RANDOM NOTES

Dominion, Volume 33, Issue 188, 6 May 1940, Page 8

RANDOM NOTES

Sidelights On Current Events

(By

Kickshaws.)

We are beginning to suspect that what constitutes a buffer State is one that, has a biffer State beside it. « * * It seems just as important to guarantee free speech us it is to guarantee its quality. It seems a foregone conclusion that if the Statue of Liberty were redesigned today a money-box would replace that torch. * • ♦ “The Canadian soldiers on arrival in England gave four cheers, not three, as we do when giving cheers. I am wondering if there is any particular significance in it,” says “A.W.” [lt is a Canadian custom to give three cheers and then “The Tiger.” The Tiger is a fourth cheer which Is bigger than all the other cheers, and is a mark of especial enthusiasm. It is an American custom as well as Canadian.] Whether or no the news from Norway will encourage Mussolini to take sides with Hitler, there are still factors which may stay his hand. If one disregards matters of internal controversy as between Mussolini, his King and the Pope, there are still factors outside Italy which cannot be ignored. Whatever the temporary setbacks in Norway may do to encourage Mussolini, one fact has emerged from the Norwegian operations. The German navy is now too small to 'be a factor in the war. The Allies, therefore, are able to confront Mussolini with naval forces many times stronger than his own. The situation in the Mediterranean is by no means the same as the situation in the Skagerrak. Italy projects into the Mediterranean at approximately its centre. Even if her air force could keep local command of the areas immediately round Italian naval bases this would not suffice to prevent a long-range blockade at botlends of the Mediterranean. ’ ♦ # *

So long as the Allies can prevent supplies reaching Italy, the situation in the Mediterranean must be precarious for the Italians. Without ready access to world supplies by the only practicable route via the Mediterranean, Italian war efforts could not continue indefinitely. The Allies, therefore, have it witbin their power to cut off supplies of oil, rubber, food, coal, iron, and many other essentials In which Italy is not self-sufficing. The fuel problem alone must give Mussolini cause to think. Admittedly, there must be vast supplies of fuel in Italy, but it is usually impracticable to store more than six months’ war supply. After that period Italy would have to lean on Germany more and more at a lime when Germany herself would be unable to render effective help. This becomes obvious when it is realized that the entire fuel supplies from Europe and Russia are insufficient for the conduct of a major war on the part of Germany. Without fuel an air force is impotent, and a navy paralysed.

At one time Hitler appears to have toyed with a plan to co-operate with Italy. The plan was for Germany to advance eastward along the well-known continental land routes toward Turkey. Italy would support this by an advance along the Mediterranean and African coasts. The pincers would meet in the East, biting off large chunks of Turkey, Syria and Palestine. These areas would then be used as a jumping-off place for an attack on the oil areas of Mesopotamia, thence onward to India. The plan gives full scope for the use of aeroplanes, except in the Mediterranean areas, where it would be impossible for Italy to move without fighting a naval engagement. Moreover, the plan is based on the assumption that reserves of fuel must be stored sufficient to supply the armies and navies till Mesopotamia falls. Meanwhile Mussolini appears to have produced a noticeable reaction in the disposition of Allied forces merely by shaking his fist.

There are further problems which Mussolini must consider before he commits himself to a war< against the Allies. He has large forces at the end of long sea communications which have yet to be proved to be invulnerable. In this connexion it is timely to point out that the German sea route to Oslo has yet to prove itself over a long period of time. The greatest problem which confronts Mussolini is his recently acquired Empire in Ethiopia. That area is far from pacified. Any break with Italy might be the sign for risings and incessant trouble which would be extremely difficult to suppress. Italian chances of sending troops via the Suez Canal are very slender. Moreover, powerful Allied forces in Egypt and the neighbourhood make a swift descent on Egypt out of the question. One may assume that Mussolini will be very reluctant to deny himself his recently acquired empire snatched at such a huge cost from the Ethiopians. * ,

There is another factor that Mussolini must consider before he takes the plunge against the Allies. If he throws in his lot with Hitler the Balkans will boil over, Turkey will permit British naval vessels access to the Black Sea. The Russian oil route to Germany and Italy will be in danger, and the entire course of subsequent operations must be recast. It is clear, therefore, that there are many formidable considerations upon which Mussolini must reflect before he takes a step which many powerful oppositions in Italy itself consider suicidal and highly risky. Indeed, after a year the disadvantages of the Italian alliance would press themselves upon Hitler or, at any rate, upon the more thoughtful of his advisers. The price of Italian aid eventually may put a load on the German economic machine which it may be quite unable to bear. Nevertheless, the time may not be fat ahead when the Allies will have to call the Italian bluff and get the matter settled one way or the other. *♦ a •

Regarding the claim that, the longest tunnel through which daylight can be seen is situated in Switzerland and is some three miles long, a reader says that under certain conditions it is possible to see daylight through the Otira tunnel which, although straight hasa difference between its two ends of Sot) feet. The matter is complicated by the fact that so-called straight tunnels in reality are curved conforming to the curvature of the earth. There is, therefore a limit to the length of “straight tunnels through which daylight can be seen. The question was referred to Mr. Lusty, Assistant Chief Engineer Railways Department. He kindly advises that the Otira tunnel is about oi miles long. At an eye level of sft. 6m at one entrance the curvature ol the earth would conceal 3ft. 6iu. of the other entrance. A person so situated, therefore, could, see the top or the tunnel which, altogether is 15ft. 6iu. high. Provided conditions were suitable and light refraction did not deflect the rays, it would be possible to see from one end to the other. A cutting of this paragraph will therefore be sent to the editor of the reference book whence Kickshaws obtained the facts.