ITALY'S UNEASY NEUTRALITY

Dominion, Volume 33, Issue 184, 1 May 1940, Page 8

ITALY'S UNEASY NEUTRALITY

The attitude of Italy is still a puzzling feature of the European situation. For the past week various spokesmen, including Signor Mussolini himself, have continued to issue covert threats of the nation s early participation in the war. On the other hand, signs have not been lacking that the Italian Government is still prepared—if not anxious —to reap whatever additional benefits may accrue from its present policy of. uneasy neutrality. What is more, the tone of a speech delivered at Cologne on Monday by the leader of the Nazi Labour Front, Dr. Ley, suggests that Germany is not entirely satisfied with the reality of the Rome-Berlin partnership to which so much 'lipservice has been paid. Ley’s references to the position in the Mediterranean and to “Napoleon the Italian” were incitements and blandishments of an obvious kind. They do not seem consistent with the theory that Italy has a complete understanding with Germany and is simply biding her time till the moment comes for action. At the beginning of last week the Italian Press showed brisk icsentment of the strong terms used by British speakers and writers in describing the backing and filling of Italian diplomacy and propaganda. At the same time, a cold reception was given to a French overture for improved relations between Italy and the Allies-. But no official retort was forthcoming from Rome. Instead, after the lapse of a few days, further references were made by Fascist Ministers and writers to the likelihood of Italy being “drawn into the war,” and fresh warnings were issued to the Italian people that, they must be prepared to take part in the conflict. Signor Mussolini’s speech to the Chamber of Fascists on Saturday was in the same strain. On Monday it was made known in Rome that additional army reservists are being called up; and, at the same time, the semi-official publicist, Signor Gayda, produced an allegation that the Allies were in some way to blame for a Slovene manifesto demanding the return of Trieste to Yugoslavia. All this may be real and menacing, particularly the reference to Yugoslavia. But in the absence of any forthright Italian declaration, or any positive case for grievance against the Allies (outside the January dispute over contraband German coal), there must remain a suspicion that Italy’s immediate foreign policy consists in keeping the kettle of uncertainty on the boil so as to extract every possible concession from Britain and France. This suspicion can only be heightened by the news, published this morning, of a discussion between the British Foreign Secretary and the Italian Ambassador to London on the question of resuming economic negotiations between the two Governments. A “war of nerves” as a preliminary to negotiations of this kind is a familiar enough gambit in present-day European diplomacy. . . Whatever Signor Mussolini’s intentions may be —whether he is playing the part of a shrewd opportunist and salesman of Italy’s nuisance value, or whether he is making the prearranged moves of some secret plan with Germany—the fact remains that the embroilment, of Italy in the war would be, for her, a national calamity, invoking dissension between Church and State, people and policy, King and commoner. It would mean the sacrifice for German aggression’s sake of the strongest position modern Italy has ever attained in the European diplomatic and economic orbits, ft would mean that the undoubtedly magnificent national work done by the Fascist regime since the brave days of the March on Rome would be offered on the altar of a dubious partnership. It would mean, finally, the casting of Italy in a thankless military role as a cover for Germany’s left flank and a champion of the Nazism, which almost the whole of the Balkans thoroughly distrusts. Short of a complete European triumph by the axis Poweis. Italy has everything to lose by the abandonment ol her neutiality. It is difficult to believe that it would be abandoned without heavy pressure and a compelling reason.