The Dominion. MONDAY, MARCH 27, 1939. THE COMMON FRONT

Dominion, Volume 32, Issue 155, 27 March 1939, Page 8

The Dominion. MONDAY, MARCH 27, 1939. THE COMMON FRONT

Strong resentment on the part of the lesser democratic States in Europe against the bullying tactics of the axis Powers, and concern for their future interests and independence should natu rally them to align their policies and fortunes with Britain and Prance, but they are hesitant to make open declarations as to their attitude. Poland, for example, appears reluctant to join the common front movement initiated by the two Western Powers for the defence of democratic freedom. This state of mind is quite understandable. Open defiance of Germany might evoke reprisals involving the loss of territory and privileges originally conferred by the Treaty of Versailles at Gei many s expense. It is quite conceivable that a declaration by Poland of the kind now sought by Britain and France would be regarded by Herr Hitler as justifying instant action. By shock tactics with which we have been made disturbingly familiar, he might seek to regain for Germany what she lost to Poland. A lightning stroke, if successfu , would enable him to consolidate the coup and organize his defences before assistance could be forthcoming from the Western Powers. This, from the Polish standpoint, is a tangible possibility, to be carefully weighed. The temptation to take the short view, to propitiate Germany and accept at face value whatever assurances for the future she is prepared at the moment to give, must be very strong. There can be no question that the gangster methods of the axis Powers has shaken the morale of the less powerful States, and considerable difficulty may be experienced in persuading them to take the longer view that if they do not stand together on a common front now, they may lose all later on. “Divide and conquer” is the basis of GermanoItalian strategy. Preparing the ground by fomenting discontents and creating disunity, they are proceeding by a process of infiltration to gobble up the smaller States piecemeal. Again, the axis Powers, realizing that their position is in danger of being challenged through the growing resentment in other countries at their tactics, might be tempted to anticipate combined action and render the smaller States impotent by unprovoked aggression in order to strengthen their own strategical position in Europe. A common front in which Britain, France, Russia and Poland would be associated for concerted action should enable strong pressure to be applied both on the eastern and western fronts. Poland’s hesitancy and Russia’s attitude of reserve, however, may tempt the axis Powers to regard the danger from the east as somewhat speculative, and to take risks. As Field Marshal Goering once remarked, “We must exploit every opportunity afforded by disunity among our opponents. It will be recalled how the exploitation of this psychology enabled Signor Mussolini to embark upon his Abyssinian enterprise. Divided opinion in Britain, and between Britain and France, together with the demonstrated futility of the League system, encouraged him to draw heavily on Italy’s man-power for the expeditionary forces, and with Germany’s connivance, even leave the Brenner Pass and his northern defences practically depleted of troops. The common front now being organized is therefore not only a measure of safety, but also should have a considerable moral effect upon the dictators. The most serious and definite challenge to their policies is the spirit of democratic unity which is being animated as a result of their methods. The prospect of this being translated into resolute concerted action in defence of cherished liberties hard won and now threatened with destruction may force them to pause and reflect.