CONSTANTINE AND THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 81, 30 December 1920, Page 5

CONSTANTINE AND THE WAR

PRIVATE SECRETARY'S REMINISCENCES.

At the time when Constantino _ was about to return to Athens once again to ascend the throne after his exile in-Swit-zerland there appeared a book written by Major C. M. Melas, and entitled "Ex-King Constantino and the War. Major Melas was for 30 years private secretary, and a close personal friend of Constantine, and as he remained m this relationship for at least a yeftr after tile Great War broke out he had exceptional opportunities for observing what went on behind the 6cenes at the Greek court during thosS critical months. Constantino is described by his "close personal friend" as utterly lacking in moral training. Hq is intelligent, and at bottom a good sort of man, but no one had ever, paid any attention td his moral development. And lie has always been an autocrat. We are told that lie was not influenced by German ideas in his youth, and even laved France and England. The personal influence of the ex-Kaiser did not become manifest until after the war, when ho gave him tho "ill-fated 1 ' baton of ft German fieldmarshal. As for the people of Greece, saya Major Melas, they not only loved their 'King, hut they ;dolised him. The reason for this was that lie was born in Greece, and bore the name Of the last Byzantine Ertiperor of glorious memory, who was slain whilii defending his last stronghold against the Turks. ' Yet it was this other Constantino who refused to take arms against his country's traditional foe because his wife was a German. On one occasion when informed of tho pro-Ally feeling of the people he said: "I care nothing for what the public siiyrtf am not a man to be led by tho nose." He thought lie ruled, wherf' in reality it was others who were rulinir him.

Venizeios, tho great Greek statesman, who was defeated at tho general elections a few weeks Ago, was the arch-enemy of Constantine, but only in tho sense that ho rospecred tho traditional pro-English feeling of the Greeks. His tormd of office woro marked by incessant conflicts against the! Germanophile policy Of Constantino and tho emissaries from Berlin who swarmed about- the Palace. The author from his own knowledge tolls us that after an mterview between Constantino and Venizelos the King's wife, who is a sister of tho ex-Kaiser, was always tho first to encounter her husband for fear thftt lie hnd been led "away from the side of Germany.

The late King Alexander, who succeeded to the throne when Constantino was deposed, and whose death has causqd the present position, alone of all the Royal piiuccs never spoke of Venizelos save in terms of respect. On the dfty that ho ascended the throne he is reported to have said: "Ity grandfather reigned over (ireece for fifty years because ho never interfered with politics, lly father (Constantino) did the contrary, and did not reign live year?. I intend doing what ray grandfather did," In' tho opinion of Major Melfts, the Allied policy in tho liast was a failure. Serbia was not; allowed to fall on the Bulgarians nt the propitious moment, because of the perpetual fear of "offending" Bulgaria, not then in the war, which ended by Allowing Bulgaria to destroy Serbia. Uven when VenizcloS formed a provisional Government at Salonika in 1916, tho Allies continued to bolster up Constantine in the chimerifal hope of winning liim over from the German cause. It was not until two years later that his dethronement was effected. "So," writes tho author, "after the groat initial mistake jil regard to Serbia, after suffering disappointment in Turkey, and committing a third blunder in regard to Bulgaria, the Allies persisted deliberately in making a final and equally grave tii i'or in endeavouring to obtain the good Mil of Constantlne. This sums up in a few words the Allied policy in the Near East."