NOT A BAR

Dominion, Volume 20, Issue 56, 30 November 1926, Page 13

NOT A BAR

HOTEL BOTTLE STORE MR. JUSTICE STRINGER DEFINES POSITION Dominion Special. Christchurch, November 29. Because the liquor was sold from a store used only for the sale ol liquor in bottles, and for consumption off the premises, Mr. Justice Stringer allowed the appeal of George Isles, proprietor of the Provincial Hotel, against the decision of Mr. H. 1 • Lawry, S.M., convicting the appellant of a breach of section 30 of the Licensing ■Amendment Act of 1910, in tliat be employed a female in the bottle store, such female not being a registered barmaid. The Magistrate held that the bottle store was a private bar, and stated that, in his opinion, the fact that the liquor sold there was tor consumption off the premises only made no difference, as it was the place of sale, and not the place of consumption which was the determining factor. “The real question at issue is as to the meaning of the word bar as used in section 36 of the Act of 1910,” said His Honour. ‘‘Apart from any statutory definition, the meaning usually attributed to the word ‘bar’ is a place where liquors are sold, and, as a general rule, consumed. Tim bar of a ptiblic-house is, -as we know, strictly speaking, the counter over which liquor is served, and it lias come to be extended to the space in front of it, where the people stand The word has a perfectly well understood meaning. The generally accepted meaning of the word ‘bar’ appears, however, to be modified for the purposes of the Licensing Act by the definition there given of ‘public bar,’ or ‘bar,’ which is, that it means any room, passage, or lobby in any licensed premises open immediately to any streets, etc., wherein the public may enter and purchase liquor.” His Honour said that he had come to the decision that the word “bar,” as used in section 36 of the Licensing Amendment Act, 1910, was not intended to be used according to the strict definition of “bar’ in section 4 of the Licensing Act, 1908. It appeared to him that the object there in view was the prohibition of the employment of females in bars in the ordinary acceptance of that word, viz., places where liquors are sold exclusively, or mainly, for immediate consumption, with a saving clause in favour of certain specified individuals, and of females who had been employed as barmaids before the passing of the Act of 1910. In his opinion, it was not intended to extend the prohibition to all places where sales of liquor were made merely because such places came within the definition of “public bar,” or “bar,” contained in the Act of 1908. That, however, would be the effect if the Magistrate’s -uling were upheld, for all places “where -the public may enter and purchase liquor” must, according to the difinition, be a bar of one sort or the other where such places were licensed premises in respect to which any of the various kinds of licenses were granted under the Act, This, to his mind, would make the section under consideration perilously near to an absurdity,, and would go far beyond what was necessary to remedv the supposed mischief which, he thought, was the employment of barmaids in open bars where liquors were sold for consumption on the premises. No order was made as to costs.