THE DARDANELLES

Dominion, Volume 13, Issue 73, 19 December 1919, Page 7

THE DARDANELLES

LORD FISHER'S "MEMORIES"

CAMPAIGN OPPOSED ' . I The. greater part of tho book from ■which this matter is taken was dictated by Admiral of tho Fleot Lord Fisher in September. Tho book includes also extracts from certain fugitivo writings ■which Lord Fisher is renting f or p r j. vate circulation. Tho complete volumo has been published by Messrs. Ilodder and Sfcoughton, CHAPTER V. Th 2 Dardanelles. "Until this day remaineth tho same vail untakeu away."—ll. Corinthinne, iii, H. If anyone thinks that in this chapter they are going to sco sport and that I j am going, to trounce Mr. Winston Churchill n,nd abuse Mr. Asquith and put it nil upon poor Kitchener, they nre woefully mistaken. It wns a r.nasma that brought about tho Dardanelles adventure. A miasma like tho invisible scentless, poisonous-deadly poisonous-gas •with which my dear friend Brock, of imperishable memory mid Victoria Cross bravery, wickedly massacred at Zee-, brugge, wa 3 going (in unison with a plan ■I had) to polish off not alone every human 6oul in Heligoland and its surrounding fleet sheltered under its guns from the Grand Fleet, but every rabbit. It was much, tho same gas tho German put into tho Inflexible (which I commanded), in 1882 to light tho engineroom. W 7 hen it escaped it was scentless; instead of going up as it ought to have done, it went down, and povroeated the double bottom, and wo kept'hauling up unconscious men like poisoned minors out of a coalirit We'll get afong with the Dardanelles now. Well, / I left off at .the "miasma" that, imperceptibly to each, of them in tho War Council, floated down on them, with raro swbtlo dialectical skill, and proved so incontestably to them that cutting off tho enemy s big toe in the East was better than, stabbing him to the heart in the West; and that the Dardanelles was better than tho Bnltio. and that Gallipoli knocked spots off the Kiel Canal or a Russian army landed bv tho British Fleet on the Baltic shore of Sclileawig-Holstein. Without any doubt, the "beseeohings' of the Grand Duke Nicholas in the Caucasus on January 2, 1915, addressed to Kitchener in snch soldierly terms, moveo! that ereat man's heart; for say what you will. Kitchener was' a great num. But he was a, great deception, all tho same, inasmuch as ho couldn't do what a, lot of people thought he could do Liko Moses, he was a great commissariat officer, but he wns not a Napoleon or a Moltko: he was a Carnot in excelsis, and he was the facile dupe of his own failings. But "Spoak well of thoso who treat von well." I wont- to him one evening at 5 p.m.. with Mr. Churchill's knowledge, and said to him as First • Sea Lord of tho Admiralty that if Ms inyr- [ midons did not cease that 6amo night from seducing men from tho private shipyards to become "cannon-fodder" I •was eoini* to resign at Gp.ra. I explained to 'him the egregious folly of not ■pressing on our shipbuilding to its utmost limits. Ho admitted tho soft im■neachment as to the seduction; and there, while I waited, he wroto the telegram callinsr off the seducers. If only rhnt had been stuck to after I left the Admiralty wo shouldn't be rationed now in sucar nearly a year aftor the Armistice, nor should wo bo bidding fair to become a secono! Carthage. Wo left our element tho sea, to make ourselves into ft conscript nation fighting on the Continent with four million soldiers out of a population, of 40 millions. More than all the other nations was our Army.

