TERRITORIAL FORCE

Dominion, Volume 13, Issue 49, 21 November 1919, Page 3

TERRITORIAL FORCE

: ITS READINESS FOR WAR QUICK MOBILISATION NECESSARY In the course of an address delivered to officers at the Garrison Officers' Club, Brigadier-General G, S. Richardson dealt at length with tho organisation of tho j A civ Zealand Territorial Force and its readiness to take the licld should another war occur. Although there had been defects in our military organisation, said the Gene•i ■'i l K wa ? considered that tho New Zealand Territorial Force had not failed to fulfil the functions for which it was originally organised, viz.: home defence, and the provision i,f a small overseas force (arrauged in 1913), and ample reinforcements. If in the future our obliga- . tions were varied from those of 1914, tho organisation of the Territorial Forco must bo varied accordingly. Whatever the futuro scheme might be it must provide for the quick and complete mobilisdtion of tho force decided upon. It must have a highly-trained staff' and efficient officers and n.c.o.'s. There must be ■ample supplies of equipment, and the men must have had sufficient previous training to enable .them to be made efficient by a short course of .intensive training. The New. Zealand Territorial echome had been "universal;" This had ' been the underlying principle, but tho numbers to be kept under training were limited by Act of Parliament to' 30,000 men; therefore, as we had 60,000 eligible, "50 per cent, of thj men were registered but not trained. During the war reinforcements who had been trained in the ' Territorial Force wore apparently not classified for training, but all mixed to' gether, trained in New Zealand, and trained again in England, and again at the bases in France, before being posted to units: therefore, we must adniit that our system of pre-war training did not ; give us highly-trained forces ready to tako tho field. The same might be said of the Home Territorial Force, with some brilliant exceptions of whole units going to Franco in 1914. The supply of trained officers and n.c.o.'s wus a serious defect, and must receive our closest attention in future organisation. . ' '' One of tho training lessons of tho war was that by intensive training a man . could ba made efficient in a short space of time. Extraneous training was eliminated in the War Office syllabus, and intensive training given to recruits . for fourteen weeks; after which .they were then sent to a unit in the field, but it took six months' continuous and special instruction to.train a young officer, wliilo good n.c.o.'s were most precious and difilcult to . train, and could be considered efficient only when they had had considerable ■ exp-srienca in handling men. By intensive training was meant continuous training of the individual for u definite period in the essential duties of 8 Soldier in the Sold, the principal part of this training for an infantryman being musketry and skill in tho use of weapons—core of liims'lf and his arms, and equipment in marching.: Such training in peace time for every man should ba one of the qualifications for citizenship. The great advantage to be eiiincd by rapid mobilisation could not be overestimated. and too much attention could '. not be paid to it. Whether we in New Zealand could improve on our arrangements of 191-1 'ft '-'matter for serious ' r.onsioeratioij. _ The conditions existing in the Unit" " v'.om and New Zealand were . ' '' ,'W, but it'was in-' teresting to nou. .. . ,'hft British Army, consisting of one u. ' y division and four infantry division-,, -"was ■' mobilised and transferred to France in six days. In New Zealand mobilisation was order- , etf on August 4, and a force of 77111 was embarked for overseas on September 16, 1914. n period of forty-four days The New Zealand Expeditionary Force vrns . no.t' a,. ( self-contained formation, nor was it fuJiy cqiiipped. A country which did not organise its mobilisation arrangaments so as to ensure rapidity of con- . . centration of its Force was inviting a . reDetition in its country of the cxperiences.of Belgium jind France. The Brit' ish Empire could' bo described as a league of nations uuitetf for a common obiect— defence and the maintenance of its integrity—each portion of the Umpire being under an obligation to maintain a force to share in this defence. If rach dominion did not provide for rapid mobilisation of its forces there would bo danger of defeat in detail. The gallant - efforts of the French "Army and (he British, Expeditionary Force prevented this in 1914; The Militarism Bogey. . "In discussing reorganisation at this period, when war clouds have dispersed, and wb nil hope that 'wars shall be no wore.' one is liable to. bo accused of fosterinir militarism," continued General Richardson. "By militarism is meant that, condition of government which existed in Germany, where the military party were supreme, and dictated tho polity, In other woros, militarism subordinates policy to strategy. This can never hap' pen in a democratic country, where there is no such thing as a military party, but an organisation for defence subordinated ■ to the policv of the Government, which in turn is dictated by the will of the people. This was well illustrated In tho delav in declaring war on the part of the British Government in August. 1914. From a military point of view it would liavo been an advantage if Brit- ' ain had declared war on the same cay ns France did, but our strategy hnd to conform to policy, and that in turn to tho will of the people, who were not united in the eaufo of war until Germany violntea Belgium. Similarly, America delayed for two and a half years in 'coming into the war. but here again in this democratic country the Government could not act until the people supporteo their action. Tho organising. and main, taininir of a force lo merely defend one'? own Jiome or to 0.--sist in defending the Empire is not. militarism, but protective insurance designed to prevent v;ar, arid not to nniKo it—lo ensure that we ean livo in peace, and do not bScnin? an easy prey to an uiise'rurillous foe. Is ■ the criticism of 'fevering militarist')' against those who urge that we should have a properly organised defence ivatem a hist one:-" ' Our training in the future must be . for a war of movement only, but equipment should be maintained for trench warfare purposes. Special trench warfare units could lie formed after mobilisation. The war had shown that tho . system of training officers to make quick tactical decisions on the ground was one of tho best forms of training in leadership. Officers should be selected who had, or were likely to develop the finalities of physical iitness, and leadership and courage. High shell power guns were needed in trench warfare. Mobile guns firing large high explosive , sheila were needed for coast defence. Questions for consideration were: Had New Zealand trained sufficient gunners in the past? and How sho-iM the artillery be organised in tho future? Coast Defcnco. 1 The lessons of Gallipoli and tho Belgian coast, and the various raids on the east coast of England during the war showed that: (a) A large area such as a town could, with modern guns, bo bombarded at a range of 2fl miles; fb) submarine mines were needed for defence of port? of that Tower which presumably held command of the sea. In • pre-war days the submarine mine was used ns an offensive weapon oniv by Iho strongest naval Power, 'c) Submarines were needed for local defer-? of cnasls. (d) Jlachine-guns were the best form of close defence of binding pVes. (e) No mutter how strong the defence, raids , by night were nn*=--ib , e nzcinst impart- • ant defended iwts (Ostond and Z"e- J brngge), mid Q.F. guns. =Ir- shell*. , lights, and obstructions we™' needed fir , defence of such pisitio". On"- const de- j fences prevenled New Zealand ports 1">- , inn- raided during the war. bul in the | light of the abov», should our const de- . fences be-revised? j Compulsory and Voluntary Training, ' In New Zealand we were conversant ' with both systems. The voluntary sys- 1 tem of training wa.s very suceessiul in ■ Homo units in peace time wliero officers- ' were keen and very efficient men were < cncoiiraged and rewarded for individual I proficiency. Units had a definite aim to ' work for, such as u competitive scheme r which classed units in order of merit * and caused men to work for the good of t their unit "Esprit do Corps." The volun- r tary system was, however, a failure in (

most units, and did not produce efficiency; furtherfore. it was a failure in tho recent war. It was understood that the British Army would rvvert to prewar conditions, viz: A small regular voluntary army, more highly paid than before the war, and a Territorial Force in which those who joined must sign an agreement to serve for a definite ]>eriod and to comply with certain regulations.