The Dominion SATURDAY, APRIL 2, 1921. AMERICA AND THE ALLIES

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 160, 2 April 1921, Page 6

The Dominion SATURDAY, APRIL 2, 1921. AMERICA AND THE ALLIES

The suggestion is repeated in one of to-day’s cablegrams that M. Viviane, in his mission to the United States, will endeavour to dissuade the American Government from concluding a separate peace with Germany. It seems, however, much, more likely that the duty he has undertaken is that of discussing from the French standpoint the possibility of a- working understanding between the Allies and America oven when the latter country has entered into a separate peace with Germany. France is not in a position to negotiate with the United States for such amendments to the League of Nations’ . Covenant _ as would remove America’s objections to ratifying the Treaty of Versailles. It rests with the League as a whole to deal with the Covenant, and in any case, there is no longer any question of reverting to the point which had been reached when the Republican majority in the Senate opened its campaign of obstruction. There is little doubt that Congress in the . near future will adopt a resolution terminating the state of war with Germany, and tyfit. Harping said during his election campaign that as soon as such a resolution was submitted to him he would sign it. The passage of a peace resolution, however, need not of necessity have the effect of entirely 7 ■ separating the United States from the Allies. This would depend upon its terms. “Such a resolution,” the New York Outlook observed some time ago, “would not necessarily put us in a position of aloofness.. Indeed, it might strengthen us with our Allies.” It is of very material importance that the Republican opposition to cx-Pkestdent Wilson's peace policy, though it culminated in the rejection of the Treatv by the Senate, was directed chiefly against certain Articles of the League Covenant, In spite of American criticism of the Shantung settlement, and some other details, there is no doubt that the Treaty minus the League Covenant would have been ratified by the United States. It, therefore, seems possible that a more or less acceptable alternative to the ratification of the Treaty ma.y be found on the lines indicated in a New York cablegram to-day: by attaching to a resolution of peace with Germanv a declaration that “America still supports the Allies in carrying out the Treaty of Versailles.” The precise terms of a declaration of this kind may afford scope for controversy, but from the standpoint of American interests, as well as on wider grounds, such a declaration may seem greatly preferable to a policy of isolation.

Writing in February, just after the Allies had presented their re-n-’ration demands to Germanv, 'h' l AVashington correspondent of the London. Times remarked that n sprinkling of serious students in the American capital were looking nhoixd to the moment tvhen the United States must seek a. point of re-entry to European affairs. They see with increasing clearness (the correspondent added) that whatever compromise there may be between tho League of Nations and the vaguer arbitral association finally approved as tha machinery of American connection with the Old World, the motive power’ will be whal they call “credit diplomacy." . . • This means not that the American Government will concern itself directly with foreign credits, but that the guiding principle of its action will be to make the world safe for such credits, and thus more fertile ground for foreign trado.

It was anticipated, the correspondent went on to state, that a point of contact with Europe for general discussion would be found in the reparation question. The fact that the Allies had reached accord amongst themselves on this question caused much satisfaction in. America, but in regard to details the Americans, whose views ho was reflecting, were inclined to believe that neither Mb. Lloyd George nor M. Briand looked on the huge reparation total spread over forty-two years, and the export- tax as othci’ than a basis of negotiation.

These negotiations (the correspondent continued) will still be proceeding when the United States under the new Administration will bo ready to add its voico to the discussion, and the nature of the proposals is considered as tending to equal-ise what otherwise would be an overwhelming American advantage in debate resulting from the huge debts owed to the United States by Europe. The export tax is adduced in order to illustrate this point. Thus it is pointed out that Americans must consider the tax mil ter its effect on. German export trade, but for its repercussion on the export trade of the United States. The Allied demand for what amounts to a "dividend” of 121 per cent, on German industrial effort must reduce German exports, and in consequence diminish the volume of German imports—which last is me shoe that pinches the American fool. The cotton-growers of the South, to mime only the class that is most heavily affected, expect to supply huge quantities to Germany. These, with others who also are prejudicially involved, will surely press the American Government Io attempt to secure a modification of the tax.

Thu case, for effective participation by the United States in the settlement of international affairs is-per-haps here stated in its lowest, or, at u.ll events, least altruistic, terms. It is very possible, however, that such considerations as the Times correspondent touches upon may provide the American Government with an incentive to immediate action towards co-operation . with. the Allies, while larger considerations of human welfare lead for the tdme being to little more than empty talk/ The United States certainly has much to gain from co-operating with the Allies in hastening the. repstal/lishmcnt of normal conditions of international trade. Such questions as the operation of the. tax on German exports are conceivably open to adjustment, and in any case it is wholly in the interest of the United States, as a great trad-

ing nation, to expedite the stable settlement of • European affairs which is the primary 7 condition of economib. recovery. It is quite possible that regard for ,her trading interests may induce her to seek such an understanding with the Allies as will pave the way for cooperation on a broader scale in the international areifa.