HAIG AND NIVELLE

Dominion, Volume 13, Issue 75, 22 December 1919, Page 7

HAIG AND NIVELLE

THE 1917 CAMPAIGN CHARGES OF WANT OF LOYALTY DISPROVED (By Major-General Sir F. Maurice in tho "Daily News") Tho plan-; for Hie Allied campaign of 1!)17 date, as Commandant de Civrieux tells us, from a. conference of Command-ers-in-Chief and Chiefs of Staff held at Joffro's headquarters in November, 1910. It was then derided that (he Allied armies should be ready to attack during tlio first fortnight of February, 1017, ana .lollre asked Uaig (o bo ready for nil offensive on tlio front between Bapaumo and Viiny by February 1, while lie was to l>e ready to follow a little later with a great French attack between the Soiumo and the Oisc. Mr. Lloyd George,, in his l'aris speech, poured much ridiculo over this conference of ,Toff re's. He said it merely consisted in sticking, together a number ot totally disconnected plans and in giving them a semblance of unity which was tnlallv fictitious. In point of fact, a* things turned out, it would almost certainly li.ivo been much better for our cause if the plans agreed upon by the Allied generals had been left alone.

Nivelle's Plans, Viifortunntely they woro not left alone. ITiirdly had the November conferenco closed before the so-called "Young Turk" party in Mis French Army and in the French Chamber hod got to wcrk. Joffro was dejiosed, and oil December 12 was replaced by Niivelle. Foch was put on the shelf; and resolute but costly attempts to carry tlio Vimy R-idgo had not made him popular: and ho was followed not long after by Petain, who from tlio first expressed disagreement with Nivelle's plans. Immediately on his arrival at French Headquarters Nivolle proceeded to recast .Toffre's plans, and oil December 21 he wrote to Itaig asking him to carry out a. very considerable "xtention of the British front. To this Haig replied that such an extension must depend on the time of'arrival of six division;? which, were about to be transferred to him from Egypt. These divisions were to be landed at Marseilles, and it depended upon the capacity of the French railways, over which Haig had no control, when they would reach him.

Mr. Lloyd George and Italy,

Tlio next step in the negotiation was an Allied Conference lieUl at Rome early in January. To this conference Mr. Lloyit George, lliirvkinjj of the bloody assaults of the Somme and of tlio impenetrable barrier in the West, brought a plan for a great reinforcement of the, .Italian front, and for an attempt to knock out. Austria. Mr. Lloyd George's plan, which overlooked the fact that the railway communications between France and Italy were neither numerous no*- good, and that the Germans could readily anticipate such a movement, was, >1. Painleve tells us, heavily sat upon by General Nivello; and 5L Painleve also hints broadlv that it did not commend itself io the French Government. It does not appear to havo token Jr. Briand, then Prinm Minister of France, lons tn get Mr. Llovd George to chan.ee his mind, for at a conference held at No. lfl Downing Street. on January 15, the British Government decided to support Nivelle's plan wholeheartedly. Jlaig was directed to cany out the extension of the front and was to be ready to attack on April I—that is, two months later than tlio dale selected by Joffre.

Haig Placed Under Nivelle. Tlio "Young Turks" wero meantime hiird at work, endeavouring to get tlio British Army placed definitely under the orders of .Nivelle. At an interview which took plac« on February 15 between Jl'r. Lloyd George and Major Berthicr do Sauvigny, the French officer who wca nt that lime attached to my department at the AYar Office, Mr. Lloyd George declared, according to Major Bertlrer's report, which Commandant do Civricux gives in extenso, that ho had completo confidence in Nivelle, and that, though there might bo difficulties owing to tlio prestigb which Haig enjoyed with tlio British Army and flic British people, tho War Gab'net would not hesitate to give orders placing the British .Army under tho French. Commander-in-Chief, Init those orders must be secret. Then followed, (ho Calais Conference of February ii(i and 27, at which the general direction of the cnmpaijoi was placed in General Nivelle's hands.

The German Retreat, While tlio_ Calais Conference was ill progress, Mill'" received news from Gougli, then, in command of tlio Fifth Army, that there were indications of'si German retreat on his front. This was the beginning of Ludeiidorfr.= retirement into the ]lindenbur<» Line. That retirement extended rapidly, and before long had affected almost the whole front between Arras and the Smnme. However, immediately on his return to his headquarters from tho Calais Conference, : Haig received from Nivelle instructions fixing Cambrai as his goal. It at once beeamo apparent to Sir Douglas that tlio German retreat would make it extremely diffimilt, if not impossible to carry out Nivelle's instructions. and he accordingly mado reDrcsentations to the French Commander-in-Chief. Nivelle appeal's to have regarded these representations ns frivolous, and to have considered their object to be an attempt bv Haig to cscapo from tho decisions of the Calais Conference. He annroached his Government, with tlio result that, on March G !!". Brianil addressed a stronsr remonstrance to Jfi\ Lloyd George, in which he stated that Haig had made in> his mind not to accept the oee.isions which t!ie two Governments had reached at Calais, and was repeatedly calling in question the plan of campaign on which the two Governments " had acrecd. Such charges as have been made again-? 1, Lord Uaig of failing to cooneratc whole-heartedly with Nivelle are based on (hi-; dispatch. It is clear, bcvond shadow of <ioul.il, that those charges made liv .M. Brianil were based on a complete misconception of the situation.

The dotnt is that, as does happen in war. the enemy had intervened, and had done something which knocked the bottom out of Xiveile's original plan. Haig' would hav-'. failed in his duty «to his countrv ana (o Ihe men under his orders, if. in ihe circumstances, he had agreed fo attack C; mbvai, as Nivelle directed. There never was, and there never has been, anv croiiml whatever for any charge of want of loyalty 011 Ihe part of Mais' towards his Fieucli comrades. In the issue, as is well known, Haig shifted his front: of attack northwards to tho Arras-Vimv front; from which the Germans had not retired; and 011 April 9 and the davs following, he won tho most important victory which hn<i till then rewarded our efforts, taking more than his full share i:. the combined plan of cammien.