LUDENDORFF’S DEFENCE

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 108, 31 January 1921, Page 7

LUDENDORFF’S DEFENCE

VIOLATION OF BELGIUM’S NEU TRALITY.

In a review of General von Ludendorff’s book, "The General Stall aud Ito Problems.” which has just been pu - liihcd, "The Times” says: ; The book is one to be studied rather than read' continuously, and, unlike Ilindenburg as an author, 'Ludendori has airs and grapes, and is content to throw i his bundles of documents at the reader ■■ 1 head. The variety of subjects discussed I in the book gives a great diversity st interest, and incidentally shows that what we call militarism in Germany w~s a philosophy of tho whole of and not merely a theory of the ait W The book opens with a citation of some documents on tho Germiui preparations for war. It is notable that in J"b. 1910, the General Staff has just plajec » war game based on the assumption of war with France. Russia, and England and that the chief problem in this game was how to deal with an English am m„ in Schleswig-Holstein. Bv Decembei, 191-> the General Staff had deumtely made up its mind to invade Belgium. If there is no change in tlie political situation of Europe Germany’s central I position will compel her to form a_ front lon several sides. We shall (sajs Lud - dorff) therefore, have to hold one front, 1 dofeAsively with comparatively weak i forces in order to be able to take the • offensive on the other. That front can ’ only bo the French. A speedy decision I may be hoped for on that side, while an offensive against Russia- would be an ! interminable affair. But if we aro to take I the offensive against France, it will be ; iicccftsary to violate the neutrality or '"Belgium. It is only by an advance across I Belgian territory that we can hope o I attack and defeat the Fronch army in the j I open field. On this route we shall meet illie English Expeditionary Force, andI unless we succeed in coming to some ai- ' rnngement with Belgium-the Belgian ! army also. At the same time, this operation is more promising than a frontal attach on the French fortified eastern frontier. ((Memorandum of December i, 1912.) tin such questions as recruiting and labour, this book supplies many pieces justificatives for the arguments already • set forth in General Ludendorff s former : book. Ludendorff was surely right in thinking that German women were doing much less work for the war than women in England and France. Already, in October, 1916, he was urging a scheme of compulsory labour for women, and the nlosing of the higher schools and uinvorsitics. It is mentioned incidentally, m the course of argument on man power in June, 1918, that the Germans lost 300,000 ' wounded in March and April of that 1 year. On the submarine campaign, the i documents now qiioTcd add a good deal ‘ to our knowledge, both of the so-called offer of peace made by weg at the end of 1916, and of the reasons for the delay in beginning unrestricted submarine warfare. The chief reason, was that Ludendorff did not wish to begin sinking the shipping of neutral I'ow'er.s at sea until he was in the position to take military precautions against their attacking Germany. Further, ho insisted that before any "offer of peace was made, Germany must, ho in a strong military position, and also able to begin hor intensified naval warfare in the event of the offer being rejected. Ludendorff believes that America would have como into the war anyhow, and (hat tho submarine campaign was not to blamo. Ludendorff guarantees the truth of the story that on July 15. 1918. Foch said, "If the German attack fit Rheims succeeds, wo have- lost tho war. On the same day Ludendorff said to Lersner, "11 my blow- at Rheims succeeds now, we have won the war.” Th the mass of dicuments on the peace and armisticenegotiations, the most interesting is the report of the conference in Berlin on October 17, at which Ludendorff, who sixteen days 'before had been so insistent in his demand for peace, argued against it. At this conference the War Minister gave it as his opinion that he could give Ludendorff some 600,090 now men. 7f I get these men,” said Ludendorff, I can face the future confidently." Ho fold tho conference not to overrate the Americans. * r T4xey are certainly smart, but we have beaten them hitherto, even when we were very inferior in numbers. . Our men aro not anxious about the Americans. They are about tho English.” At this same conference General Ludendorff asked tho Civil Government io do something to rouse'the spirit of tho masses, to which the Secretary of State returned the reply that will become classic—"lt is a question of potatoes.” One of the important documents given 'is General von Eulitz’s report on a statement made by Ludendorff on September 39, ascribing the Gorman defeats not so much to thei’r dwindling numbers, but to the tanks. "Owing to the effect of the tanks,” said Ludendorff, "our operations on tho Western front have now practically assumed tho character of a game of chance. Th? General Staff can no longer work with definite factors.”