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A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

Smaller War Cabinet ADVOCACY BY MR. J. L. GARVIN One of the subjects certain to be raised in today’s debate in the House of Commons on the conduct of the war is the question of appointing a small war cabinet. This, according to recent reports, is one of the principal aims of a section of Parliamentary and outside opinion in Britain, as it is felt in some quarters that the present machinery is, in the words of “The Times,” too cumbersome for rapid and vigorous initiative. Supporters of the smaller War Cabinet idea are able to point to a striking precedent from the Great War, Mr. Lloyd George’s War Cabinet, or committee, of five members. When the Great War broke out Lloyd George was Chancellor of the Exchequer. After placing British finance on an impregnable foundation he was appointed to the newly-created office of Minister of Munitions, and as a result of his leadership infused new drive into the production of armaments. All this time his views on the conduct of the war were growing more definite, ■his main contention being that so large a war committee as then existed could not bring about victory. When he laid these views before Mr. Asquith a crisis was precipitated and the upshot was that Lloyd George, became Prime Minister. Lloyd George’s Policy He was then in command of his own war policy and the small war committee which he forthwith appointed is. held by history to have fully carried out the hopes of its founders. It sat from day to day, very often twice a day, and practically took the place of Cabinet. The result is generally held to have been a general quickening up of war decisions and a more decisive control of the whole machine of government. Later Lloyd George pressed to fruition his advocacy of unified control of the Allied armies. The call from some sections of public opinion for a smaller War Cabinet, as reported in the cables, has not grown out of the Norwegian affair, though this has doubtless led supporters of the scheme to press it more firmly. For some time a school of thought has held that such a concentration of control is desirable. Air Supremacy Drive

A strong supporter of the small War Cabinet has been Mr. J. L. Garvin, editor of the “Observer,” London. In this journal he has lately devoted much space to vigorous advocacy of two things, first, the creation of such a Cabinet and secondly, the devotion by the Allies of every possible effort to the building up of a clear supremacy over Germany in the air. “Air supremacy, added to sea-power and the blockade,” he recently proclaimed, “is the Allies’ ntaster-key. The Mon has wings. The lion must have wider wings."

One of those who believes the Allies must wrest the initiative from the Germans, Mr. Garvin holds that to do this the Allies cannot have too much air power. Preponderance here he sees as the means of turning defence into attack on the Western Front and, in addition to sea-power, of rendering Britain Itself as impregnable as it has been in past wars. “Total Warfare”

Great as Britain’s rearmament effort has been, Mr. Garvin argues that it must be greater, in the full conception of “total warfare” on the industrial side. Another example of this feeling that the very maximum effort was necessary was seen recently when, though Sir John Simon’s Budget reached hitherto unheard of proportions, it was criticized chiefly because it was felt by many to go not far enough. Mr. Garvin calls for nothing short of Britain’s total effort, a consummation which he claims cannot be reached without the creation of a small War Cabinet, or, as he puts it, a better adaptation of the present system of Government to the urgent needs of a struggle in which every day millions of pounds are expended. To Win'The War To those who say that because Britain has an Inner War Committee of Ministers something like that of Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Garvin argues that it is not at all on the same lines, that it bears no resemblance either in structure or in spirit. He says Mr. Chamberlain’s Inner Committee is twice the size of Mr. Lloyd George’s and that a majority of its members are also hindered with departmental duties. Whether the arguments of Mr. Garvin and those who share his views carry sufficient conviction among others to win their point remains to be seen. In any case this and other ideas of what should be done all go to make even more impressive the acknowledged determination of the British people to carry the war to a successful conclusion. That is the dominating thought, even though there may be different views as to how it can be most speedily accomplished.

R.A.F. Pilots.... ’When the new R.A.F. pilot reaches the passing-out standard of the last war, lie is still only in the preliminary stages of his modern .braining.

The difference is one not of men, but of machines. The aeroplane is now so mudli more complicated that the pilot recruit must spend more time in learning its make-up and its ways, and today more than in the Great War he learns the essentials on the ground. The R.A.F. is continually testing “gadgets” designed to reproduce for the pupil on the ground the conditions of flight. The pupil must understand his 42 inistruimeuts and must drill himself to use his controls without hesitation and without mistake in a dummy cockpit. Similarly, the air gunner practises in power-turrets on the ground. He may try to train his sights on u spotlight travelling round the walls of a darkened hangar or pot away at clay pigeons with a shotgun. .... Have Thorough Training

“Quality,” the aim oil’ the li.A.F.’s training ecnitres, is being achieved. Though the aerodromes and the air above them are more congested than they were before the war, the ratio between the number of accidents and tlie iiinniber of tljung hours remains unchanged.

The accuracy of the R.A.F.'s longdistance flights over Germany and Poland is another testimony to the tho roughness of its training and navigation. As for tlie youths now entering the training schools, an expert with 28 years’ experience said recently, “Their morale is every bit as good as was tiuil: of the Service in Hie last war, and 1 think their intelligence and education are belter. We are getting a very good typo indeed.”

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19400507.2.38

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Dominion, Volume 33, Issue 189, 7 May 1940, Page 6

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,085

A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR Dominion, Volume 33, Issue 189, 7 May 1940, Page 6

A BACKGROUND OF THE WAR Dominion, Volume 33, Issue 189, 7 May 1940, Page 6

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