The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 9, 1935. PASSCHENDAELE

Dominion, Volume 28, Issue 89, 9 January 1935, Page 8

The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 9, 1935. PASSCHENDAELE

■ » One of the chief results of the publication of the latest volume of Mr Lloyd George’s War Memories in November last was thef outbreak of an animated and at times acrimonious . discussion m Le columns of The Times on the question of responsibility raised bv the author in connection with the British offensive in Flanders in 191/, and particularly with reference to the fighting at Passchendaele. x.. Lloyd George’s comments under this head amounted to a seiiotu indictment of the late Field-Marshal Earl S plan of ca n W - and various correspondents, including General Sir Hubei t Goi L and Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, entered the lists in defence of their former Commander-in-Chief. . • There has been a great deal of controversy at various times m New Zealand and Australia as to who was responsible for the tragedy of Passchendaele—for both countries were heavily involved in the losses The New Zealand and Third Australian Divisions each suffered some 3000 casualties. General Sir Alexander Godley, who commanded the New Zealand Division and is now visiting t.,e Dominion, declared in an address to returned soldiers a Oama,u yesterday that Mr. Lloyd Georges attack on the late Lield-Maishm was “scurrilous and wholly unwarranted.” . But even among highljplaced officers there is a conflict of opinion whether the Field-Mai shal was justified in pressing forward with the attack on 1 asschendaele when it had become apparent, from the state of the weathei and o the ground, that success was by no means certain.- lhe question o responsibility has two issues: that which is concerned with the general strategy of “the Flanders offensive, and the momentous decision to advance on Passchendaele after the rain had converted the ground into a sea of clogging mud. Neither of these can- be satisfacton y determined until one of the'principal witnesses as to the strategy of the offensive, who is also the chief witness to be heard on the Passchendaele attack, has spoken. He is dead, and judgment, should in all fairness, be suspended till his diary, now being prepaied foi th, press, has been published. ■ ' Certain points, however, should be clear to anyone who can vic the attack on Passchendaele as part of the immense perspective of the war. The Flanders offensive of 1917 was impelled by a grave necessity. It had been discussed for months. 1 here had been mutinies in the French Army, the morale of which had become deploiably weakened. The German submarine menace had become so serious that the Admiralty had asked that something should be done by the land forces to clear the Channel ports. There had been disasters on the Italian front, and Russia was in a state of collaps’e. Hence the Flanders offensive was undertaken by the British Army to iclieye the strain on the weakened and demoralised French hues and in general to restore as far as possible the spirit of the. Allies. It openee in the summer, and ended in October with Passchendaele. It wa> a costly campaign as regards casualties, but people are apt to forget tha> right up till the.first days of October the.step-by-step advance planned by the Commander-in-Chief had been highly successful, lhe. battle of Brood'seinde, which preceded Passchendaele, was described at the time as the most decisive of any since the first battle of the/Maine. The German resistance was .crumbling, the German ranks were demoralised, and, on the documentary evidence of the enemy s ow;n High Command in Flanders,'had been forced into fighting a retreating battle to gain time and more favourable ground. Had it not been for the rain there might conceivably have been a different story to tell of Passchendaele. The Field-Marshal was on the brink of a sweeping victory, and it can readily be imagined that he felt so confident of the result of'his next advance, , m spite of the weather, to make a bid for it. But, as General Petain subsequently remarked, “You can fight the Boche, or you can fight the mud; but you cannot fight the Boche and the mud.