OUR AIR WEAKNESS

Dominion, Volume 21, Issue 114, 11 February 1928, Page 24

OUR AIR WEAKNESS

The last report of the Committee ot Imperial Defence contains the following momentous statement: — ‘‘The most important result of this part of the inquiry was to confirm the vital need for a great increase in our Air Forces which had been established in previous inquiries” (writes BrigadierGeneral I’. R. C. Groves in the "Daily Mail”). . . /Vs a result of this Air. Baldwin announced in July 1923 a new air programme, which was to be carried out with “as little delay as possible.”. A member of the Air Staff, who gave a remarkable lecture at the University of Londoi; College a few days ago, confirmed a recent statement that the completion of that programme had been postponed for eight years. In other words, “the vital need” has been, and is being, sacrificed to secondary requirements. The ngt result is that, although this country is spending about £10,000,000 a 7 moiith on National Defence, we still lack, and shall continue to lack for eight years, the first essential for national security—adequate defence in the air. This indefensible policy, which amounts to a one-sided limitation of aerial armaments, is being dictated by political considerations. That is clearly indicated in the above-mentioned lecture, which also shows that our weakness in the air is an open invitation to irretrievable disaster. Official statistics prove that we have to-day but a fraction of the strength in military aircraft of our nearest neighbour, whose Air Force is the accepted standard of measurement. But aerial strength should not be measured in terms of military aircraft alone, for, as a former Government has stated, commercial aviation is readily convertible to war purposes. Our commercial aviation, highly efficient though it is, is insignificant.” We possess to-day a total of but twenty commercial machines, while Germany and France each has many hundreds. Of the 36.636 miles of air routes in operation in Europe, Germany has L4,Bfi2, France 8304, and Great,, Britain 1090. Even if we include the CairoBasra route Great Britain’s total, air route mileage amounts to but 2226.

According to the latest information, Germany’s commercial aircraft have flown on an average 60,000 kilometres — i.e., 37,500 miles—daily during the past summer, as against our daily average of 3170 miles; this includes the CairoBasra service.

Germany ’to-day ranks as a first-class air Power? The military significance of her immense commercial air system is proved by the fact that the German War Office and army commands are represented on the Air Council which controls it. If the swing of the political pendulum should again bring the German. militarists into power we may have to reckon with the aerial strength of Germany, backed by that of Soviet Russia.

It has been argued that numbers of aircraft offer no criterion of comparative national strengths in the air. On the contrary, they offer one of the best criteria available. Obviously an air force, however efficient its ground organisation and flying personnel, could be of little use if, at the outbreak of war it lacked sufficient machines. Nor, since the wastage in air warfare is very great, could it keep the air for long if it were not backed by a large aircraft industry. The British aircraft industry, unlike many of its foreign rivals, is almost entirely dependent upon military orders. Hence our small number of military aircraft shows, not merely our actual weakness in the air. but also that we lack even those potentials for aircraft production which are the first essential for air power. In view of the above considerations, official Coueism in regard to our position in the air is totally unwarranted. It is imperative that we should realise that, despite our desire for peace, the rule of force unfortunately still prevails ness European and Russian expenditure on armaments. Nor should we forget that of all States in the -world we are, for geographical and industrial reasons, the most vulnerable to attack from the air. Hitherto our insular position and naval supremacy have, as in 1914, given us time to prepare. Henceforth the vital time-factor will not be with us but against us