THE RIGHTS OF STEPGRANDCHILDREN

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 274, 13 August 1921, Page 9

THE RIGHTS OF STEPGRANDCHILDREN

CASE IN SUPREME COURT TAXATION COMMISSIONER UPHELD Judgment was given in the Supreme Court yesterday, by Hig Honour Mr. Justice Sim, on an appepl by Dr. Philip Oswald Andrew against the Commissioner of Stamp Duties. The case had been stated under section 60 of tho Death Duties Act. The appellant is ths executor of tho will of Emily Sarah Andrew, who died on January 4, 1920, leaving a will under which the residue of her estate is to be divided equally between the grandchildren of her late husband, tho late' Rev. John Chapman Andrew. These grandchildren were not related by blood to tho testatrix. Tho residue amounted to £15,960 odd, and succession duty was assessed on this residue at tho rate of 10 per cent. Tho appellant objected to this assessment, and claimed that the grandchildren in question should bo treated as grandchildren of tho testatrix for the purposes of section 92 of the Finance Act, 1915, and that the duty should be assessed accordingly at the. rate of 2 per centum on the value of the succession.

Tn giving judgment. His Honour said: “Part II of tb.e Death Duties Act, 1999, deals with thip subject of succession duty, and the commissioner treated the present case as coming within the provisions of subsection 4 of section 13 of that Act. Part V of tho Finance Act, 1915, is, by virtue of section 103, to be deemed to be part of the Death Duties Act, 1900. The question to be determined is whether or not tho case comes within the terms of section 92 of the Act of 1915. That section deals with thcase of a successor who is n child, grandchild. or other descendant of the deceased. Bv virtue of section 2 of the Death Duties Act, the word 'child,' when used in tlfb Act, unless a contrary intention appears, includes a stepchild, and also Includes the widow of a son or adopted son. In section 92 of the Act of 1915. the word 'child’ is to be construed, therefore, ns including a stepchild. Tlje argument for the appellant is that the word 'grandchild, as used in that section, ought to be construed in the same way as including n «ten-era ndchild, and that th© grandchildren of tho late Mr. Andrew ought to be treated as the grandchildren of his widow .... The. definition of child contained in tho Act of 1900 must he limited strictly, I think to the particular case with which it deals, and cannot bo used to justify the Court in ,giving an enlarged meaning to the word grandchild.’ The context, indeed, appears to negative that construction. Um f«m ‘other descendant of the deceased shows that the onlv successors intended to have the. benefit of that section are descendants of the deceased except in the special case of a stepchild, or of the widow of a son or adopted son think therefore, that the grandchildren in ouestion are not entitled to claim ths benefit of section 92. It was contended, in the alternative that they were at any rate relatives of the deceased and camo within the terms of ®J ect, ® n n ’ of section IS of the -act of 1969. Tn its popular sense the term ‘relatives includes those related by nffinrty as - ns bv consanguinity, and this, it waargued for the appellant, was the sen=e to which it is used in that hubsection. It was decided, however, in the case o Donne’lv v. Commissioner of Stamps, that the term 'relative’ in that suh’oe ton applied only to blood relatives. JI be reasoning bv which Mr. Justice WllbX arrived at that result seems conclusive, and his decision in that erne T think to b© folloMCcL 1“ r'sult’to that, ns the grandchildren «r* nit blood relatives of the <lecea=ed they m-nt is confirmed accordingly, and the appeal dismissed with £7 7s. costs to tho Commissioner.