THE FAILURE AT GAIIIPOLI

Dominion, Volume 13, Issue 48, 20 November 1919, Page 7

THE FAILURE AT GAIIIPOLI

Terrible Conditions for tho Troops,

IMPERIAL COMMISSION'S SECOND REPORT

TRAGIC STORY OF OFFICIAL BLUNDERING

LIVES USELESSLY SACRIFICED NEW LIGHT ON KITCHENER By Toleerapi—rresi Assooiation-QosjTljhl

London, November 17. The following is a precis of tho Second Report of the Gnllipoli Commission. In a general roview, tho report says that from tho outset tho risks of failure for tho expedition outwoighed the chances of success. Tho problem was never fully investigated by competent experts, and no correct appreciation of tlio difficulties was arrived at. The Commission considered that Lieut.-Colonel Wolfe Murray 6hould havo prepared a general plan, and it was tho duty of the Secretary of State for War to ensure that this was dono.

The Suvla Failure. The naval operations of November, 1911, and February-March, 1015, naturally led to a groat strengthening of tho 'lurk:sh positions. Thero was undue delay in considering tho situation after tlio failure of the attacks following the first landing, while the plan of attack, from Suvla and Anzac in tlio beginning of August is open to criticism. "Tho attack at Suvla was not pressed as it should have beeu. Tho orders givou by General Hammcrsley were confused, •jnd his Staff work defectivo. General Sitwell, senior _ brigade commander, did not show sufficient energy and decision. General Stopford did not take sufficient inenns to inform himself «f tho progress of tho operations,. Ho and his Staff wcro partly responsible for tho failure to supply the tioops with water, In the Commission's opinion General Stopford's difficulties were'increased by Sir lan Hamilton's intervention. AVhile recognising Sir lan Hamilton's personal gallantry and energy, ho should have examined tlio situation disclosed by tho first landings more critically, and weighed the probabilities of success and failure more impartially, having regard to the resources at his disposal, and submitted a comprehensive statement to tho Secretary for War for and against tho continuance of the operations.

After Sir Charles Monro's advice to evacuate had been confirmed by Lord Kitchener, a prompter decision should havo been taken by tho War Cabinet. A considerable nmount of artillery was available in Egypt and Mudros 'for tho Suvla operation, but it was- not utilised.

Food and Medical Supplies. Tlio Commission finds that on tho whole tho food supply was satisfactory, but the provision for tho evacuation of tho wounded/ especially hospital ships, was not sufficient. This was due to tho want of a general plan. Tho supply of medical requisites on the wliolo was adequate, except in the case of the Australians and New Zealandors, who were short of or T dinary medicine, especially castor-oil and variety of food for sick men.

Kitchener's Secrotiveness. The Gallipoli narrativo shows that Lord Kitdhener's death made tho Commission's task difficult, as owing to his secretiveness in_ military matters the reasons lor various notions were not known. Early in 1915, Lord Kitchener thought that the Dardanelles was a suitable objective, probably requiring 160,000 mpn. Ho had in view a possible stalemate on tho Western'front, and tho necessity for providing another thejitra of operations, 'lib War Council sulk scribed to tho lattor view if a stalemate occurred in the spring, without, however, specifying the Dardanelles. Thc> general opinion seemed to be thai) either tho Dardanelles or Serbia would bo most suitably TJjo question of a joint naval and military action was not considered, because months must elapse bpt'ove troops wore available. Mr. Churchill, at tine War Council on May 14, staled that it'-ho had kjjown three months beforn that an army of eighty or a hundred thousand wouldbe available tho May attack by tthe Navy alone would never have been undertaken. 'loivards the end of January diplomatic efforts to secure thn co-operation oi Greece and Serbia failed, and attention was turned to the Dardanelles, bull anxiety as to a possiblo German offensive on the West front delayed the departure of the troops until' March. There tws a diplomnldo sido to tho proposed expedition. The Commission's interim report indicated that Russia wanted relief from Turkish pressure in the Caucasus, while, in addition, there was tho hope that a success in tho Dardanelles would unite the Balkans ajninst the Central Powers.

