SIMS'S DISCLOSURES

Dominion, Volume 13, Issue 166, 9 April 1920, Page 7

SIMS'S DISCLOSURES

ONSLAUGHT ON UNITED STATES NAVAL DEPARTMENT

ALLEGED WAR DEFICIENCIES

The cables hove given a summary of the sweeping attack which liear-Admiral | Sims made on the United States Navy Department in his evidence before the Sonata Sub-committee. The criticisms, which have created a great sensation in Amrica, are actually contained in a letter addressed by Admiral Sims to Mr. Daniels, Secretary of the Navy. This letter the Admiral read to the Sena to i Sub-committee. We reproduce the most important passages "In the latter part of March. 1017, in responso to a request from the American Ambassador in London, expressing the desire of Hie British Government that a naval officer of high rank be sent to secure the closer co-operation which our Navy Department had suggested, I was ordered abroad oil barely 48 hours' notice. Brief orders were delivered to me verbally in Washington. No formal instructions or statement of the Navy Department's plans or policy were received at that time, although I received the following explicit admonition: "Don't let the British pull the wool over your eyes. It's none of our business pulling their chestnuts out of the lire. We would as soon fight the British as the Germans.' I arrived in Liverpool on April !) and in London on April 10, 1017, and went immediately to the Admiralty, where the nava-1 situation was fully explained by the resnonsible officials, This explanation showed that the Nav-v Department did not understand the seriousness of the submarine situation: that its information was'verv incomplete and inaccurate. This was due to the insufficient scope of its Intelligence Service, very few naval officers bavin" been sent to J'iuiopc before we entered the war. • rev-ieiy of the cables sent to the Department in April, 1317, shows that the situation was very-serious and that theeneiuv was rapidly winning the war bv the destruction. of merchant shipping. Throughout the following year numerous cables and letters of the most urgent possible character wore sent, with the obiect of impressing on the Denartment: the. vital necessity of our maximum ef--fort' being exercised in Enronenn waters with' th"' least possible dele- but without producing the desired result. Attention wns frequently- invited to the fact that, shipping was being sunk much faster tlian it was being built, and that it was a matter of simple arithmetical calculation to determine when tb" A»]es would have to sue for peace if the rate of loss continued. . "For some rea°nn which has never been examined, the Navv Denartment. during at least the first six months of the rr. failed to put int« actual "'nntjee a whole-hearted policv of co-oieration with the Allies—n policy renuired f"" winning fW-«*nr with the least possible iWny. Tlie headouarter.s in Enrobe was jiot mifrenuent'r left in isrnorance of the Uennrtmpnt's policies, plans for co-operation of United Sites' forces, nnd its '"teivled action. Not until .Tulv 10. 11117, did the Navv Department outline n . " o !'. oy as regards naval co-operation mtn the Allies—in a cable quoting ft letter to the "State Department. ~ "As usual in such cases, the policy thus =et forth was academically sound, but that it was not carried out, or was not understood by the Department, is shown by the fact that for ten months after its receipt I was shll urgently recommending an increase of forces-still trying to convince the Departmriit- that tb° war was in the Eastern Atlantic and that the United States' naval 'front' was off the European coast and not oil tho United States coast: that it was there only that the enemy was iperatjjig; (hat it was there only that tho United Slates shipping, let alone Allied shipping, could "be protected with the maximum efficiency. A review of the dispatches makes it apparent that die. Department did not accent my reports and recommendations with the seriousness that the critical situation demanded. There are many instances that illustrate this. One that may be cited is a case bf our battleships that were rcquestetl as reinforcements of the Grand ['Meet. "Following a conference wih -\dnnral ■Te.llicoe, then First Sea Lord, or 'Chief of Naval Operations' of the British Admiralty, and Admiral Beafcjy. the Com-mander-m-Chief of the Grand Fleet, it. wns strongly recommended on , r uly 21, .1917, that four of our coal-burning battle'ships be sen) at owe There was great delay before there was eVjCn _an acknowledgmenl of this request. This naturally ■subjected me®to much embarrassment. The request, though repeated, was nnallv refused. ~/«■< "In the following November the Unet of Naval Operations (Admiral Benson) arrived in England with the v. olonel House Mission. After discussing this question of the necessity of sending our battleships with the same officials with wliom I had discussed it, he cabled «u once recommending that they be sent. The result was that it was over four months after the original request (/November 28' that the four ehip3 sailed from the United States. "This is but one of a, number of examples of a similar kind, and strikingly illustrates the nature of the delays caused by the Department's insistence-v.pon tryin" to understand the intricate details oi rapidly changing conditions 3PW miles away." As it was, of course, a physical impossibility to keep the Deportment fullv ami accurately informed, and as the "Department insisted upon making decisions concerning 'both the disposition niul the actual operations of Hie European forces, the inevitable result was unsound decisions, and in some cases long delays before the Department i as induced to accept the original recommendations' that vera ba°=d upon exhaustive discussions of the actual conditions with the heads of the Allied navies. ",Tud"ing from the actions that were finally r ta£en, after extensive cabled and written communications and after consequent long delays, it is apparent that if I could have appeared daily >n Washington to explain fully my recommendations, and the discussions before the conferences upon which they were based, iliev wr.nld undoubtedly have been earned out from two to six months earhoi. The point is that if the Department considfred that there was anyone in U as hir.gton to form just conclusions he should have been sent to Europe for thfit pu»iiose but, failing this, the recomoiendalion* of the Navy Departments representative, based upon conferences with the Allied commanders, should rave been accepted and immediately acted upon. The action of tho Department m this respect, vjis a violation of a, fundamental principle of warfare-see Malian or any authority—mid it was continuous throughout the war. It added greatly to the burden of my work. "While the Departments first statement of policy (which was dated July, 1017 or three months after we entered tiie'war) was what I had recommended siuco the beginning, it nevertheless withheld'putting it into elVect, apparently be-c-itise of a conviction that the Allies were not keeping it fully informed of their plans. The truth of Hie matter was that nothing was being withheld, and that all policies and plans, which were in writing which were actually of an official nature, and which in any way affected United States naval co-operation, had been transmitted to the Department as completely as long-distance communication (coiled messages) permitted. "Certain .suggestions were made Uy the British Admiralty as to uses of our forces in the campaign. For example, m April, 1917 there was anxiety leit the enemy . should attempt a raid in the Channel with a heavy force and get away before bo could bo intercepted by a lorce from the Grand Elect, the nearest naso of which was at Rosyth, near Edinburgh. Accordingly, the Admiralty suggested that a squadron of our battleships he based on Brest or in the Channel. No reply was made to this suggestion. Also, Hie "value of submarines in the campaign was lirst explained April l!i, 11117. None were sent until October, 1917, when fivo arrived in Ireland, followed by seven more in January and February, 1018. In spite of the numerous messages sent in April, tho only information received up to April 27, 1017, was that six destroyers only would be sent. The situation was then so very critical that I appealed to tho American Ambassador in London, who sent, a most urgent message to the President, and on May 3, 1917, the first definite information was received of the Department's intention to send more than six destroyers, that ultimately 3G and

