AVIATION IN WAR

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 75, 22 December 1920, Page 9

AVIATION IN WAR

—.— SEA CONTROL DEPENDENT ON AIR

SUPREMACY

BRITAIN'S GREAT SUPERIORITY

PROBLEM OF INSURING OCEAN

COMMUNICATION

The following 1 article on naval aviation Was written for tho American. "Review of Heviows" by Brigadier-General William Mitchell, head of the U.S. Army' Air Servico:—•

Future control of tlis seas depends on the control of the'air.

.Tho only thing which it is difficult for air power to destroy at sea- is the .armoured battleship; and this is largely due to tho fact that the problem of tho •attack of. battleships has not .been studied and worked on to the same extent'as haa been .the application of air power against things on land. The characteristics of air power, in comparison _ with sea power,' are, first, tho predominant feature of speed which air. power possesses. Navies move at the rate of 20 miles an hour, and many increase their speed , about 30 per cent, when, going: into action; airplanes move* in large bodies at tho rate of 100 miles ftn hour, or over. • They fight at speeds of about 150 miles an hour, while the fastest ones are -approaching a rate of 200 miles per. hour. The range, of view from an airplane ia almost, infinite as comnared with that from a ship on.the water. At a height of 15,000 feet a radius of view of about fifty miles is possible; that is, a circle with a diameter of 100 miles. ,

An air force moves from three to six times as Jast as tho fastest ships of the-navy. Prom its 6peed alone tho air force has the power of taking the'offensive against the navy-and engaging it ■under its own conditions. Tho only defence against an air. force is another air force; and, as an indispensable prelude to any engagement on tho water, there must be an air battle to determine which eide shall control.tho.area above- the water which is to be used by a fleet. a fnture contest between nations, the control of the ocean lanes will rest on a. decisive battle between the opposing pursuit aviations) and in order to accomplish this fill the air strength whioh a nation possesses will have to be concentrated at the decisive point. • Tho principal difference between tho employment of aeroplanes over tho -water end over the land is in the character of aerodrome, or landing place, that has to used. This landing place mav bo on 'tself; it may be on the water ■itsolf; it may be a floating aerodrome on the water, such as an aeroplane carrier, or a floating landing platform; or it may be even on an airship such as a Zeppelin. . ; ■

TJntil recently military aviation over the -water lias been thought of by tho ordinary person essentially in connection .with, navies.

Tho aeroplanes could go out, find the enomy, Teport whero was by wireless. wait for the first shots to come trom . the cannon, tell their own fleet where they were striking, and proceed to adjust the fire by reporting, the position of each shot with respect to'the target.

When hostile pursuit aviation is encountered, however,' this will all be .changed. Even at the Battle of Jutland, neither tno British nor German fleets had any pursuit aviation with them. In this contest the German Zeppelins kept up a constant patrol over the North Sea, from north to south, ajong a definitely established line, and r-eported to their own 'fleet the whereabouts of the British naval detachments. The British planned to 1 fiend 'their main fleet out from Seapa Flow, "and attack the German main flcntj Vhile o detachment of the British fleet' was -supposed to come lip from the south, get in behind the German fleet, and cut off .their line of retreat, The Z-oppelins, however, reported air these moves to their own fleet, which made it possible for the Germans to* extricate themselves, and at tho same time cause the- British fleet a gr-?at deal of damage. Had' the Zeppelins been shot out of tlio air by pursuit aviation, or by other Zeppelins, the German fleet would have been without eyes, and the' superior ' British fleet would have destroyed it.' The British themselves, in this battle, sent out a reconnoitring seaplane, which, although its speed was scaroaly 100 miles an hour, was able to find the German fleot and report back to the British fleet 'without being molested in any way. . It is,' therefore, evident that if observation' is to be carried out in the air for fleets, particularly with tho long ranges at which- artillery now. is, from 40,000' to 00,000 or more yards—it will be necessary to flght oft the hostile aviation before any observation work for a fleet can be done.

