attempt to cut this sea into two by means of air and naval action based on Pantellaria. The idea is to prevent Allied fleets at either end of the Mediterranean maintaining contact. Moreover, it is hoped to mark off an area to the south of Sicily over which Italy might hope to assume temporary command of the sea with a view to sending supplies by transports to her armies in Africa. On this assumption depends the security of Italian armies in Africa and their subsequent use against Egypt. Italian armies have been formed in Nortn Africa in Libya and Abyssinia. Even in peace time the Libya garrison consisted of 50,000 troops, including motorized units and a powerful air force. Nevertheless, the Italian armies in Libya are confronted on one side by powerful French forces in Tunisia and Algeria, and by a powerful Allied force based on Egypt, Palestine and Syria. It is therefore essential that Italy make secure her sea route to Libya, and the only effective way to do so is to attack the Allied naval fleet. * * *

Before the days of the aeroplane British strategy in the Mediterranean was comparatively simple. The enormously superior British Fleet virtually dominated this sea. The problem has been immensely complicated by the air arm. One must not assume that Italy wouid not be able to cut the Mediterranean in two and gain a local supremacy in the area dominated by Pantellaria. Nevertheless, the air arm alone could not assure this supremacy if the Italian fleet suffered a major reverse. Hitler found in his Norwegian campaign that he could only succeed if he were prepared to resign himself to the loss of his fleet as au effective fighting unit. In much the same way the issues in the Mediterranean might develop along similar lines. There is, however, a difference, because Italian plans and Italian communications to Africa are open to attack from two sides. There are no neutrality complications and unless Tunisia were captured quickly from the French the sea routes are longer and less sheltered. The Allies, moreover, hold the keys to both the doors of the Mediterranean through which Italy must obtain supplies or starve. » • ♦ “I should be very grateful if you would settle an argument. The question to be decided is: Wb<> is t e present New Zealand A grad, cl,_ ...pion cornet player?” says “A h»ew Pipe.” [Mr. A. Morton, Institute for the Blind, Auckland, is the