Wild-cat Schemes. Well, once more resuming tho Dardanelles etory.. Theso side-lights-really Jl-. lnminate the situation. Theso armies wo were raising incited us to these wild-cat expeditions. 1 haven't' reckoned them up, but there mu3t liave been a baker rf dozen of ■"om goiji? on. Now, do endeavour to get tte vital fact into your mind. Wo are an island. Every Boldicr that -wants to go anywhere out of I'.ngsailor has got to carry him there on his back. Consequently, every soldier chat yon Taiso or enlist, or recruit, or whatever the proper word is, unless liie is absolutely part of- a Lord Lieutenant's Army, never to go out of England and only recruited, like the Militia.—that -splendid force!—to be called up only in case of invasion—as I say, ovexy soldier that is recruited on any other basis means so much tonnage in shipping.that has to.bo provided, not only, to take him to the Continent, but ifs got to be kept ready to bring him back, in case of this being wounded, and all the tjmo to take him provisions, ammunition, stores, Theso vessels again have to have other vessels to carry out coal for these vessels, and thesi) colliers have again to be supplemented by ofiher colliers to take tho placo of dhose removed from tho normal trade, and tho goal'mines themselves necessitate more miners or the miners working beyond the hours of fatigue to bring forth tho extra, coal; or else the commercial work of tho nation, gets diminished and your economio resources get crippled, and that of itsolf carried in extremis means finishing tho ■war. As a matter of fact, it has nearly finished the English nation—the crippling of .our economic resources by endravonring to swell ourselves out like the frog in Aesop's Fablesj and become a great Continental Power—forgetting the Heaven-sent gift of an incomparable Navy dating- from tho time of Alfred tho Great, and God's providing a breakwater COO miles long (the British islands) In front of the German coast to stoj) tho Gernian access to the ccean, a.nd thus by easy Mockfldi* killing him from tho sea as he was Killed eventually. . • . Mr. Churchill was behind no one both In his enthusiasm for the Baltx: project, and a.lso in his belief that the decisive theatre of war was bqyond doubt in 'Northern waters;, and both he ami Jlr. Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, magnificently responded to the idea of construct.'aig. a eront Armada of 612 vessels, to ba rapidly built—mostly in a few weeks and only a few extending over a few months—to carry out tho great purpose; and I prepared my own self ■with my own ha.nd.= alone, to preserve sp,crocy, all the aiTangements for landing three great armies at different places— two of them lu'in? feints Mat could bo turned into a reality. Also I made all tho preparations, shortly before these expeditions were to start, to practise them , 'embarking at Routhamnton and disembarking at Stoker Bar, so that those who wero goine to work the Russian armies would be nractised in tho art, having seen tho experiment conducted' on a scale of twelve inches to tho foot with 50,000 men. fWe onco embarked 8000 soldiers on board tho Mediterranean Fleet in nineteen minutes, and the Fleet steamed nut nml landed them at similar speed. Old Abdul Kfimid, tho Sultan, heard of it, anfl' ho complimented me on there being such a- Navv. ( That was tho occasion whnn a Ted-haired, short, fat major, livid with rage, complained .to mn on the beach that n blnoiacket bed showed him into tho boat nml said to him, "Ilurry up, you — lobster, or I'll be 'ung!" I explained to the major' that the man would havo been hung; he was -esponsiblo for getting the boot filled and shoved oil in so many seconds).)

The Baltic Scheme. I remember that at tho War Council held on January 28, 1915,. Nt 11.30 n.m.. Mr. Churchill announced that the real purposo of (ho Navy was to obtain access to the Baltic, Mid lie illustrated flint there were three naval biases. The first phaso was the clearing ( 'f the , outer seas, and that had been !,ccompihh"<l. Tlio second phase was Hie eloariiiff of tho North Sea. And the third phase was the cleaving of tho Baltic. Mr. Churchill laid stress on the importance'of this latter operation, because Germany always had been and still was very much afraid of being attacked in Die Celtic. I'or this purpose special 'vessels were needed, and tho First Sea Lord, Lord Fisher, had designed cruisers, etc., etc., meaning tho Armada. Mr. Lloyd Goorgo paid to me at-.another limiting tf tho War Council, with all listening, "Bow many battleships shall we lose in the

