NEW DEFENCE POLICY

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 49, 22 November 1920, Page 5

NEW DEFENCE POLICY

Sir—Assuming that discussion in your pages of the new defence scheme is permissible, I would like to draw attention to an aspect of the matter that invites thought. I will leave aside for the moment any inquiry as to whether public opinion in any country in the world would 6onctioik in the present generation another war, also as to whether the financial situation throughout the world couid possibly withstand or survive the shock of another upheaval. I wish to tiommeut on the following paragraph of the report:—"Our organisation should bo fuoh as will provide for the rapid mobilisation iind the subsequent ninmtennjioe of a force for defence either against raids or against an •attempt to invade New Zealand." Tho Pacific Ocean is practically _ -■> "closed sea," dominated by the British/ American, and Japanese nations. A laid or an attempt at invasion must, therefore, come from either America or Japan. The possibility of conflict between the U.S.A. nnd the British Umpire is,tardy, thinkable, as it would mean the end ol civilisation. Still, we will suppose ii possible. Now the Americans are nothing if not thorough l , and they would simply send 6iich a force as would be mathematically certain to overwhelm us. The Antwerp case, where the Germans, knowing the armament of tho Belgian forts, sent guns that outranged them, and the tactics of the British Admiralty at; the Falkland Islands naval battle in December, 1914, when the German ships were annihilated with next to no damage to our ships, would certainly be followed by the Yanks. Now, as to Japan, a moment's reflection will convince all thinking persons tliat Japan would hn insane to attack us so long as 'Britain remains dominant on the seas. In both cases, there is not the slightest evidence that unfriendly intentions are contemplated. But suppose that the British Fleet were defeated. "What earthly usi would it be to continue fig'hting? The enemy having command of the seas, and knowing our armaments, need only send longer-ranged guns to blow our main cities to pieces. Sir, why is this contingency never faced or always slurred over?

Then I will take the case where the enemy eludes the British Fleet and sends a, force against New Zealand. This is the favourite argument of the Defence League. It presupposes an idiotic policy on the part of the enemy. Would they attempt to invade us when they knew that a superior fleet was still in being? The enemy fleet in that case would surely do as the German warships did at Papeete in 1911, that is, stand out to 6ea, and bombard from a safe range, and then retire. What would be the value of one brigade or one division ii» that ense?

Sir, docs not the whole of our defence ■problem' hinge on-this: we arc absolutely safe if the British Fleet is paramount; we are doomed if sea : power passes to the enemy? Thou, 6urely wo ought to think this matter out squarely. If our land force' can ho of no use to \is in the only possible emergencies that can arise (humanly speaking) then scrap it entirely, and depend on and subsidise (with Australia) a naval squadron. That is the logical thing to do. Lastly, T trust you mil allow me to say (although many of yftiu: readers will disagree with me) that there is a growing feeling that this defence scheme is totally unnecessary, and Eenuis, to have for its primary object, the establishment of a military caste in our midst. Most of the nations of the earth are trying to get rid of this incubus, whilst we in New Zealand reap as our reward for engaging in "the war to end _ war," the perpetuation of the very evil that was overthrown in Europe.—l am, etc., PHILIP KING Wellington, November 14, 1920.