THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 73, 20 December 1920, Page 5

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

/ OFFICIAL DISPATCHES ISSUED / > 'OBSERVATIONS BY LORD JELLICOE IBr T»l#sr*pli--Pres« Agi<ralation~Oopyrisrlit . London, December 17. The official dispatches of tho Battle of Jutland, with appendices, wero issued to-day, in. a'volume of six hundred pages ,vith numerous maps, charts, and diagrams. Tho reports aro very numerous,' there being one from practically every Jhip engaged.. Admiral Jellicoe, covering letter, Id a ted "Iron. Duke, June 8, 1916, draws attention to a number of lessons drawn from the brittle.» He says that when tho ordered the Grand Fleet at " ficapa to proceed to sea on. May 30, he prdered Admiral Beatty, whose ships were at Rosyth, to be at a certain spot in the 'North Sea at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the 31st, giving also his own probable position, at that hour. If Admiral Beatty had no news at 2 o'clock lie was to.stand toward Admiral Jellicoe. Lord Jelliooe says he had no anxiety as to Admiral Beatty's advanced position, owing to the gun power and speed of Admiral Beatty's ships: but the German third squadron displayed unexpected speed. Though nominally the British battle cruisers had 25 knots and the Germans 20J knots, the former were unable to increase their distance from the Germans. "This comes to us as an ■unpleitspnt surprise," he observes, "and will considerably affect, future operations. It js quite evident that tho German ships ye much fnstei' 'than their nominal Bpeed." Admiral Beatty adopted the corloct and' only possiblo courso ,'n keeping between the enemy and his base, and ill keeping in touch with the enemy. Ho .'kad great superiority. , . ... . A Lord Jollicoo states: "Tho loss of the Queen Mary and the IndefatigiMo was unpalatablv due partly to the indifferent, armour of the British battle cruisers, and partly to their disadvantage with regard to the light. The German gunnery, though of a very high standard,- falls off when they are hit, but even then is very, aocurate. The German organisation ift night time. was very good, nnd their recognition of signals was excellent, whereas ours was practically nil: Wo had a good deal to learn from them. The German tactics were anticipated. Ihe enemy's turning away movement under cover of destroyer attacks, is difficult to counter. It.lias been closely studied, but there is no real. counter except a"® 0 timo and superior speed. Thus a hghr to a finish is almost impossible, unless" it begins oariy in the any. It would be tendered still more difficult by minefields and submarines. A feature of the action Vas the number of. torpedoes which crossed the British line. 'Only one ship was hit. It was supremely important not i-> let the enemy know tha't the torpedoes' tracks were visible, because it would not be beyond German ingenuity to prevent a track being loft. Certain, lesjons liave been' learned as regards the dispositions of tactics." Interesting sections of the book are devoted to' the many thousand messages and signals between the shins before, during, and after the battle. Theso show that the Admiralty received news on M ay 30 indicating tho early activity of the German' Fleet, and- instructed- Admirals Jellicoe and Beatty to /'oncentrate_ to the eastward in the "Lon.tr Forties," ready for eventualities. —Aus.-N.Z. Cable Aasn. IMPORTANT SIGNALS > . BRISK DISCCTSSION PROCEEDING. (Rec. December 18, 5.5 p.m.) . . -London, December 17. Among the signals is one which is being much discussed. It was sent from Admiral Beatty to Admiral Jellicoe at 7.47 on the evening of .May 31, and was received seven, minutes later. It. read: "Urgent! submit van of battleships follow battle-cruisers. AVe can then, cut oiV whole enemy's battle iieet." ' Admiral Jellicoe at 8.14 ordered Admiral Jerrnm, commanding the Second Battle Squadron, to follow Admiral Beatty, but Admiral Jerram at 8.45 reported that the battlecruisers were not in sight. Another signal from .a destroyer tioallaJrader.the Faulknor, at 1.52 on the morning of June, announced that she had sighted the enemy b'attleshiw,.