Dardanelles?" "A dozon!" sr.id I. "but I 'prefer to lose them elsewhere." In dictating this account I can't represent his face when I said this. Here I insert a letter on tho subject which I wroto to Lord Cromer in October, 1916:— "3G Berkeley Square, Oct. 11, 1916. "Dear Lord Croroer, -To-day Sir F. Cawley asked mo to reconcile Kr.cLci:er's statement of May 1-1 at tho Wμ Council that the Admiralty, proposed, tho Dardnnolles enterprise with ii-y abortion that ho (Kitchener) did it. I'loiso see question No. 1119. Mr. fn ureliijl is speaking, and Lord Kitchener; said to him, 'Could we not, for instance niako a demonstration at tho Dardanelles? "I renont that before lull-honors; letter of January 2 to Mr. Unirclnll there was no Dardanelles. Mr.. Churchill had been rightly wrapped up m (he ..plendid project of tho British Army sweeping nlong tho sea in association with tno British r Fl e et. Sco Mr. Churchill at quesof the (British) Aimy nlong the- coast wns an attractive operation 'but we could not get it settled. Sir John Freneli wanted very much to do it, but it fell throutrh. "Seo Lord TTishcr, War Council of January 13! Sir John French thai pre-sent-rthreo times he camo over about it)-' Lord Fisher demurred to anj attempt to attack foebrnwp Y" 1 ' 0 co-operation of the British Army along %;Ttftho Queen Elisabeth, Mr. Churchill is riglit in raying there was prent tension between Kitchener anil myself. He came over to the Admiralty and Then I said, It the Quoen Etofaetli didn't leavo 'tho Dardnnelles that nichf I should!' ho R ot v,p from the tnUo-and he loft! And. wro o a i .n----pleasant letter about me to the■ I'mjne Minister! Lucky ehe did leave 1 lhe, German submarine prowling around im a fnrlnipl't looking for her and ne«lecti." nY tho other lmttltfliins) blew up her duplicate wooden image. "Your?, etc., ■■(Signed) FISHER." Mr. Churchill is quite correct. I backed him uu till I resigned. I would t the Van* akain! Ho had courage and illumination!- Ho was a \Ui • M. . "If you doubt my dictum thai, the Cabinet Ministers only were members.of tho War Cuincil and the rest oi us voico tute to convey information and advice, ask ilanke-y to come betore you again and etato the elntus! "Otherwise the , exports would be the Government! Kiiwly read what Mr Aeauith said on November 25, 191 a, Hi ''S'constructed a fleet of dummy battleshius to draw off the German submarines This eanadron appeared v, th effect in the Atlantic, and much confused the enemy.) . . , Mr. Asmiilh also was miasma-ed; and it's not allowable to describe the discussion that he. I. and Mr. Churchill had in the Prime Ministers private loom, exceot so far ns to observe that Mi. Churchill hatf been strongly ... favour o military cooperation with he Fleei to , the Belirian coast, and Sir Joh l , '^* l ; on three different visits to the War Council, had assented to carrying out tie operation, provided ho had another division added to his force Tins pro-iect-so fruitful n B it would have been in its results at the early stage of tie war-was. I understand, prevented I>J ta oeterrents: (1) Lord utchener * (2) the French dulnt want the British Army to get into Belgium: CD the .Dardanelles came along. I obiected to any naval action on the Belßian , coast without such military cooneration. Those flat shores of Hie S.n coast, enfilade,; by the guns of the accompanying British Fleet, rendered that enterprise feasible, encouragnig. ami tevond doubt, deadly to the enemy s «A flank. BcsidPN .rreventine 7** brnojn from being fnrhfietf and the leidan const being made use of as a, jnmp-iiur-olf nlace for th« nir raids on London "ml elsewhere, with guns nnnaWe of mngine such an' enormou, distance m ■tbose mounted in Hie monitor* wo con! 1 Imve enfilnded with great effect all attacks bv the Germans

