The Dominion: FRIDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1920. LIMITING NAVAL ARMAMENTS

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 82, 31 December 1920, Page 4

The Dominion: FRIDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1920. LIMITING NAVAL ARMAMENTS

Fhom to-day's cablegrams on the subject it seems not unlikely that the conclusion of a naval agreement between Britain, Japan, and tho United States may be the first great international event of tho i\ T ew Year. On the familiar merits of the case an agreement between these Powers to limit naval armaments is, ot' coursc, supremely desirable. It is recommended equally by a commonscnsc regard for tbeir own interests and as an effectual means of developing the spirit of friendship and mutual faith between nations which is the best guarantee of , future peace. The cablegrams which refer to the matter to-day are particularly optimistic, and need the backing of official statements before they can be received at their full face value. It seems established beyond doubt, however, that Britain and Japan aro prepared to approach the formation of an agreement in an eminently conciliatory spirit, and a really explicit definition of the attitude of the United States cannot be expected until the new Republican Government has assumed office. }Vith the position to this extent in suspense, the British First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Walter Long) is credited with giving a particularly bold lead in the interests of the three-Power agreement. 'According to a cablegram which appears to-day he uaa ucclared in a message to America that Britain, although an island Power en r tirely dependent upon ocean highways, is willing to acccpt a standard of equal strength with the . next Power. This statement may provoke criticism in the United Kingdom and in other parts of the Empire, but it can hardly be hfcld that it involves any concession damaging to British interests. The fact has to be faced that the United States, with its vast population and resources, is in a position to establish at least as powerful a fleet as the British Empire could possibly build and maintain. There is no need, however, to regard this stale of affairs as disquieting. The belief may be as confidently held to-day as when the late Mn. Koosevelt expressed himself on the subject years ago, that war between tho two great branches of the English-speaking race is unthinkable. Naval competition between Britain and America would simply mean' the futile squandering of resources which might instead be devoted to useful ana constructive achievement! and there is just as good a case for terminating a race in armaments between America and Japan. The readiness with which Japan has accepted tho idea of limiting naval armaments is not as surprising as one of to-day's reports suggests. It is particularly ohvious that Japan lacks the resources which would enable her to emulate a maximum effort in naval construction' by the United States.-

Tho first practical step to an agreement would be an undertaking by the United States to modify its current naval programme—a programme fairly epitomised as an attempt to crcato rapidly the strongest navy afloat. On a recent occasion the American Secretary for the Navy (Me. Daniels) said that if naval construction were stopped today. the United States would have 408,000 tons of wauships, Britain 854,000 tons, and Japan 426,000 tons. This statement, however, is purely hypothetical. _ What are the real facts] Britain, for the time being, has called a complete halt in the construction of capital ships. Japan has a big programme in hand, but it has been stated with apparent authority that she is prepared to cut it down. Under the current plans of the United States Navy Department, the American Navy in 1923 will consist of 35 ships of the Dreadnought and superDreadnought type, apart from six giant battle-cruisers each of 43,500 tons displacement. Short of some radical change in the existing situation and tho policies of the several nations, the American licet of capital ships before 1923 will considerably outclass that of Great Britain in tonnage and gun-power, and of course will outclass the Japanese fleet by a very much greater margin. Fortunately the view is being widely expressed and emphasised in America that naval construction on this scale is extravagantly ahead of what is necossary. The idea ol building "incomparably the greatest navy in the world" gained a certain vogue, but critics of the proposal pointed out that, at best sueh a navy would represent a particularly costly and useless white elephant. Demands for taxation relief, and due consideration of tho. fact that America- is at present spending more than one-fifth of its Federal revenue on current defence preparation, have no doubt strengthened the advocates of a moderate naval policy.' Another more or less important factor is the suspicion that the day of the groat fighting ship is possibly over, and that aviation is tile vital feature of future ' national defence. One American paper while admitting, some time ago, "that there is a certain pride and vainglory in boasting the greatest Navy in the world." added that'

both will dwindle if it is demonstrated that our Navy equals or surpasses flint of Grsnt Britain only because that nation, with lon(! vision, reduce? its naval construction- and turns its attention to aerial fleets.

Apart from sucb considerations, there is, or ought- to be, a compelling incentive to the conclusion of a naval agreement in the fact that by removing a needless and evcrincreasiiiK drain oa national resources it would do much to assist, and promote human progress and welfare. It ought to be as apparent to the people, of America as to those of other nations that continued naval construction at the pacc. now vefc in that country would point to conditions of', moral bankruptcy auguring ill for the future of mankind.