- giving their position, but the Iron Duke (Lord tffellicoe's flagship) did not receive the message, which probably was jammed by | the Germans. This is viewed by some "'commentators almost as u tragedy, as X/ord Jellicoe's battleships were then speeding southward to cut off the German Admiral von Scheer. The FniUknor's message, if it had been received, Slight have provented the enemy reaching home, an<l wouldi have showed .Lord Jellicoe that von Scheer at about that timo was cross-, ing his track. ' - Critics are busily reconstructing events in the light of the* signals: The schools are still sharnly divided. Some declare the signals uphold the previous contonfion. that Lord Jellicoe < in turning away lostjiis chance of a- decisive victory. Others'say that Jellicoe took the less spectacular "but logical course of avoiding the torpedoes.. Th'ey direct attention to.the fact that Admiral Beatty did.not signal before Admiral Jellicoe manoeuvred a*way but half an hour later, and that Admiral Jellicoe completed the inanoeiivre at 7.35.—Au5.-N.Z. Cable Assn. COMMENT IN LONDON PRESS WHAT THE DOCUMENTS SHOW. (Rec. December 19, 5.5 p.m.) London, December 18. In commenting on the dippatchesfthe "Morning Post" states: "The documents ghow that the conduct ol Jellicoe and Beatty was of the highest .inent. They prove that under Lord Jellicoe s command the Grand Fleet in every conceivable manoeuvre had been constantly practised and that every contingency was foreseen., Nover was. a reputation more signally vindicated than the reputation, so fonily assailed, of Lord Jellicoe." The "Express' points-out that Lord Jellicoo's tactics wero substantially those submitted to the Admiralty in October, 1914, for use in the case of a fleet action, which the Board officially endorsed. The German fleet escaped annihilation by jamming a series of vital wireless signals i from the destroyer flotilla during the jiiglit. ■ , ■ Tho "Daily Chronicle says : 'TTio documents show that the Buttle of Jutland did not rosiiTt in a complete British victory owing to the .timo of day when the I •battle was fought, but it is disquieting ' to learn that the German battle-cniisers were bettor armoured and that their system of fire direction was superior to the British." The "Daily News" states: "Ihe main controversy, whether Lord Jellicoe had it in lii= power to destroy tho Gorman fleet, will never satisfactorily be settled. Lord Jellicoe will recoive praise, or blame.' as the criticS are in sympathy with one type of strategists or the otner. Aus.N.Z. Cable Assn. LESSONS OF.THE BATTLE BRITISH SEAMEN'S SUPERIORITY. (Rec. December 19, midnight.) London, December 19. Lord Sydenham, in an interview with "Lloyd's Sunday News, that we allowed the Germans to decciv® us over their battle-cruisers' speed just as they did earlier over their census. The German fleet had one definite . purpose, to fight us in the North Sea. The Kaiser could therefore build ships cut into flections for better protection on tho watertight system, creating such difficulties relating to the restriction of space for the crew, internal communication and discipline that ocean-going battleships like ours were unable to follow their model. The Germans had certain advantages m speed, fire direction, night communication and other technical devices. Then why did they go home? They went because the seamen were not as good as the ships they sailed. This one hammer- ' lng knocked the fighting eplrit out of them. Von Scheer could not subsequently trust the moral of his own sailors. In their position British tars would have j,un2 on like grim death, so the Jutland sacrifice was well worth .while. The lesjonfl o# tho to&ttls <1) That the

gun was still supreme; (2) that the torpedo was as disappointing in a fleet action as ifc proved in tho Jvusso-«Tapnnese War; {3) that officors must give more careful study to strategy and tactics; (4) that not all the technical < science in the world can supply the place of born seamen. The future would Gee the battlecruiser disappear. Battleships and destroyers wouM fight big actions, cruisers would scout and sweep the seas, but men would count for everything every timo. -Aus.-N.Z. Cable Assn. a germaTadmission "JELLICOE'S- STRATEGY -UNIM- ' PEACIIABLE(Rec. December 19, 'midnight.) London, December 19. Captain von Hase, the Derflinger's chief eunnery officer at the Battle of Jutland, in his book "Biel and Jutland, which will shortly be published by Skeffington g, admits that Admiral Jellicoe's strategy was unimpeachable, antf that the battle, though indecisive, in no way impaired Britain's mastery of the sens.—Aus.-JN.i. Cable Assn.