■■• .Scene in the War Council, men w got lo fho Council M" * member* havinß been keiit wiiilmj a * ?o the derision- H>at Jhe Ttnrdanelte 'project must proceed; and as T vow f oni ho Council -table Kitchener followed .no and was so earnest and even omobonn' A I should retm-'i tha J .nul to itself after some delay: "Well, we :an withdraw the. shin, nl R«r moinnnt f" long n* the military Won't lam}. »>d iLcumbod. I ««« ™<1 n " ""£,£'• mada. of Gl2 vessels? « jmHjroiisl} . fosh - od bv Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. f.lnnelill and sustained V Hi? Prime Mini=ter They wore of all sorts and «.«w -but alas! as they reached nompletio" they Wan to Iμ Rradually nerverted and diverted to purposes for which I hey wero unfitted and .employed in waters to wcl thev were ununited Nevertheless, the) maile (some nf them) ,tho Gonnans fleo for liheir lives. ... .. To resume. I wvo Lord Crome.r. _tnn chairman of the Dardanelles Commission, ft precis of. the Dardanelles ewe.. It doesn't apnear in the Renort of the Dnr(lahelle? Commission. I foyc!ive_ him that, because, when in his prime, ne di'l me a good deed. It is wmW reltiluifr. I entreated him' to cut a channel into Alexandria hnrliour deep enoii'rh for n Drendnnuirht; and he did it, though it cost a million slwline. and thus- pr.yt us a lia.?o of incalculable advantage in certain contingencies. While my evident v«i irinT lipfnre the '.DfirdniieNiw Commission, r»e Secretary (Mears) was splond'd in hi" kintes to me. awl my everln--<ing (jrafitndn is with the "Da unties Three" ivhn broke nw.iy'from their collogues ,ind mide an independent report. They were Mr. "Fisher, formerly Prime Minuter M Austral'-ii. (a f»lloff labourer). Sir Thoiun* M:iekoi'7.ie (High ComuiFsionor for New ZeiOnnd). and Mr. l?och, M.P. 'Hieir report was inr life-buoy. A precis of th"ir reoort, so far as it oftVti me and which T co'iside-- ui'.i'wwibk W»br«llrt that ; l: is the <'>ity of any n'T.epr,hwer. iiijrh'v plnrx'l. In c\il.wd)nnto liia views to l'>nt of '■ho Ovnm'onl '■•'- lesn he considers such n course «> vitally antagonistic to his country's interests aa to Qompel him to T know of no Mir." of flct'on V* o'-'itiinn"" ontrni*<"ni < < and subversive of al'. discipline ns tlmt of public wrangling between a Fubordinnto and his sui'er'or, or thn Heard of Admiralty and an i.dmiral nflnat.or tjiß War Of!'«p and their comnuinder-in-chief in tho field. •This Dardanelles Commission reminds mo of another "cloudy anil dark diiv, ■/ic Kxplclpl would describe, it. when five Cabinet. •Ministers, at the' inslii;ation _of an admiral recently-pprvinif. held nil in— fliiiry iibsoliitoly technical and profess'onal en miittprs about wl'ich ""I: one ofthom could givo an authoritative opinion, but only an opinion'which rcjnrdeJ political opportunism—an inquiry noitlier more nnr less than of my professional capacity as First Sea Lord of the .Ad.rnirnl'v. The trained mind of Jlr. M'lConna only just succepopil in saving me from l«ing thrown lo the wolves of the hustiiiKs. But it has inflicted » mortal wound on the discipline of tho Navv. ITcreofter no niulinous admiral need desnair (only v.rovided he has political and social 'influence.) of obtaining countenance for an onslaught against his simeriors: and we may vet lose the. decisive battle <if the world in consequence

Lord Fisher and Mr. Churchill. The following is iny narrativo of my connection with, tho Dardanelles opera' lions. "Tho liosition will not be clear, ami, indeed, will bo incomprehensible, if it he not first explained how very close an official intimacy existed between Mr. Winston Churchill and Lord Fisher for very liianv yeara previous to the Dardanelles omsode. and how Lord Fisher thus formed tile conviction that Mr. Churchill's audacity,, courage, and imagination specially fitted him to be a War Minister.

"When, in the autumn of 1911, Mr. Winston Churchill became First Lord of Hi'; Admiralty, Lard Fisher had retired from tho position of First Sea 1/ord, which he luul occupied from October 21, 1!H)J, to January 25, 1910, amidst great, turmoil all tho time. During tod Fisher's tenure of ollico ns First Lord vast naval reforms were carried out, includini.' the ser.ipping of some I(W shipi of no fighting value, and great naval economies wero effected, and nil this timo (except for one unhappy lapso when Mr Churchill resisted the additional Dreadnought building programme), Jlr. Winston Churchill was in closo association with Jueso drastic reforms, and

