The Dominion MONDAY, AUGUST 16, 1920. THE RUSSO-POLISH PARLEY

Dominion, Volume 13, Issue 276, 16 August 1920, Page 4

The Dominion MONDAY, AUGUST 16, 1920. THE RUSSO-POLISH PARLEY

The actual gravity of the situa- . tion that is developing in Eastern Europe will appear only when the Soviet Government has definitely shown its hand in negotiations with Poland. Peace on fair terms between Russia and Poland would be welcome in itself and as indicating that tho promotion of peace on a wider basis is possible. On the other hand, the refusal of fair terms to Poland would imply that tho real aim of the Soviet is to carry a' policy of external aggression to its possible limits. At the moment the whole situation centres on tho armistice negotiations, whifih, according to the latest cablegrams, were to open at Minsk on Saturday. Whether it is favourable or the reverse, tho outwmc_ of these negotiations ought . •definitely 'to clarify the outlook. In view of tho extremities t.o which her armies aro reduced, Poland is not likely to raise obstacles to peace on anything like fair terms, but the attitude of the Soviet, as Mit. Lloyd Geohge has pointed out in a letter to KameNEFF, is suggestive of double dealing. The discussion of armistice preliminaries, if it takes place according! to programme, will afford a much-needed test of Soviet sincerity. If the issue depended upon the fjood faith of the Bolshevist dictators, the outcome would bo most unpromising, but expectations of a satisfactory settlement are to some extent warranted by their evident anxiety to secure the economic and other advantages that would accrue from the restoration of trading relations with Britain and other Allied countries. _ The persistence of the Ivrassin mission is certainly suggestive of a genuine desire to secure theso advantages, and the best hope in sight meahtimo is that this desire may prevail with the Soviet Government over all other considerations. Trotsky, who leads those"" 1 elements in the Soviet organisation which are most inclined to external aggression, is quoted to-day .as declaring that m their "solemn r«ccption" of Kamenefp and Krassin the Western Powers have recognised the Soviet Government, and that Bolshevism has "captured the whole of Europe." Though it iB too soon to take as much for granted,' this may be Trotsky's way of saying that he perceives the necessity of opening up channels of trade instead of setting Western Europe at defiance. In other words, that he recognises that the come to cry a halt in the policy of aggression, At the stage reached, the attitudo taken up by the British Labour Conference must be described as extremely short-sighted-, and calculated rather to prevent than bring about the. settlement its delegates presumably desire.. Evidently these delegates were wholly dominated by the fear of a new war, and their only idea of averting such a calamity is to endorse unreservedly the attitude of the Soviet Government, accept all its professions at , their face value, and demand that it be recognised unconditionally. As the Conference proceedings ore reported, this abject and foolish endorsement of slave-driving terrorists is modified only by the fact that those who framed and passed it apparently assumed as a matter of course that the Soviet Government is prepared to respect Polish independence. Prospects of peace in Eastern Europe will be very greatly brightened if this faith is justified, but an attempt to reduce the British Government to helplessness in face of Soviet aggression is evidently not a hopeful method of promoting a satisfactory settlement in Poland or anywhere else. Labour representatives are not, of course, alone In desiring a peaceful solution of tho problems now raised in Eastern Europe, but it touches the limits of fatuity to suggest that such a solution would be brought nearer by accepting the Soviet at its own valuation. In the statement he made a few days ago, Mr. Lloyd George outlined a policy that fairly meets the case. He intimated that if the Bolshevists made peace with Poland on reasonable terms, Britain would resume negotiations for the resumption of track with Russia, but that if Polish independence were attacked, Britain would assist Poland, and also General Wrangel, with supptfcs, though not with troops, and y,6\iM impose a strict blockatfe of Russia. The action taken bv France in recognising General Wrangel seemed likely, when it was first announced, to occasion dissension batwoen tho Allies and hinder tho effective, execution of the policy outlined by the British Prime Minister. This impression is much modified by later news, which shows that both in France and Britain the ruling determination is to maintain the excellent understanding in which the two countries are united. On tbo whole, the Soviet may still find substantial reasons for preferring a peaceful settlement to continued and unbridled aggression against Poland and other buffer States. But while the issue still hangs in doubt, resolutions like that of the British Labour Conference simply play directly info the hands of one of the vilest tyrannies ever established. .