two repair ships would be sent. Most earnest requests were made for tuj?s becauso of the urgent need for tlieiu in tho submarine zone. Tlieie requests fully explained how many torpedoed ships could have been beached and sahaged if these tugs had been available. Expcrienco had shown that such vessels could be repaired and put in service again in a short time—a very short tSme—compared with that required to build new ships-thus lesulliug in a great saving of tonnage. A year after wo entered Ihe war, but four tugs had been sent, and two of these were specifically allocated to Italy by the Department. Nine nioro were eventually sent at various times, but none before April 23, l'JlB. "The Department caused serious embarrassment and delays in putting into effect the convov system, which was the most important of all the measures used in defeating tho submarine war against Allied shipping. The Department wns repeatedly assured that the Allitb at all times bad remarkably accurate information as to the movement of submarines, anl that it waa practically certain that tliev could not reach our coast, eleven leave Europeon waters, without advance information being supplied. Subsequent events proved tins assurance to bo correct. No submarines visited our ~«Kt until May. 1918, and the Department wns in ail cases informed when tliev started across, and often as to their exact destination-where they were to lay mines, etc. "My dispatches showed that with all possible emphasis I tried to induce the Department to view the campaign as a whole, to consider our naval forces as hut one relativelv small item of an Allied naval team, that our mission was the protection of all Allied lines of.communication and not the United States lines of communication alone; that, particularly in the earlv part of our campaign, the strictly United States lines of communication, as compared with Allied were inconsiderable; that i't was-ouite possible to give our relatively small commerce quite superior protection at the expense of losing the war by denying essential protection to the vastly "rcater Allied commerce upon which the success of our common cause e.hiefiv depended. There was naturally a strong inclination on the part of bite various Power--, including, the United States, to resist this policy m favour of a disposition of forces that would afford superior protection to their ro spnctive commercial vessels. "AVar is always a ■ dangerous gameMilitary operations conducted by several allied Powers should, never be based upon a policy of 'safety first' as regards the interests of any particular ally. This is especially true where success depends unon the maximum protection being given to tho allied, com ; merce as a whole. As the possession ftT adequate shipping was an linne.rative requirement in this war, it follows that the. essential policy was to pool all antisubmarine forces and place them to the best possible advantage for the protection of all shipping, regardless of any flag that it happened to be under while bhe winning of the war was the paramount object, and ns our anti-submarine forces and those of tlie Allies were always inadequate, and as it was consequently impossible to _ prevent a certain amount of loss, it that the game was to reduce the combined loss "of Allied shipping below a point which would defeat the objective of the enemy and thus ensure victory of the common cause as a whole. It was repeatedly explained that if wc could actually 'entice the enemy into shifting his submarines to our coast-it would be greatly to the advantage of t'ne common cause, even granting that our shipping would suffer somewhat more severely;'that the chances of the enemy shifting any of his operations to tho United States coast-without onr having advance knowledge, >vhile remote, was a fully justifiable risk, and, therefore, that such considerations should not deter us in any way from throwing every possible bit of strength into the fight on the actual 'front,' that is. in the war zone in European waters. Moreover, that the risk was slight, as vessels could lie sent back, if necessary, before submarines .'could do much damage. In making long passages submarines necessarily steam at sliw speed—from five to six knots.

