The Dominion WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1921. THE TROUBLE IN EGYPT

Dominion, Volume 15, Issue 80, 28 December 1921, Page 4

The Dominion WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1921. THE TROUBLE IN EGYPT

The outbreak of rioting reported in Egypt takes a 1 more serious aspect because it follows on the collapse of negotiations which were in progress until the middle of last month between the British Government and a delegation representing the Government of Egypt. It was hoped that these negotiations would lead up to an agreement on the lines recommended by the Milner Commission. Under this agreement Egypt would acquire sovereign status, but in doing so would conclude a treaty with Great Britain providing, amongst other things, for the security of Imperial communications. While it is generally agreed that everything in reason ought to be done to satisfy Egyptian national aspirations, the problem involved is exceedingly difficult of solution. It has been urged in some quarters that the only course open to Great Britain is to give the Egyptians an opportunity of making their Government in fact what it already is in theory —a constitutional Government, consisting of the Sultan, an Egyptian Council of Ministers, and an Egyptian National Assembly. The Egyptians, it is pointed out, are not British subjects, “and they have never waived, and we have never denied, their claim to independent nationhood.” These facts are admitted, but it has to be considered, also, that the Egyptian people arc in many respects illprepared to assume independent national status. Under British tutelage they have been lifted out of a state of miserable misrule and national bankruptcy to which they would be more than likely to revert if the guidance and control now exercised by Britain were wholly withdrawn. It is fairly certain, also, that even if the paramount necessity of safeguarding the- Suez Canal as a vital link in Imperial communications did not exist, a native Egyptian Government left entirely to its own devices would soon find' itself in difficul-' ties with other Powers than Britain. Disturbances like those now in progress serve only to delay a settlement satisfactory to Egypt. They also serve,to intensify the serious doubts already raised in regard to the ability of the Egyptians. to manage their own national affairs. Zaghlul Pasha, the prime instigator of the upheaval, is a demagogue whose abilities have been directed rpuch more to inflaming popular passions than to solving national problems. He is said to retain the fervid adhesion not only of the troublesome students, and the rabble of the cities, but of some officials and a vast number of ordinary folk. His influence is far from negligible, but it is exercised within definite limits. Writing some time ago, an Egyptian correspondent of the Manchester Guardian observed that a. review of the situation led one to believe that Zaghlul might not possess all the trumps.

The rabble (the correspondent added) are for any party which incites them to excesses, and their problem is mainly a police problem. A very strong section of the upper and thinking classes have enough political acumen to know that Egypt cannot wisely jump in one year, as Zaghlul would drive it to do, where the maturer races have arrived after three or more centuries of progressive experience. And they would like to see clearly whither they- are going. Tho students, who have been allowed too much license, will certainly prove a serious embarrassment to any future native Government, and there is a tendenev all round, except among the lending Zaghlulites, to favour their repression.

The latest outbreak of the Zaghlul faction is prompted ostensibly by the failure of the recent negotiations in London and the refusal of the British Government to concede complete Egyptian independence.

For the moment, the Egyptian moderates appear to bo out of the running. Their leader is tho Prime Minister, Adly Yeghen Pasha, who headed the delegation to London. Since his return, Adly Pasha has tendered his resignation, although, according to the latest available information, it has not yet been accepted by the Sultan. A refusal by the moderates to co-operate further in laying down thp basis of a firm understanding between Britain and Egypt may for the time being give the extremists a better standing with the mass of the Egyptian people than they would otherwise enjoy. Sooner or later, however, the more intelligent sections of the Egyptian population are bound to recognise that mob violence serves only to weaken their, national claims, and that disorders like those now in progress are in themselves the best justification of the reservations with which the British Government offers to recognise and establish Egyptian sovereignty. Commenting a few weeks ago on the failure of the negotiations with Egypt, the London Times con-

demned the War Office for insisting on the maintenance of troops in the interior, “whereas the demands of security could bo met by stationing them in the Canal zone.” In light of current events, however, even the Egyptian plenipotentiaries who resented the continued presence of British garrisons as incompatible with Egyptian sovereignty may feel constrained to admit that if these garrisons were withdrawn Egypt would stand in serious danger of being reduced to much the same conditions as obtained in Turkey under the infamous regime of the Committee of Union and Progress. It is manifestly in this direction, and not towards the establishment of stable, constitutional government in Egypt, that the agitation of the Zaghlul party tends. It is evidently the first demand of the existing situation that rioting and disorder should be firmly repressed. Viscount Allenby appears to be taking what measures are necessary with vigour and decision, And it is indicated that /Zaghlul is again to be deported, as he was in 1919. After order has been restored Egypt, no doubt, will be offered another opportunity of assuming such powers of selfgovernment as her people arc fitted to exercise.