The Dominion MONDAY, AUGUST 22, 1921. PACIFIC PROBLEMS

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 281, 22 August 1921, Page 4

The Dominion MONDAY, AUGUST 22, 1921. PACIFIC PROBLEMS

When lie addressed the House of Commons a day or two ago on tho work of the Imperial Conference, Mr. Lloyd George dealt very frankly with Pacific problems and the forthcoming Armaments Conference. Even those people in the Dominions and elsewhere who do not agree wholly with his general standpoint on this occasion will be bound to recognise that he went to the root of the matter in urging that the really essential condition of an agreement on Pacific questions which will permit a reduction of armaments is a good understanding between America and Japan. There is nothing in Anglo-Japanese relationships or mutual obligations to prevent the present Alliance Treaty being merged into an international agreement of broader scope comprehending America, but it is an open question meantime whether America and Japan are able to reach a basis of understanding which will make such an agreement possible. The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance undoubtedly must be considered with due regard to the Empire’s obligations to Japan as a loyal and faithful ally. Provided always that Japan laiscs no needless obstacles to a threePower agreement in the Pacific, the case for renewing the Alliance Treaty will stand undamaged, even if the conference on armaments ends in failure. It is plain, however, that this would be a great misfortune for all three nations. All must agree with Mr. Lloyd George that, "If the United States and Japan could, combine on problems in the Pacific, that would be a great event, and a guarantee of peace in the world,” and that, "The surest way success in the disarmament conference could be reached was through an understanding on the Pacific question.” Indeed, the British Prime Minister might well have said that the only way in which success in the disarmament conference can bo reached is through an understanding on the Pacific question. Such an understanding offers the only apparent means of averting a competition in armaments which, besides occasioning a huge economic waste, would gravely endanger future peace.

Although so much depends upon the outcome of the impending conference, it cannpt be expected that Japan and America will easily reach the measure of agreement which would safeguard peace in the Pacific. According to one of today’s cablegrams, the American Government’s idea of the principles on which an understanding in the Pacific should be based is "fair treatment for Siberia and China, and equal commercial opportunities for all nations in the Far East.” Even in these apparently unimpeachable generalities, Japan may find something at which to take alarm. Sho has consistently laid claim to “special interests” in Eastern Asia, and though these interests have never been very clearly defined, they have been given general recognition in past international agreements, notably in the LansingIshii agreement (between Japan and America) of November, 1917, and in the recently-concluded Consortium negotiations. Lord Curzon’s dispatches on the latter subject have disclosed an understanding that the Governments concerned other than Japan will refuse to countenance any financial operations under the Consortium "inimical to the security of the economic life and the national defence of Japan.” As a recent writer observes, this wide reservation leaves the matter .of Japan’s "special interests” in much the same position as it was left by Mr. Secretary Lansing in 1917. It must be expected that many difficulties will arise in an attempt to reconcile American ideas on the subject of an “open door” in the Far East, with Japan’s claims to “special interests” in Eastern Asia, and her determination to secure unhampered scope for economic enterprise in the Asiatic mainland. Any unprejudiced consideration of these questions must recognise that it is vital to her economic welfare and almost to her existence as a nation that Japan should be able to look to Eastern Asia for supplies of raw materials and as an expanding market for her manufactures. As Mr. J. O. P.. Bland wrote not long ago in an article in the London Observer, it cannot be denied that just as the security of the economic life of America and the British Dominions compels them to exclude the competition of Asiatic immigrants, "even so the security of the economic life of Japan compels her either to seek new outlets for her surplus population overseas, or to endeavour to secure such a position of economic advantage in the comparatively undeveloped regions of the Asiatic mainland as shall enable her to maintain and increase hrrr industries, and thereby feed her people, at home.” These fundamental facte cannot be overlooked in any practical treatment of Pacific problems. At the same time, it seems clear that Japan has much more to hope from conditions of fair and open trade competition in Eastern Asia—conditions in which she would derive very material advantage from her geographical situation —and from the international friendship this state of affairs would connote than from persisting in the somewhat adventurous methods by which she has in the past striven to establish something in the nature of a dictatorship over China. There is already some evidence that the party of modern opinion is gaining ground in Japan, and although events like the attempted imposition of the notorious “Twentyone Demands” on China are still fresh in memory, the outlook for the future is perhaps better indicated in the fact that tho Japanese

Premier (Mr. Hara) has publicly declared that Japan would welcome an Anglo-American-Japanese understanding, having as its avowed object a common reconstructive policy in China. The translation of this general profession into’ working policy and agreement may be beset by many detail difficulties, but even a partial and preliminary understanding between America and Japan—British endorsement of any reasonable understanding may be taken for granted—would put international relationships in the Pacific in a much more hopeful light than they could possibly wear in its absence.