THE MIDDLE EAST

Dominion, Volume 13, Issue 154, 25 March 1920, Page 5

THE MIDDLE EAST

FORMIDABLE PROBLEMS

EXTENSION OF BOLSHEVIK POWER

BRITAIN'S MESOPOTAMIA

POLICY

By Telegraph—Press Association—Copyrisht London, March 20. In the debate in tho.House of Commons on the Army Estimates, Mr. Winston Churchill, Minister of AYar, said tho situation in the Middle East was tho cause of sreat anxiety, out hitherto it had not proved so formidable in practice as it seemed in prospect. Nevertheless, the situation was acute. , As recards Mesopotamia there were threo causes of anxiety-tho Turkish Nationalist movement, under Mustapha Kemal; the Arabs who had been disturbed by the occupation of Syria, and who were nowinclined for the first time in many ways to make common cause with the i'urkish Nationalists; and the Bolsheviks.

Destruction of Anti-Bolshevik Forces, The destruction of the anti-Bolshevik forces, said the Minister, was proceeding to a verv marked extent, and very soon Bolshevik military power would extend over the whole' of those. great regions north of the Caucasus and beyond the Caspian, quite unchecked by "any Russian force.

With tho fall of the Caspian Sea, which must occur when the ice in the Volea was melted and tho Bolsheviks could descend, tho river, tho Bolsheviks would be in close toucli with the doubtful Beimblic of Azerbaijan, the Eepuhlie of Georgia, and with tho hostile forces under Mustapha Kemal. . On military grounds, this junction would be formidable.' Ho thought it probable that the Bolsheviks would use their advantage to spread their propaganda as widely as possible, rather than follow it up in a strictly military sense. '

■ Strong Forces Required. It. wns therefore obvious that the whole position in the Middle East caused great anxiety, and required the maintenance of stronir forces there. Ho hoped, however, it would bo possible to effect economy in that theatre, in the course of the year by holding Mesopotamia primar,ily through the agency of tile air rather than by military forces. We could not continue holding the. country and spending fifteen or twenty millions a rear on it. He did not see why British Statecraft should bo bankrupt in Mesopotamia when it was so successful in other oarts; for instance, in the Sudan whore there was only one white battalion. ;ivbile in the. whole of West Africa there was not a singje white battalion.

British Political Influence. Mr. Churchill said he was not prepared to propose that we should ( march about Mesopotamia holding the' peoplo down bv military force; nor had he ever ovetended that -when we received tho mandate wo should immediately occupy and dominate every square, mile of the country on the first day. Other methods must lie devised if wo were to continue to keep Mesopotamia. Ho quoted, for instance, the process in AVest Africa, where British political influence had gradually nermeated the whole country, and brought great areas under successful control. That was tho lino on which they were working now in regard ixi Mesopotamia.'

Referring to Germany, the Minister said the state of affairs there was causing the greatest anxiety from the military standpoint. It ought to bo the policy of the Government by all means in its power to enable a modern to German Goverument to maintain itself as a living entity, and. under its aegis and under its onranisation, for .the productive activities and prosperity of the German peoplo to revive—Aus.-N.Z. Cable Assn.