gave Lord Fisher all his sympathy when hostile, criticism was both malignant mid perilous. For this reason, on Mr. Churchill's advent as First Lord of tho Admiralty in tho autumn of 1911, Lord Fisher- most gladly complied with his request to return homo from Italy to help him to proceed with that (treat task t lint had previously occupied Lord Fisher for six years ns First Sea Lord— namely, the preparation for a German war, which Lord Fisher had predicted in 1905, would certainly occur in August, I'M, in a written memorandum, and afterwards also personally to Sir M. Hankey, tho Secretary of flip Committeo of Imperial Defenco; necessitating that drastic revolution in all things naval which brought 88 per cent, of the British Fleet into eloso proximity with beriininy, and made its future battlo ground in the North Sea its drill ground, weeding out of flic Navy inefficiency in ships, ofl'icei'3, and men, and obtaining absolute fighting sea supremacy by an unparalleled advance in types of fighting vessels. "Mr. Churchill then at Lord Fisher's request did a fine thing in so disposing his patronage ns First Lord as to develop Sir John Jellicoo into his Nelsomc position, so that when the day of war camo he appointed Sir John Jellicoo Admirnlissimo in spite of great professional opposition. . . . .•' "This, increased Lord Fisher's regard for Mr! Churchill, and on July 30, 1914, at his request, lord Fisher spent hours with him on that fifth day before war was declared, and by his wish saw Air. JJalfour to explain to him the naval situation. This is just mentioned to show the clow official intimacy existing between Mr. Churchill nnrf Lord Fisher, and when, on October 20, Mi, Mr. Churchill asked I-ord Fisher to become Fivst Sea Lord, ho gladly nswmted to co-operating w'th him in using tho great weanou Lord Fisher had helped to forge. "J[r. Churchill «ml Lord Fisher worlc<vl in nlwiliitc orcord until it enme to (■he question of the Dardanelles, when Lord Fisher's instinct absolutely forhv.lc !\"m to "ive it any welcome. But finding himself the one solitary person disfcntil." from the project in the War Council, and k-nnwinir it to be of vital importance that he shon'd nersonnllv see to the completion of the' great, slrnbniidins proijiamme of Gl2 vssete initiated on his recent advent to the Admiralty as First Sea. Lord,-also being confident that all these vessels could only he finished rapidlv if lie remained, Lord Fisher nllowrd himself to be. persuaded' % Lord Kitchener on January ZS. 1915, to continue as First Pen I/jrd. That point now remains to be related in somewhat greater detail. Pa-,t Experience. "To be"in with: When exactly 10 years previously Lord Fisher became First Sea Lord, on"October 20, 1901. that very dav occurred tho Dogeer Bank incident with Russia,-and the Prime Minister made a speecli at Southampton that seemed to niake war with Russia a certaiiitty, so Lord Fisher, ns First Sea Lord, immediately looked into tho forcing of. the Dardanelles in the event of Russia'.* movements necessitating British action in the Dardanelles. He then satisfied himself that, even with military co-op-eration, it was mighty hazardous, and lie so represented it at that time. The. proceedings of the Committee of Imperial Defence, however, will furnish full details respecting the Dnrdnnelles, especially Field-Marshal Lord Nicholson's remarks when Director of Military Operations, and nlso thoso of Bit N". Lyttolton when' Chief of the General Staff.

"But Lord Fisher had had tho great advantage of commimdiss a battleship under Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phinps Hornbv when, during the Kusso-Turkjsh war, that celebrated (lag officer lay with the British Fleet nenr Constantinople, nnd Lord Fisher listened at tho feet of that naval Gamaliel when he supiwlwl Nelson's ('jctiim that no sailor but a fool would ever attack a fort! Nevertheless, Nelson did attack Copenhagen—was realty beaten, but he bluffed the Danish Crown Prince ami enme out ostensibly as victor. Nelson's Comuian-der-in-Chief, Sir Hyde Parker, knew Nelson was beaten and signalled to him to retreat, but Nelson diwbeyed orders a? he did at Pt. Vincent and the Nile, and with Wnal judgment. "We miplit have done tho Fume bluff with the Turks had nrompf'itmle nnd decision directed us. but procrastination, indecision. a«rl vacillation us in-ste-r.d. I The 20tb Division oscillated for ivei'ks between France and Turkey.