Doubts Existed. 1 he disastrous effect of a • possible failure was not altogethor absent from tho minds of tho War Council. On the military side there was doubt us to the l'leet's ability to guaranteo the landing, and in view of this risk tiho General Staff was not prepared to recommend tihe attempt. The Director of Naval Intelligence, while generally in agreement with the General Staff, and fully concurring in the great risks involved in a joint enterprise, thought that tho Staff underrated tho vatuo of tbp Fleet's heavy covering firo at tihe disembarkation point. The War _ Council did not think tho Staff's opinion was wholly LWlicnblo to the existing conditions.- T'v fall ot' tho Namur and Liege forts "iL to tiho conclusion that permanent _ iru <s could easily be dealt with by long f-hrgu gt»is, whilo tho valuo of n, naval Inmwdintoit iiad been greatly advanced by aircraft observation; and also the development ol submarines uncounted tho hope that thc_ Turkish communications, with Gallipoli through the Sea of -Marmora wouid lo very vulnerable. The Appointment of the Commander, Tihe question of tho appointment of a commander was discussed in February. General Birdwoijd's name was tirsli considered, but as tho scope of tho operations became enlarged it was thought advisablo to select an officer of higher rank a.nd greater experience, and Sir lan Hamilton was clioson. General Birdwood went to the Dardanelles and mado a. rooonnaissiWicii, und tho telegrams which passed botween him and Lord Kitdhenor showed that tho latter intended tho troops to ho used in a minor capacity only, wliilo General Jjirdwuod did not expcct filial tho Fleet would bo nblo to force tho straits unaided; further, that General Dirdwood fully appreciated tho formidable character of the Peninsula's defences, and anticipated that largo military operations would be necessary, General Maxwell telegraphed Lord 'utohener on February 21 that Gallipoli was practically a fort, against which «n attack from any quarter without' heavy guns would be hazardous. Ito advised Lord Kitchener of tho recommendation of Colonel Maucorps, formerly French Military Attaoho at Constantinople, in which tho lattor suggested an Jittack from tihe Asiatio sido the least cliJiiiiult, .Colonel Miiuawpfl jagaaJsd ft

landing at Gallipoli us extremely hazardous. Serious Omissions Stressed. Ihe Commission is satisfied that no general plan was evolved, and fails to see why that should not have been done, thus putting tho problem more clearly More tlio War Council. _ A* 1 ? T 'lY n l uutlioritios in March wero satisfied that it would bo necessary to clear the enemy's artillery on Gallipoli bptoro tho licet could make the straits sale tor transports. Lord Kitchener thereupon tihought that no operations i nln beforo the arrival of tho 29th Division. Sir lan Hamilton's eyidenco showed that ho had been given clearly to understand that his force would bo niorely a second string; that Uhe Aavy could forco tlio Dardanelles on its own, and that the military must not chip in unless tho Admiral definitely chucked up tho sponge." Sir lan Hanilltoii added that) ho could obtain prac,tically no information as to the position before ho left. Ho was not supplied inth the information prepared by tho General Staff in 1906, nor was Colonel tpi ut i?. rps ® „V' e, r communicated to him. lnq \Var Ofnco information on tho wholo ?V^ C 'l - 1 ™? mo . s ' : meagre. He received dohnito instructions from Lord lutchorar that the occupation of tho Asiatic sido nas strongly to bo deprecated! Sir lan Hamilton's Arrival. Sir lan Hamilton, after his arrival, conferred with Admiral do Bobeck. The latter said that the War Office was too sanguine in thinking that tlio Navy's guns could prevent a Turkish lodgment on the Peninsula. Tlho Germans had tfrappled with the situation, got troops scientifically disposed, and .heavily entrenched. Tho enemy had nothing to tear owing to tlio flatr trajectory of tlio naval guns. Sir lan Hamilton, in a private letter to •L-ord lutchcncr, said: "Gallipoli on the spot looks a tougher nut to crack than it did over the map in your oiheo. Sir lan Hamilton, after witnessing tho naval bombardment, tolegraphcd Ijord Kitchener that ho had been reluctantly driven to the conclusion that tho Dardanelles was less likely to bo iorced by tho Navy than onco seemed probable, and "if tho Army participates, it will not assumo tho subsidiary form hitherto anticipated." To this Lord kitchener replied: "You know my views --that tho Dardanelles must bo'forced, li a largo military operation is necessary it must bo undertaken and carried through." Sir Inn Hamilton stated that at tho conference on board tlio Queen Elizabeth, Admiral do Eobeek said that it was quite clear that they could not get through without tho help of the troops. Admiral Wemyss concurred, and no voice was raised to question this momentous decision. Admiral do Eobeek, reporting to the First Lord of tho Admiralty, said that tho assumption that the forts could bo destroyed by naval tiro had been conclusively disproved. Tho analogy of tho Belgian forts was quito misleading, n? these had been destroyed by howitzer fire.

