WAR IN A NUTSHELL

Dominion, Volume 13, Issue 111, 4 February 1920, Page 7

WAR IN A NUTSHELL

FACTORS IN VICTORY AN ABLE SUMMING UP Tho concluding-' ''Victory" volume of "Nelson's History of tho War," by Mr. John Buehan (Thomas Nelson and Pons, Ltd., London, Edinburgh, mid New York) is reviewed in recent English files. Mr. Buchnn's work in this history lias lioen masterly, but it is not too ranch io say that he has written nothing finer ,-s a. study of events and operations than in the last paees of his retrospect in this volume. The following is extracted from the work: I "We may well leave to posterity the task of envisaging this colossal turmoil, in tho sure confidence that posterity will not underrate it, for with every year tho i infinite ramifications of suffering will be more clearly seen. Lot us nttemnt to Pot down briefly the character of (lie ■war itself, the objects of the combatants, the methods which led the Allies to' victory, and tho nature of thnt'victory. Wo hnvo watched tho 6low process, and wo may now venture to summnrise its salient features and results. "Germanv began with the odds in her favour. She was superior to any combination of her enemies in the number of trained men she could put straightway into the field; she had a smooth ar,d powerful military machine built no oatiently during a generation; she had a centralised command, and her colleague were subject in all matters to her will. She was aware that her opponents had great notential strength,'but it would take time to become actual, and sho hoped to win victory long before that dav dawned. Unlike her enemies, she realised the fundamental weakness of Russia, and knew that if che could deal a crushing blow in tho West she might Rifely leave tho East to be dealt w'th at leisure. So, outraging cverv law of God and man in her methods, she sought to win in France that "battle without a morrow" of which her general staff had nbv.ivs dreamed. "Tho dream was shattered at the .'.Fame, but with praiseworthv courage she revised her plans. She fell back ini pido impregnable defences, and being, as she thought, self-sub'istent and wholly discinlined, set herself to wear down tho spirit of her foes. For three yen" the vi" became the siege of a fortress. There were sallies by the hesieired, ns when von Mnckensen swept Russia out of Poland, when the same ceneral overran Serbia, and when von Falkenhayn pushed Rumania behind the Sereth: there was the sally of .Austria, first to the edee of the Lombard nlain, and then to the Piave: there was the great and disastrous sallv of the Imperial Crown Prince at Verdun. There were attacks, too, by tho besieeers; by the Russians in tho East; by tho British at Gallipoli, on the borders of Palestine, and in Mesopotamia: by Italy across the Isonzo; by the British and French at Festubert and in Artois. at loos and Champagne, in the lons-drawn First Battle of the • Somme, at Arras. Messines, Ypres, and Cambrai. These attacks gravely weakened the gar-1 rison of the. fortress, and the blockad of the Allied navies lowered the resis' ing .power of the vast population insid tho defences. Early in the year 1917 i seemed as if the fortress might fall iron an enveloping attack. Russia's Downfall, "The downfall of Russia changed tin Drosnect' Thenceforth there were no be loaguring armies in the East; and thi garrison could be thinned on that sidi and supplies gathered from tho huge un defended territories stretching to tin Pacific. _ A neve policy was revealed t< the besieged. America had entered tin war against them, but America would b< slow in mustering, her armies, and the] had the chanco of annihilating the wearj levies of France, and Britain while the.i ■were vet unreinforced. Germany still Rambled upon her superior military prowess and disciplined moral. So far tin offensive was in discredit, for the assaults of her enemies had not breached hei fortifications, but sho might devise a tactical :mothod which would succeed •where thev had failed. Accordingly, on March 21. 1918,. she gathered all her strength for a final effort, the trench campaign ceased, and tho day of tho onen battle began. "Tho plan, if it were to win, must win nt once. For the Allies had begun to set their houso in order, they had tightened the strings of tho blockado, and Riven authority into skilled hands. Moreover, even nearer from the AVest crept the ominous cloud of America's battlecower. The Gorman stroke miscarried, , and its failure meant the certainty of Germany's defeat. Sho had staked everything on tho venture, and her flagging vitality oould not compass a second. Further, tho peril had compelled her enemies to tako tho final step in reform, and thev had entrusted the supremo command to their greatest soldier. We have seen tho masterly strategy of Foch, Waiting patiently on tho appointed time, he struck a blow which put the German machine out of gear. Carrying his enemy's tactics to their logical t conclusion, he kept the battle 'nourished' and mobilo, till on September 2G he dealt those hammer strokes which turned a great, machine into dobris.- Tho victory in the field, •which faint-hearts among tho Allies had despaired of, camo in the most shattering and cataclysmic-fonn._ At last had been fought tho "battle without a morrow/ for it broke not only tho German armies but the German people, and tho. creed for which they had contended. "History will not deny to Germany tho credit of boldness in conception, and vigour and tenacity in execution. Her national trade had long been war, and for tho first years of the campaign sho was tho professional arrayed against amateurs. Her disciplined peoplo suffered great hardships patiently, and did not break till they wero assured of defeat. Her armies showed, both individually and in the mass, tho utmost valour and resolution. It was no contemptiblo foe that yielded on November 11. She bad tho elasticity of spirit to bo jiblo to revise her plans in the face of failure, and to carry out tho new as methodically and vigorously as the old. She showed beyond doubt a higher average of talent in subordinate commands than any of the- nations allied against her. Germany's Blunders, "Her blundws lay in statesmanship and in the supreme military direction. Tjnited lieisclf and with complaisant colleagues, she had-to face a loose alliance of proud and independent democracies. A little fikill might have increased tho looseness of its bonds till it dissolved, but Germany by her maladroitness welded it together. Her calculated barbarities sickened tho world and turned nuutrals into enemies; her clumsy propaganda weakened tho impression of power which her victories hud created; she lit revolutions to destroy her opponents, and scorched her hands in their flame; above all, she forced America, unwilling and unready, into the conflict. The mingled bluster and whine which had become her public voice ended by making her a laughingstock. Tho policy of Gormany throughout the war was of a pieco with her diplomacy before 19H, an invitation to tho hostility of mankind, and defensible only on tho assumption that her soldiers wero so great that fatuity in her statesmen did not matter. "But sho produced no tfnglo great soldier, though many competent ones. Von Jlindonburg had" sonic of tho indefinable magnetism that makes a great lender, and von Mnckensen had remarkable driving power. But her best were von Falkenhayn. and von Ludendorff, for they alone Lad somo inkling of' the nrt «w opposed to the mcro science of war. Again and again throughout 'he p-nr"t><V7'"> ■.■p--v r-:i» f <■■■:- tratcd, not by patent blunders, but by a certain narrowness of- outlook and scientific woodenness of method. The instances are endless: von Kluck's rigid adherence to his encircling plan during otlatk at First Ypres; tho attack on the Lys in April, 1918, which drifted , from u minor to a major operation, and ' thereby defeated tho general strategy; tlio Second Battlo of tho Marnc, vhich f»nr l b- •- -,- ground. Ludendorff was a great organiser and a master of detail, but he had not that synoptic view of a battlefield and that insight into the heart of a situation which has belonged to tho great captains of history. Jt may bo argued that tho preoccupation of Germany with her machine and her meticulous industry mado it impossible for Ler

