"U" BOAT SECRETS

Dominion, Volume 13, Issue 193, 11 May 1920, Page 7

"U" BOAT SECRETS

KAISER'S HESITATION OVER BARBARIC METHODS ADMIRAL SCHEER'S STORY Admiral Scheer, who commanded tho German High Sea Fleet for a considerable part of the war, writes as follows in his memoirs on the submarine campaign:— On receipt of the American Note on the Sussex affair our Government decided to yield and the Admiralty Staff thereupon communicated orders that the submarine war was to bo conducted thenceforth in accordance with prize law. Theso orders readied the fleet by wireless while it was preparing to bombard Lowestoft. As nothing could be effected in.the waters around England by a submarine Avar conducted according to prize law, and as this must expose the- boats to the greatest dangers, I recalled all submarines by wireless from their stations and reported that the submarine trade war against England had thug ceased. On April 30 (1916) I received confirmation from the Admiralty Staff that His Majesty had agreed to the interruption of tho submarinei' commercial war and directed that the submarines should pursue purely military aims. A resumption of the submarine commercial war would ufe ordered if the whole political and military situation justified it. Having the submarine boats at my disposal for military purposes gave me the desired opportunity to extend the. operations of tho fleet, and it is due to this circumstance that the fleet was enabled to fight its battle against the English Fleet of Skagerack. A Word in the Kaiser's Ear. Tho moral impression made by the battle on neutrals created', in my opinion, the most favourable.''"atmosphere, for carrying on our war against England with all possible means and for resuming the ' economic war with tho utmost severity, and I took the opportunity to submit my views To tho Kniser when lie visited the iTeef; at Wilhelmshayen on.Juno 5. ■'. Already in May endeavours-had again been jnade toy tho Admiralty Staff to per- , euajo file commander of the fleet'to resume submarine war in accordance with prizo law to ensure at least 6ome damago being done to England, but as action ', against armed steamers had again been dropped I had not agreed. Soon after tho battle in June the Admiralty Staff once ! moro brought forward the idea and re- ! quested me on June 20 to ' define my attitude m order that : the matter might bo brought before the , Kaiser. My reply was'that in view of ! ttye situation I advocated an unrestricted submarine mercantile war inform of a .' blockade- of- the British coasts, but protested against any modified form; if it was considered for political reasong not advisable to have recourse to this tho \ keenest weapon, nothing remained but to J uso submarines in pursuit of military , aims only. „,.„„., > T A few days later.the Chief of the toal Cabinet, Admiral von Muller, tried! to induce me to alter my attitude. . . . I maintained my opinion, however, es- ■ p'ccially as there was a question of very important decisions being taken by tho - Kaiser, for which knowledge" of my atti--1 hide was desired. I gathered, further, from a visit of the Imperial Chancellor - on June 13 that ho did not think of i using all the means at our disposal [ against England. f America's Intervention. x America had interposed in favour ol ! England as soon as the submarine war >' began to make itself felt. America pre--1 vented systematically and deliberately . the successful employment of our strong--1 est weapon. Our attitude led the (jer- ' man people to bolieve that, notwithstond- . ing America's protests, wo were using the submarine weapon with all our force. 1 • Our people did not know that, bound 1 os wo wcro by our big words to tho uu- '.■ tion, wo were conducting a sham sub--0 marine war, and America laughed be- . causo she knew she could determine ox- . actly how long we might thus amuse our,l. America never permitted us to cua--1 qucr with it, and wo thus conducted subb marine war, not as if it were a weapon - drown with the deliberate intention of t winning tho victory, but, as my Chief o of Staff, Rear-Aduural von Trotha, ox- '- pressed it, to delude public opinion al e home and with a blunt edge against th< !„ enemy. ' e Later in this chapter Admiral Scheei 0 writes:— ; . The fact that we did not begin th< g submarine war in January. 1916, as tin 6 Chief of the Admiralty Staff proposed >e or at the latest immediately after oui s. Skagerack battle, when, in my opinion •o tho situation was particularly favour r- able, was of fateful significance for tin r. issue of tho war. Construction had pro j! so .favourably in 1915 w< :e had an adequate number of submarine: ,y Wo thus lost a valuable year., in whicl a tho. power of resistance of. our poopl ■ was very much greater than it was ii sa the year 1917, for tho water had no^ ie gradually rieon up to our throats, am it we were compelled to have recourso b f. -the weapon that promised to save ue io England in the meantime had been abl ig to execute systematically her defonsiv * plans.