. Tlie basis of pursuit aviation is .the flight; that is, tho greatest number-of pursuit aeroplanes that can be directed personally by one man in the air. It ranges from not less tlmn. five to not more than aeroplanes; and is the actual fighting unit in pursuit aviation. 'Pursuit aviation relics for its effect 911 an enveloping or surrounding attack in tbree ' dimensions—that is. from above, from underneath, and on th? same level. The squadron, composed of three flights, is .organised to bring a surrounding attack in one dimension, the' flights- attacking successively one after the- other. Three squadrons acting together are used for the purpose of attacking the oppesing aviation on the sanio level, from above, find from underneath; a fourth squadron ig put into the formation as a reserve. If pursuit aviation is not organised according to this system, it cannot cope with an- aviation that is organised to fight according to these principles. The fir&t nation to see this clearly was England, because her whole existence is bound up in keeping the ocean lanes free to and from the British Isles. The problem,' of course, was primarily to equip pursuit aviation with aerodromes that eo'jld move over the water, so that pursuit aviation could ba kept up with and ahead of her fleets. Early in tho European war she began to etiuip lwjrsclf ■ with noroplone-carriers. Her first carrier was the Argus, which had a deck 353 ft. long and CSft. broad. Her hangar held 20 aeroplanes. - Her ep.'ed was only 20 knots. - , The next carrier was a warship being constructed for a South American country, but recognising that such vessels could not operate far enough in ndvaneo of their fleets so as to go out and fight for air control, they took the vessels most readily available, with the -required speed and fighting _ power to ward oft other vessels—that is, their battle-cruis-ers-and transformed them into a combination carrier and battle-cruiser. They are no® reported to havo a division of battle-cruisers, or four of these •highspeed vessels, equipped with-aeroplanes. They all have a spowl of about .to knots, and hav<> very heavy equal to that of any battksliip-a ml vith )•'. aoropiiine carriers attached to them they have the power of concentrating the equTvalent of one or moregroups of pursuit aviation, wherever thoy deJJo other navy in the world is so equipped. The British could seize and hold command of the air in the vlc "? v! of a fleet, and render a nhvy opposed to them not only totally- blind ' which. 1 well known to be a deoisivoTeatnre of modem warfare—but could also ( attack tho opposing navv through tlve,jtir *itn aerial weapons, go as to prooably destroy it without the assistance of the iran-fire of their ships. The first-problem over the water, therefore, as it is over land, is to afisure command of the air by pursuit avijtion; the next problem is to develop awnal means of destroying any enemy battleships that may be on the water, a ms can be done by aeroplanes carrying liombs. torpedoes, and chemical weapons •As aeroplanes always have the PO^« r of initiative in offence ngamst batt leahip., jt is entirely a question of developing proper weapons for sinking them. Each nation is solving its nii>,prob lem in accordance with its particular position and national policy. Germany's air policy against Englan would be to oonstruot cap,l,l. of sinkinc *5 British .fclpninf. 11®

air forco will take the place of Germany's destroyed navy. Franje sees an enemy to tho north of her as her greatest menace, and her air service, therefore,. is designed _ to Sight the Germans 111 tho air, which means pursuit aviation; and to attack the German columns as they march.

England. as has been explained before, has to insure her sea lanes of communication; and has really solved the problem to a great extent already. Our problem in America is quite different, but unquestionably. the air forco will constitute the first line of defence of the country, Tho navy may be second, or it may bo entirely eliminated. A nation unequipped to concentrate her whole air forco over- the water, ■ if the decision lies there, can just as we)! leavo her navies tied up to the wharves, instead of sending them' out to certain destruction against a . hostile country equipped for this purpose. England today can hold absoluto mastery over the sea against a navy several times her strength, ami apparently will snnn_ be in a position "where she will need urtle or no navy to guard her eea lanes in case of danger, as the air force will do it.

Auierica'3 only .defence is a proper air organisation for .tho defence of the coast. This" should cunsist_ of a pood airship organisation, with some 12 airship stations distributed throughout tjio country; next, a line of observation aerodromes. deployed along the, coast at about 200-mile intervals (these would bo for the purpose of determining where the hostile air force or aeroplane carriers were coining from); with aeroplanes capable of maintaining themselves from 8 to 12-hours in constant flight. Behind this line of observation' we should concentrate offensive elements of aviation 1' tlmt is, pursuit, attack, and Bombardment units, in central positions, so that they could be launched together against the hostile forces. We cnn_obtain more security from a wise organisation of our air forces as a means of coast defence than from any other one element.