Combined Operations Decided On. After this Mr. Churchill saw clearly that a combined operation was essential, instead of his original plan of achieving the operation without; involving the Army. Sir lan Hamilton on April 1 told Lord Kitchenor that ho had not enough ammunition to destroy tho enemy's entanglements by field guns and howitzers, and therefore must rel'' on other methods. The Commission' was uncvblo to ascertain tho precise date on which, after the failure of tho naval attack, tho military operations w.ore decided on. When tlio decision was talwn much inephtudo was displayed in loading the transports, whereby men. material and stores were shipped in different vessels, this resulting in delay. Much unnecessary 'material was also taken. On.Mny. 11 the War Council dismissed tho situation. There were insistent demands for men for France, whilo we wore saddled with renuirements for F-.vnt and olsewhoro. The Council had therefore to considor tho wisdom of continuing thn Dardanelles campaign. There was a tendency to send morn reinforcements. hut nothing immediately was done beyond Lord Kitchener asking Sir lan Hamilton how many men were required to ensure success. ' The latter replied that, if tho nrcsent situation remained unehanßjd they would ne<M nn additional urmy corps. Sir Tan Hamilton reckoned tlint ho could advance with n.'ilf the loss of life if he had n liberal supply of _, guns and munitions, especially liW'i explosives. Lord Kitchener replied on May 18 expressing h's disappointment that his preconceived views ns to the conquest of the positions with the necessary support troops on land wero miscalculated, and it now became <i question whether tliev could support two field operations, draining our resources. Politics Cause Delay.

The intervention of .1 political crisis blocked 0, decision on Sir lan Hamilton's request for twenty-four days, and in Mr. Churchill's opinion the crisis prcventod an unbroken stream of reinforcements. Proviaion mado to send two divisions. '['lien Lord Kitchener changed his mind and sent only one. Mr. Asquith admitted that the uolitical situation had caused delay, but lie thought there was a shorta'/e of available troops. The Commission, however, thought that the crisis was tho main cause, "When the now Cabinet was constituted several now members had to lw> convince*! that the expedition was justifiable. Lord Kitchener at the end of May informed the Dardanelles Committed that the difficulties of the entornrise had proved more formidable than hid been anticipated. A much greater efTort fhan had originally been bargained for was now required, and for the first time waa the hint, of evacuation heard. Threo Solutions. Kitchener preparod a memorandum 011 May 28, submitting threo solutions:— Firstly, withdrawal. Secondly, to,seek if possible an immediato military 'decision. Thirdly, to continue to push and imikp what progress wn.s possible. In regard to tho withdrawal, Lord Kitchener declared that the disadvantages were so great that iti could only be justified in order to avoid a. great disaster, and he threw liis weight in favour of tho third solution, becanso it avoided a blow at our prestige, kept the door open to Balkans intervention, and ensured a strategical position, preventing active Turkish operations in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and tho Cnueasus. Early in .Tune Iho TCussinn reverses relieved (he Turkish posilion. Sir Tnn Hamilton tolegranhed that he foresaw that this might onable tho Turks to throw a quarter of a million against him, and urged that some equivalent for Russian co-oporation was now vitally necessary. JThwa irojh division? jyerg dispatched. 1

Whon ihoy arrived a mistake apparently was inado in employing them at Suvla without an admixture ui seasoned troops. Moreover, their officers were, generally speaking, inexperienced, and tho lailuro which iollowed was the precursor of the evacuation. Eventually Sir Charles Muuro went to Gallipoli to report, 110 eamo to tlio conclusion tluit with the exception of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, the troops on the Peninsula were unequal to a sustained effort, owing to their inexperienced officers, their want of training, and del'ectivo Staff work, (jeneral Birthvood agreed with Sir Charles Alunro regarding tho difficulty of making progress, but opposed tho evacuation, considering tliat the Turks would view it as a completo victory, whilo it would exert a bad effect on the iUuhominedans of Egypt, India, and Persia. Further, tho lateness of the seaBon and tho probability of had weather would make the withdrawal dangerous. Generals liyng and Dnvies agreed with Sir Charles Monro in regard to tho evacuation, Lord Kitchener 011 November 3 wired General Birdwood: "I am coming to see you. I believo the Admiralty wid agree to force the straits. Wo must do what wo can to assist them. Exainino tho best landings at tho head of the Gulf of Saros. Wo may perhaps havo to evacuate Suvla. All tho best fighting men that can bo spared, including your ' Anzac boys and everyone 1 can swoop up in ligypt might bo concentrated at Mudros ready for this enteipriso. You will havo command of the wholo force. Monro will go to Salonika. I'lease work out plans. Wo must do it right this time. I'absolutely refuse to sign an order for the evacuation, which would be tho gravest disaster, and condemn a large percentage of men to death or imprisonment." Kitchencr Converted .'to the Idea.

