TRIUMPH OF THE TANK

Dominion, Volume 13, Issue 76, 23 December 1919, Page 7

TRIUMPH OF THE TANK

"MOST IMPORTANT WEAPON INVENTED DURING WAR" LUDENDORFF'S EVIDENCE (By Major-General Sir F. Maurice, in the "Daily News.") Tanks were, beyond question, the most important weapon of land warfare invented during the course of the long struggle, iiiul those'to whom tho invention is dii 9 deserve a fitting reward. Aeroplanes iiad been tested at military manoeuvres by all the Great Powers hefore the war, ami.had lioen incorporated in military establishments. The Germans, as the result of a long and careful study of the lessons of the Russo-.Tapan-oso war, had ready when war broke out heavy howitzers, long-range guns, trench mortars, flame-throwers, and hand grenades.

They were as much surprised as wo were by tho development of trench warfare. Jt was the last thing they desired. AVhat they wanted was a w;ar of movement, bringing with it a quick decision. But they knew that-both tho French and the Russians had great tu 1 - tresses, and they prepared these new arms for use in tho sieges which might take place, and therefore they were ready with them long before wo were. German Invontiveness. It was generally assumed in the early part of the war that the Germans had shown themselves to be conspicuously superior to us in inventiveness. In point of fact they wero'oxtrnordinarily thorough and painstaking in their preparation, but they did not show any remarkable quickness of perception or power of imagination. The Germans believed that they would be engaged in siege warfare, and they prepared for it systematically.

We did ncit conceive that our little army would he employed in a great siege, and "wo made no such preparation. _ So when trenches were dug across Belgium and Prance, from the North Sea to the Swiss" frontier, tho Germans were ready and wo were not. The ono important new weapon of trench warfare which they produced was poison gas, in violation of the spirit of tho Hague Convention, which Germany signed. An appendix to this Convention bound the contracting parties "to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiatinir or deleterious gases," while Article 23 prohibits the use of poison and poison weapons. In April, 1915, the Germans got round these agreements by discharging asphyxiating gas from cylirders, arguing doubtless that a cylinder is not a projectile. As tliey had these' cylinders ready for use four months after the trench barrier was formed I strongly suspected that they bad, at least, thought out the-ir use before the war.

Struggle Against Difficulties. , When it came to devising an offectivo antidote to barbed wire and tronches, British inventiveness led the way. There was tlie usual struggle between the enthusiasm of the inventors, who at first claimed too much for their child, and the obstruction of authorities, who made insufficient allowance for tho possibilities of improvement as experience was gained, but in the end enthusiasm triumphed. Our first tanks made their debut in tho Battle of the Somme, in September, li)lfi. They did good work, but did not fulfil all ' the expectations which had been formed of them.

A new invention rarely does so; still, they just'fied themselves, and the enthusiasts' went ahead. Ludendorif was not impressed by th'em; the only remark he makes ahout them, in reviewing tho. le.s/ons of the Somme, is that " the time was not yet come for us to undertake tho construction of tanks." So he deliberately allowed us a long siart. which cost him dear. It was not until near the end of 1917 that tho tanks made their name. Tn the spring of that year, in the Battle of Arras, they often broke down, and were more often bo slow, ond thn infantry began to complain that thev were unreliable. In the attack on Bnlleeourf. in -particular, Ihe Australians roundly asserted that they had been let down hy the tanks.

In Plumer's attack' on the Messines Twdge the effect, of the great, mine explosions and of tho ni'tillnrv bombardment was so great that, the infantry swept on ahead of the tanks. In the autumn of 1917 the mud of Flanders proved ton much for them during the slow climb up to the Passohendncle T;idge. Of tliav battle Lndendorff pays the strength of -mr attack "did not. consist, in lb" tanks. We found them -'nconvenienf, b»t pnr them out of action all the same.". The Tanks Make Good. Then came Evnsr's r-.-te'e at Cnmbrai in November, wb'ch proved beyond question that tanks in mass could take the place of the prolonged bombardment for cutting wire and mncl>i"cfiin nests.-and so mnk" surnrise possible. But it also proved Unit the tank was very vulnerable tn nrt'llory fire. One gnllnnt German offiror, firing hir eun.to the last from lielrnd a r-*rk wall, knocked eut a dozen tanks. Tt. v-n- iv-ecs'/n'v to find a means of protecting the tnnk (!!».•""*t the eirmv's """-.

Polying on his artillery. 'LudendorlT still did not think much of tanks. Sneaking of his "rent nff«nsivp in (lie spring of 1!)18 lie savs: "Wo formal detaclimPTifs of captured tanlc=. T ha'l a l*nl.- .it Hip first onp in I'"hrunry. 1018. It did not- imp'-nss mo. 0»r own tank detachments suPfpred hoavv losses 15 the fiirhting which followed without cffectinc anything." Luckily the tank= captured by tho Gorman", wore very different in power and in speed to Hip tanks which tboy met in Hip summer nf 1918. A German Tribute. Ludendorff tells ns that August S, 1918, "was the black day for the German army in tho history of the war." It was tho day of Huig's 'victory of Amiens'and the day of triumph for the tank. A heavy barrage rolling in front of them neutralised the German guns, and the. tanks advancing behind it piayed havoc. The moral of the German troops collapsed largely owing to the panic created by tho tanks, and "thereafter,'' says Ludondorff, "artificial fog and mass attnek by tanks remained our most dangerous enemies." Towards the end even tho nppearanco of tho unarmed tanks used for transporting troops and stores caused the enemy to flee. On October 3 one of Ludcndorff's staff, carefully instructed by him, was sent to Berlin to explain to tho politicians why it was invent to obtain an armistico at once. He said, "Two factors liavo had a decisive influence on our decision, namely, tanks and our reserves. The enemy made use of tanks in unexpectedly large' numbers. In cases where they have suddenly emerged in huge masses from smofco clouds our men wore ■complete I .)' unnerved. Tanks broke through our foremost lines, making a way for their infantry, racking our rear, and causing local panics, which entirely up set our Kittle control." Tho tanks need no oilier tribute.