"Note—See Mr. Churchill's sliitement nt Hip JDHi moptin? of the 'War Council on May U 1!)15, that. lui/Jjt been known (Jirco months previously Hind an English -iiniv of ifIO.DM in mi would liavc been available, for the attack on , the Dardanelles, the nnvnl attack would never havo lioo'i undertaken

"The. War Council met on May 14. lills. 'and certnin stons proposed to be IM-e'i by Mr. Churchill immediately afterwards decided Lord Fisher that ho could no longer support tho Dardanelles operations. Ee could not go fnrlllrer in this project with Mr. Churchill, and was himself convinced Wiat we should seize that moment to cive vn the Dardanelles operations. So Lord Fisher went. Lord Fisher Departs, "Lord Fisher's parting will* Jlr. Churchill was piit:hetic. bull it was tbe i only way out. "When the Prime Minis-' tor read to Lord Fisher Lord Kitchener's letter to the Prime Minister attacking Lord Fisher for withdrawing (bo Queen Elizabeth from certain destruction at film Dardanelles, Lord Fisher then realised how eplendid had been Mr. Churchill's support of him as to her withdrawal. A few days afterwords the Gennnn submarine that' had bcoii hovering round tho British .Fleet for a fortnight blew up the woodeirimage of, the 6U[ier-Drendnougllit we had sent out there as a bait for iilie German .submar'nes, ehmving bow the Germans realised the Qiieen Elizabeth's vnlno in letting nil tho other older battleships alone for about a. fortnight till they thought they really had the Queen Elizabeth in this wooden prototype! "It must lyv I'UiphnsWd on Mr. Churchill's behalf that he had the whole navnl-opinion nt the Admiralty fs well as the nnvnl opinion at the Dardanelles with him—Lord Fisher was the only dissentient.

■ "Jt nniet bo as.r'.n rrnonlpd that though T.ord Fi's'ipr was ?<> decidedly agi'.inst llio Dardanelles operations from the very first, yet )m ivii.s very larsfely inlhiancetl to .renin ill because ho was convinced it was of vital importance to the nation to cftiTy ottt the large Iniildinfj prograjiimo initinlcfl by him, irhich ivns to enable the Nnvy to deal such a decisive blow in the decisive theatre (in Northern water?) as would shorten the war—by the great projects alluded to by JFr. Chureliill at the ninth meeting of tho War Council on ,T:immry 23, 1915, when he described the three naval phases of the war, loading; to our occupation of tho Bailie is being tho supreme end to 'be ntbiiierl.

"Tfad Lord Fisher maintained his resignation on January 27, IJIIS./Jio Dardanelles enterprise would certainly still have gone on, because it was considered a matter of vital political expediency (seo Mr, Bnlfour's memorandum of February 2-1, 1915). but those Rl2 new vowels would not have been built, or they would have been co ,vWp.i ."! hV« iis"lp«i. Ait by Lord Fisher's leaving the Admiralty even so late Stay 22 191.V there was great delay in the completion of the five fast batlie cruisers r-nd in the laying down of further destroyers and submarines, and, in face, four large monitors (some of which had been advanced one thousand tons) that had been considerably advanced were stonped altogether for'a time nml tho further Imiiomsf of fnfifc battle cruisers was given vp. Lord Fisher had prepared a. design for a very fust 'battle cruiser carrying six 20m. puns, nml the model was completed. She was of exceptionally light draught of water and of exceptionally Imrh speed. He had arranged for the manufacture of. thn«e 20in. guns. ,•■,,, t "It has also to be ■.'inphasised that that programme of new vessels owed its inception to a great plan. skoMied out in secret memoranda, which it ci.n bo confidently asserted voiilrt h-ve produced such proat military results as vcnld certainly have ended the -.vnr in 1915. "These plans wero in .irlduinn to that r-incurrnd in by Kir .Tolni French in his three visits to' the War Council in™o. vi.mber, mil, for joint action of the British Army mid tho British liloi.'t on tho Belgian coast." . «()n .Iniumrv 2. 11)15. Dussia asked for n (leinonulralion against the Turks in or<!c" to relieve Ihe prppsnro they were puttins on the -Russian forces in the Caucasus. Next (lav the War Ofiico cabled a limmisc, through tho I'orciffn Office, Hint I his should ho done. Before ho sent the cablegram T.onl Kitchener wrote to Mr. Churchill: " ; * to on,v l' ,noe |1l;il: a demons!ration might havo eomo effect in stopninpr reinforcejnents going East would be ths Dardanelles."