to produco tho highest kind of military Renins. Sho was too busy with tlio trees to sec tho wood, and in tlio long run it is the wood that counts. Allies Prevail. "Tho Allies struggled upon tho strung against heavy odds; their strength 1; in Ine fact mat every <lav that uisum was evaded tlio odds would lesson, li nrpsentlv tlinv wouhl bo on their sid It is for this reason that tho Fir Marne is to be reckoned ono of tho d cisivo battles of tlio world; it definite shut the door of complete defeat, ar gavo them a breathing space. Tin oveded leisure to train their nianlni and prepare a machine the equivalo] of Germany's, and Russia's heroic battl during 1015 were vital as a distractic for. tho enemy. The Allies niado couu less blunders, but, while it is easy enoug to detect them now, it is hard (o see bo at tho timo they could have boo avoided. There was no central coinmam no singlo mind envisaging the yho clumsy device of occasional conferenci could not atone for tho lack of exoci tivo unity. They suffered, too, froi several profound misconceptions of fac They exaggerated tho strength of Russi; and did not forcseo the lindergroun forces which were destined to overture her. They underestimated tho po: sibilities of their command of the sei and wore too slow to declare tho bloc! ade, and, when it was declared, t make it effective. They underestimate the strength of the German war-mc chine and the power of defensive i. modern war. Their various attacks i the West during 1915 were, as is no\ clear, mistaken; they were not prepare' cither in men or material for ambition objectives. Again, while the neccssitie of their position forced them to under take divergent operations, it may fairl; he argued that these operations wer too divergent. They lacked purpose am a definite place in a strategical scheme for minor operations they were toi Co3tly, and for major operations toi weak. In the long run they bore amph fruit, but only after victory was as sured in tho main theatre of the West Finally, the Allies were slow to rea'. the lessons. of the now war, and foi .years followed unsuitable methods ir 'rhe field. That was inevitable, and it ii to their credit that in tho end they rcaf these lessons more correctly than theii enemy. Remember that for long thej were improvisers, and had to learn a new art and perfect their machin« through.many experiments. "Let it not be said that they 'muddled through' to victory. . Success was never yet won by such a road. While thev muddled they stuck fast. Their nroblem was the same as that of the North in the American Civil War—to 6tave off immediate defeat and to make actual their potential human and economic superiority. When their material strength wns so organised that it surpassed that of their opponents, and when it was so used that no nart of it was wasted, victory followed like the conclusion of a mathematical demonstration. The war proved once again tho supreme value of training and intellect. The Allies were victorious in the end because they used their brains better than Germany and out-generalled their opponents,