. "Delays and confusion also were caused by tho'dealing with representatives of foreigj. countries stationed in America, who made independent and strenuous deman ls for ships, coal and other supplies, etc., without reference to the demands' or necessities of others. The Department- thus ignored its own representative, who was manifestly i.broad for the paramount purpose of investigating the detniU of all such requests, and determining, after conference with the Allied navies, their relative merits, and particularly their relation to the necessities of the anti-submarine campaign. There Wit's insistence by the Navy Department upon finding now naval plans—a royal roal to victory—such as blocking the enemies' ports. The objection to radically new plans was that the situation w 15 critical and their preparation ivould del ly striking quickly with all available forces This insistence assumed that the Department, incompletely informed as it necessarily was and without pi evio is experience in the war, was more competent to decide upon practical plans thvn their own representatives in contfnuou'' conference with the lenders of the Allied navies who had had nearly three years' experience. This attitude was maintained until after the Com-mai'.der-in-Chief of the Atlantic l'leet (Admiral Jlayol and t'l® Chief of Naval Opi rations (Admiral Benson) had visited Europe and learned something of the situation. "During the first year of the war the Department refused to «ermit in© to enroll in the Naval Reserve capable Amevicuna who h>id special knowledge and wha offered their services. Many ot these men possessed special European experience which could not be obtained at home. Some of them felt so impelled to do their part that they actually returned to the United States in onto that rhey niljht be enrolled there. At no time during the war was I permitted to select my subordinate flag commanders and but very few of my subordinates. Efficiency in war depends so much upoi complete mutual confidence and sympathy between subordinates and their superiors that it seems hardly necessary to stale that I should at least have been consulted as to these important assignments and, of course, held responsive for the results attained. "The above brief account of the manne;' in which our naval operations were conducted clearly shows that the following giave errors were committed,in violation of fundamental militnry principles; and it is manifestly desirable that sii':h violations should be avoided in the future:— "1. Although war with Germany lmd been imminent for many months prior to its declaration., there was nevertheless no mature plan developed'or naval policy adopted in preparation for war in so far as its commander in Europe was informed. "2. The Navy Department did not announce a policy until three months after war was declared—at;, least not to its representative and the Commander of th.? Forces in Europe. "3 The Navy Department did not. enter wholeheartedly into the campaign for uianv months after wc declared war, thus putting a great strain upon tho moral of the fighting forces in the war area by ilecreasinj their confidence in their leaders. "4. The outbreak of hostilities found many impoiitanl naval units widely dispersed and in need of repairs before thev could be sent to the critical area. Destroyers arriving in the war zone had been cruising extensively off our seaboard and in the Caribliean, and, when war was declared, were rushed through ' a brief and inadequate preparation for dicta lit servicc. '. I "5. During the. most critical months lof the enemy's submarine campaign n"i»inst the Allies' line of communication the Department violated the fundamental strategical principle of concentration of maximum force in the critical area of the conflict. "(S The Department representatives willi" the Allied Admiralties were _ not •supported during the most critical months of tlio war either by the adequate personnel or by the adequate forces that could have been supplied. "7. The Department'? commander in the critical area of hostilities was never allowed to select his principal subordinates, and was not even consulted as to their assignment. A fundamental principle of tiie art of command is hero in"8. The Navv Department made and acted upon decisions concerning operations that were being conducted 3000