NAVAL "HUSH-HUSH"

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 60, 4 December 1920, Page 9

NAVAL "HUSH-HUSH"

PLAIN FACTS ABOUT JUTLAND.

It is a great misfortune that ,tlie present Admiralty is lha'afiaiuing the "hushhush" policy as to what happened in the battle of Jutland''instead of promptly publishing all the available evidence and documents in the 6linpo of logs and signals, writes 11. W. Wilson, in the "Daily Mail." The public' is not concerned in tho personal dispute- between Earl Beatty and Lord Jellicoe, but in a vital issue of naval dcfcnce. . For ii the tactics employed by Lord Jellicoo wero sound, and if the - escape of the German fleet, .which was their consequence, was inevitable, then it is diflicult to seo why we should maintain squadrons of battleships and battlecruisers. The great problem before British admirals in the days of sail was to attack promptly and decisively with . a large fleet. Nelson's famous Trafalgar _ order open? with the words, "Thinking )t almost impossible to bring a 11 set of iu sail of the line into line of battle 111 variable winds, thick weather,'and ol 1 - circumstances wlii<;h must occur, without such a loss of time that the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing tho enemy to battle in such a manner as to make the business decisive." and goes on to outline the plan ho adopted. It' will be "observed that ho condemns tho line of battle beeauso'in thick weather (low visibility) the enemy would get away while it was being.formed. Lord Jellicoe. . however, decided to form his fleet into one great lilie, whir would be about 11,000-yards long. To form it lie had to turn his battleships' in one or.'two directions—either towards enemy, or away from the enemy. In the 'first ease He -would get the slnps quickly into battle and use to tho utmost the surprise- which the arrival of his great force hnd sprung on the Germans. He would run some risk, 'bin to protect him against that risk Lorn Beatty, by o manoeuvre which the German commander von Hase has described' n.i superb, had drawn well in front ot the leading German shins, and if Lord .leiiicoe's battleslnps fell into line beli'nd Lord Bentty's battle-cruisers ■ th.'t Germans, in von Haso's words, ,'ould nave been "completely:enveloped." At Hie same time Sir K. Arbutlinot hnd moved out m such a manner iliat he •:onld crush any German torpedo ultucJc. an I though his ship was destroyed her movements covered the hattle-fleet. The battle-fleet, however, deployed not lowardu but away from the German main force. The result of that was to leave i/u-d Beatty ill-supported, to low thefl'pct of surprise, and to delay tho tie Cl3lOll of the battle, though (very moment was, of importance as the h£Uir_2*as thou C.15 p.m. Kv°u then it was possible to deal a decisive blow. The British Fleet wa.much faster than the German. It ctiilrt "team certainly 20 knots, and pcrliaps 21 knot*) as a whole. By .niainiainiiv the highest speed it- could work rnmnl the Germans and either get across their head or compel them to keep on li ming in a circle (ill they w«rc destroyed. Evidently expecting s.ueh a manop.uvre, Tjord Beatty increased the speed of hia l>n( lip-cruisers to 22 knots. Hut. (no Mile-fleet followed at only 17 knots, which was txactly the speed of tho ( man (lwl, A gap opened between flic •>r 1 ti«h battle-cruisers and the British battleship*—accentuated by a second turn-away from the enemy on the pan of the battle-fleet—and Lord Beatty wra (-0 yeducp enped or tal'c l'" 1 chalice of being isolated and cut off. It was as the gap was opening that, ho called—in vnin—oll the nearest battleships *o foi'ow him and amiihilale (lie enemy. _ ft Is on all these points that light is JieetW before tho final verdict on the oattlo and the leadership employed there can tie pronounced. There ma> have been unsus.pcctcd reasons for movements which seem inexplicable, but. if so. tho country ought to know what they wer».