The Dominion. MONDAY, MAY 17, 1920. THE POLISH BLOW AT BOLSHEVISM

Dominion, Volume 13, Issue 198, 17 May 1920, Page 4

The Dominion. MONDAY, MAY 17, 1920. THE POLISH BLOW AT BOLSHEVISM

It is hardly necessary to emphasise the critical issues raised by the Polish attack on Bolshevik Russia. The position in some respects is complex, but the case stated for Poland by her Foreign Minister is that in taking the initiative she anticipated and forestalled an imminent attack by the Soviet armies. Obviously if this claim is substantiated, Poland is hardly to be blamed for her action, though it ,-is quite possible events may show that she would havo been wiser to- stand on the defensive and if need be fight a defensive; campaign.' From recent Ministerial utterances it is o\'U dent that Britain is giving the Poles no official countenance in their present enterprise, but it is likely that they are acting with the approval of 'the French Government, and are looking chiefly to .France as a base of necessary supplies. Although the lied forces are still being driven in retreat across and beyond the Dnieper, that is to say, towards the eastern confines of the Republic of Ukraine, the military situation has not yet been tested. Their present success argues that the Poles chose- their moment' well, but it has yet to bo wen whether, they are capable of withstanding a prepared return blow by the Soviet armies, Reports that ' a close military censorship has been established in Moscow and that Brusiloff is urging the Russians to unite against the Poles are suggestivo in this connection. While the outcome of the Polish adventure is not to be foretold, there is little doubt that its success, would do a great deal to stabilise conditions in and beyond Europe,-and' that its failure would entail serious consequences for many other countries than Poland. In making war on Bolshevik Kus-, sia the Poles are attacking an autocracy which aims quite frankly at reproducing as nearly as possible in othencountries the conditions of government, if they cam be so described, that now obtain in Russia. Well-informed European journals, amongst others those which reflect the mind of the French Foreign Office, state emphatically, that the present rulers of Russia are quite eb definitely intent as any of their predecessors on world-domination, and are shaping all their plans accordingly. Socialist organs of Bolshevik tendency seem also to agree in presenting Lenin as the Mahomet of Communism, a prophet who hopes to spread his "gospel" by means of the sword, or rather of its modern equivalents. Even those who believe that the evil growth of-Bol-shevism is destined to perish under the play of internal forces ,cannot regard with indifference.the development of the Red Army, still less the tactics by which Lenin and his are striving to foment conspiracies and stir up civil war in other countries. As a European Power, Britain has little to fear from Bolshevism, but in the broader outlook of the British Empire there is for the time at least a real and _ formidable danger that Bolshevik influence and propaganda may operate as a seriously disturbing factor in_ Asia, and' not least amongst tho illiterate millions in India and Egypt. The state of Europe to-day demonstrates that the influonce of Bolshevism is most potent where the populace is least jhlightened, and it is, of course, largely for this reason that the danger of Bolshevik nenetration in such countries as India and Egypt must be recognised and guarded against. With such territories to protect, the British nation as much as any has reason to sympathise with the Poles in the attack they' are now making on Bolshevism in its central stronghold. Whether the enterprise fares well or ill, it promises at least to test; definitely a situation which now in many, respects is exceedingly ill-defined. It is a condition of complete success that large sections of the Russian poople should show themselves eager and ready to cast off the yoke of their prcEcnt taskmasters and to es-

tablish independent '\rcpublics—the Baltic Provinces, Lithuania, White liussia, and tho Ukraine—extending from the Gulf of Finland to Enmania. It is the declared object of the Poles to promote the establishment of such a chain of independent States, separating their territory from that of Bolshevik Russia, and though partition on these lines' would in some respects accentuate the conditions of economic disorganisation that already exist in Europe, there is no doubt that the redemption of a large part of Western Russia from Bolshevik rule would be a great gain to the people concerned and to the world. One of the most important incidental results would be to broaden the barrier now interposed between Soviet Russia and .Germany. _In exercising an independent initiative, f he Poles 'manifestly have assum'ed a heavy responsibility, and at an immediate view the task they have undertaken may seem to far exceed their strength. They _ were well placed, however, to weigh the dangers involved and also such factors as may give them prospects of success. So much depends on the people of the western provinces of Russia being ready to proclaim their independence, and on the rest of the population being disinclined to face a war in support of Soviet rule, that it must be 'assumed J.bat the Poles did not take action without giving these factors full consideration.