0 Reasons of Success, j "If; would bo a task both futile ani t invidious to discuss the relative con 1 tributions of the different Allies t this achievement. All had it in i full and noblo share. But since thi book is a'> British history, it is permis i siblo to cmphnsise the magnitude of on - couptry's part. The British Fleet nulji > fied the Germans on the high seas in tin ) first month of the war, and conducted thi blockade which sapped her interna ! strength It alone made possible the cc i operation in the field of allies separate! ! bv leagues of sea, and the conduct of thi i campaigns in distant battlegrounds. Thi wealth of Britain boro for years the mail financial burden of the Alliance, and hei ' factories produced the greater part o that mighty reserve_ of material whicl ended bv far surpassing Germany's long 1 prepared stores. Her armies, beginning from the smallest numbers, grew to lx the eaual of any in the world, alike ir , training, discipline, and leadership Moreover.-her' steady resolution was f bulwark to all her confederates in the darkest hours. Such has always beer her record in European wars. At the beginning she is underrated as a sofl and pacific Power already on the decline. Such in the eighteenth century was the view of Continental monarehs, Frederick the Great. Joseph II of Austria, Catherine of Russia; such in 1911 wae the view of the German Government, ■She comes slowly to a decision, enters upon war unwillingly, but wages it with nil her heart, and docs not slacken till her purpose is attained. It was so in tho davs of Philip of Spain, of Louie Quatorzo. and of Napoleon. The 'island Poland' ends by finding the future of the world in her hands. The few wise men in Germany were amply justified who on the news that Britain had entered the conflict cried Ichabod to the houes of German victory. Great Men. "The war was 000 of nations rather than of Governments, of the rank and file rather than of generals. Without the susfiSncd endurance of every class, in the community there could have been no success, and the battles were dependent upon the fighting vigour and endurance of tlie average soldier rather than upon anv particular brilliance and subtlety in leadership This was inevitable, partly because the struggle was so vast and desperate. reaching to the roots of human life; partly because it was a new kind of war. . and generals as well as privates had their business to learn. One figure alono among tho commanders in tho field on any side stands out in tho full heroic proportions. By 'whatever standard we judge him, Ferdinand Foch must take rank among tho dozen greatest of tho world's captains. Long before the outbreak of war ho had rondo himself a irastor of his art, nnd a happy fate ji.vo him the chance of putting into praetico in tho field tho wisdom he had learned at leisure. Itc had studied closely the work of Napoleon, and had brought his mind into tune with that mighty intellect so that he absorbed his methods like a collaborator' Tatlier than a pupil. Discarding the pedantic cobwebs which tho too laborious German Staff had . woven round the Napoleonic campaigns, ho mastered those principles which to the great Emperor were like 'flashes of white light' to illnminato his path. Few soldiers havo been mora learned in their profession, nnd few have worn their learning moro lightly. His broad, sane intelligence was without prejudice or prepossession. Ho turned a clear eye to the instant need of things, and read tho facts of the caso with a bravo candour. But ha did not forget that the maxims of strategy are eternal tilings, and lie brought his profound knowledge of tho past to elucidate the present. No aspect was neglected; he knew how to inspire men by the beau geste as well as how to labour at the minutiao of preparation. He was both artist and loan of science; ho worked at a problem by tho light of reason nnd knowledge; but ■when these failed he was content to trust that instinct which is an extra senso in great commanders. His character was a marvello-is compound of patience and ardour; lie could follow Fabian tnV,ties when these were called for, and ho could risk anything on (iio sudden stroke. He was not infallible, any more than Caesar, or Napoleon, or Lee, but lie could rise from his mislakes to a higher wisdom. In a word, ho had a genius for war. that rarest of human talents. In the splendid company of the historic French captains he will stand among the foremost, behind, not far behind, the greatest of nil. "Ho was well served bv his colleagues. .Toffre and de Castelnau. through the first difficult years which laid tho foundations of victory. Pefaiu showed a supreme talent for dei'ensiv.? warfare land for tho organisation of armies. Army and group commandors like Mangin and Gounuid, l'ayolle nnd Frnnehot d'Esperey, Phnneraml Cnvnu. lvero in all likelihood superior to any generals of iho sanio rank on (lie ener.'iy side; Ihough men like von Annin, von lioehii. and von Kinvm were most capable soldiers. But if we are to seek for the first lieutenant or the Commander-in-Chief, fhe choiro must fall on Sir Douglas Tlnig. He moro than nny iither man mado tho final conception of Foch possible. Ho had not the great Frenchman's gift for .'■•tralejry, but lie had tho scarcely less valuable power of creating the weapons fur iho strategist lo use. lie was a master in the art of training troops, tho frrontest Britain had seen since Sir John Moore. Under his guidance tho British