It appears that Admirals Robeck, Wemyss, and Keves held strongly _ that the Meet should attempt the strait in ordor to relieve the army, but 'between November 3 and 4 Lord Kitchener's proposal to seize Bulair Isthmus was adversely criticised bv the Admiralty and General Birdwoocl. Therefore lord Kitchener on November 4 telegraphed General Birdwood tlmt the naval opera'tions might not be renewed. "The moro I look at the problem the less 1 6eo a way through, so you had better quietly and secretly work out any scheme to rernovo tlio troops/' On November 22 Lord Kitchener telegraphod tho Prime Minister: "As German assistance tor tho Turks now practically available, our position lias become untenable, and evacuation seems inevitable." Lord Kitchener on November 15 had repbrtcd to tho Prime Minister the result of Lis'personal inspection. 110 said:

"The country is more difficult .than I imagined. To gain what we hold has been a most remark-

able feat of arms. Everyone has done wonders, both at sea and on land." i Tho fact that tho Ixise at Mudros was too detached from the field force, and the impossibility of proper linN of communication, was tho main difficulty of successful operations. Telegrams which passed between tho Prime Minister and Lord Kitchener show that the latter was greatly concerned with defending Egypt. In the event of evacuation he advocated a landing nt Avns Bay, near AlesandreHa. to cut the Turkish railway communications. This project necessitated the withdrawal of forces from Salonika and France, as well as diverting Indian divisions on the way to Mesopotamia. The General Staff did not support it. and it was ultimately rejected at a joint conference in Paris between tho French and Enqlish Governments. Cabinet, discussed the evacuation on November 23, anil Lord Curam, on behalf of several colleagues, elaborated the case against evacuat'on. to which Mr. Bonar Law renlicd that everv military expert favoured evacuation. Mr. Bonur Law's memorandum shows that the Prime Minister and (he First Lord of tho Admiraltv opposed evacuation, but that tho military advisers' advice was accented.

Meanwhile, a blizzard in the last days of November aggravated tho condition of the troops. Two hundred and eighty men wore drowned in tho trenches at Silvio, many were frozen to death as they stood, while sixteen thousand were frost-bitten. Sir Charles Monro then tplegranhed to Lord Kitchener pressing for a decision. From to Derember 8 Admiral WemyFß, with remarkable nertinacity,, advocated the renewal of the naval attack, but Admiral fiobcck, who was then in England, placed his views before tho Council, and as tbi> result of a War Cabinet meeting on December 2 Lord Kitchener telegraphed Sir Charles Monro: "Owing to political consequences there is a strong feolinot against,evacuation. If the Salonika troops were placed at your disposal, could you make Snvla retainable? The Navy would also take Ihe offensive." Sir Chnrles Monro replied that he d'd not think there was any reasonable chaiico of a success. Tho naval puns could not search the Turkish positions. On Tlwemher 7, Cabinet, mainly on Lord Kitchener's ndvicp, decided to evacuate. Admiral Wemyss again telegraphed. on lcarninc of' th« decision. urTin? the renewal of the offensive, and added; "T am convinced that, the time is ripe for a vigorous offensive. I am confident of success." But the Admiralty declined.

Admiral Lord Fisli n r appends n memorandum rcjreHinrr that his official duties preclud»d h : s nt'emlonce at the sittings, and therefore he did not fenl justiM in attaching his name to the report. ) Sir Thomas Mackenzie Speaks Out. Sir Thomas Mackenzie (Now Zealand), supplies a supplementary report, jHe regrets that the evidenco was not published, making tho narrative inadequate. While substantially agreeing with tho findings, he holds stronger views upon cortain of them.' lie believes that the forcing of tho Dardanelles would have been practicable had the authorities approached tho problem adequately, and should only have launched a combined attack after proper preparations. Whother Sir Jan Hamilton was the right man to command can never be answered, because he was hurriedly dispatched, imperfectly instructed, and inadequately equipped. Though Lieu-t.nnant.-Colonel Wolfo Murray attended the War Council, he expressed no opinion. tenoered no advice, nor did he clearly understand that a decision had been arrived at to prepare for' a naval attack. When lie was asked why ho had not prepared a plan, ho replied that he was overshadowed by Lord Kitchener. Sir Thomas Mackenzie believes that tho vital neriod for determining success or failure was between August (i ana' 10, irhen Genera! iS'toniord and his officers throw nwav a golden opportunity, and gave tho Turks time to reinforce. The failure at Sulva was not duo to tho opuosition of the Turks, but to General Stanford's failure to provide water for tho troops. Sir Thomas Mackenzio directs attention to tho evidence of several witnesses as to tho frittering away m life through General Hunter Weston's repeated frontal attacks, and quotes Colonel Wilson's evidenco that lives had been sacrificed almost with futility, and Sir lan Hamilton's admission to Lord Nicholson that lives wero used instead of sholls. lteardiug tho treatment of tho wounded, Sir Thomas Mackenzie quotes Surceon-General Howse's (Director-Gen-eral of tho Commonwealth Medical Services) matured opinion : "That ho personally would rccouimend his Government when the war was over that under no conceivable conditions woulo ho trust tho Imperial authorities with the medical arrangements for the care of Australian sick and wounded."