The Dominion WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 31, 1921. THE ALLIES AND THE NEAR EAST

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 288, 31 August 1921, Page 4

The Dominion WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 31, 1921. THE ALLIES AND THE NEAR EAST

In his latest statement on the subject in the House of Commons, Mr. Lloyd George admitted that the Allies were in a dilemma over Asia Minor, and indicated that the Turks and Greeks were being left “to fight it out” only because no practicable alternative presented itself. From his further remarks it is clear that the British Prime Minister does not expect the military success lately won by the Greeks to bring an orderly settlement in Turkey into much nearer prospect. The Greeks have made good headway against the organised forces of the Turkish Nationalists, and at the moment appear to have prospects of shortly occupying Angora, the Nationalist capital. -It is another matter altogether, however; for the Greeks to control, effectively the great area over which their campaign extends, and until that is accomplished they will be as far as ever from finally establishing their hold over Smyrna and other regions of the former Turkish Empire to which they lay claim. Some wellinformed observers declare that no matter how badly they are beaten in the present campaign, the Nationalists will find means of dragging out defeat in conditions which will make Turkey more than ever a centre of unrest, spreading dangerously throughout the Moslem world. The difficulties of the situation are enhanced by the fact that Britain and France have been unable thus far to reach a common standpoint in Near Eastern policy. The Paris Figaro observed recently that Britain had not definitely given up the idea of using the Greeks as a police force in Asia Minor, while on the French side there was a definite refusal to lift a hand toward involving France in warlike adventures. In French eyes (the "Figaro” addid), which ever way the strife between the Greeks and the Turks may finally be decided, the consequences are Ixiund to' be evil. If the Kemalists are victorious there will be no holding them. If Constantine should win he would pay less attention than ever to the counsels of the Allies. Finally, if the enemy forces on both sides should neutralise themeelves, we should'' still be left in that state of doubt which cruelly pains our British Allies, which is far from agreeable to us. and which in the end is bound to favour the designs of the Bolsheviki.

These observations aro -typical of the opinion which seems to be held all but universally in France that peace can only be re-established in the Near East by granting Turkey much more liberal terms of settlement than she was conceded in the Treaty of Sevres. Speaking in the Chamber of Deputies not long ago, M. BitUND stated that he had informed the Allies that the French Parliament would never consent to ratify without amendment the Treaty of Sevres, which was in direct opposition to French interests. He desired, lie added, to see a lasting and durable peace made with Turkey, which should be given the means of becoming once more an independent self-supporting Power. Italy ’S as little inclined as France to rely .upon Greece to restore order in Turkey, and it is possible that Britain by this time would have been impelled to adopt much the same attitude but for the impossible demands made by the Turkish! Nationalists through their leader, Mustapha Kemal. As recently as the middle of July, when the present Greek offensive was already well advanced, Mustapha Kemal intimated that he would discuss peace only, on the basis of "a free and uncontrolled Turkey, with he<. national frontiers as they were .ate the commencement of the armistice —that is, including Eastern Thrace, Mosul (Northern Mesopotamia), lonia, and all Turkish' Armenia.” An Allied reply informed-the Nationalist leader that if he really wished for peace he should reduce his demands to a form in which it was possible to discuss them, and that as "one out of many instances,” the demand for unrestricted Ottoman sovereignty over the straits without any guarantee for their complete freedom made all negotiation impossible. Subject to the neutralisation of the straits, and such measures as can be taken for the protection of Christian and other minorities in Asia Minor, the Allies, other than Greece, no doubt

would be able to agree upon considerable concessions to Turkey, and it is possible that the defeats they have lately sustained may make the Nationalists rather more inclined than they have been to negotiate in a reasonable spirit. Even this anticipation, however, has yet to be realised, and meantime the Greeks will no doubt lie encouraged by their military success, even though it is inconclusive and gives them no real mastery of the situation, to persist in demands which make peace impossible. As matters stand the prospects of establishing settled order in Turkey are anything but bright.