LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 229, 22 June 1921, Page 7

LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

ATTITUDE OF THE HARDING ADMINISTRATION

TIME NOT PROPITIOUS FOR CONFERENCE OF POWERS

By Telegraph- Press Association—Copyright (Rec. June 21, 10.45 p.m.) London, June 20. “The Times’’ Washington correspondent deals fully with the broader aspects of the attitude of the Harding Administration toward the limitation of arma-

ments. He says: Firstly, it is not believed that the present moment is propitious' for a conference of all the Powers to discuss disarmament, because the conference could not be completely representative, and also owing to political indecision in many countries, especially European. the British Empire, America, and Japan, have a vir tual monopoly of naval power, thus making an arrangement between them theoretically possible, and also desirable in the interests of world peace. Thirdly, tho Harding Administration favours agreement on naval limitation by the three Powers. Fourthly, a formal conference should not be called until agreement is assured previously by informal conversations aiming at the discovery of an acceptable formula. A fifth aspect jnay be added, namely, that the Administration hopes that the Imperial Conference will help to create a situation in which informal conversations may proceed with fair hope of success. President Harding and his advisers are convinced that a conference would certainly reach a deadlock unless every

conceivable difficulty were smoothed in advance. Each country would find ii practically impossible to recede from a position once taken up without the risk of causing a domestic outcry. If a general conference of world Powers failed, it would lonly cause disappointment, whereas if the Empire, America, and Japan overtly tried to find a common basis, and-failed, it would carry certain implications of policy and national intentions which would strain relations dangerously, and do infinite harm. When America accepts a conference restricted to certain Powers, we may bo sure that a basis of agreements has already been found. Hence the importance of applying a financial formula to naval strength. Britain’s readiness to confer even informally was not expected until the Imperial Conferenca had had an opportunity to discuss the broad lines of the Empire’s naval policy.—" Tho Times.”