The Domkinion. SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1919. AUTHORITIES AT ODDS

Dominion, Volume 13, Issue 32, 1 November 1919, Page 6

The Domkinion. SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1919. AUTHORITIES AT ODDS

One of the worst obstacles to the formation of a settled naval policy for the Empire is the serious conflict of opinion amongst high authorities as to tho lines on which the Navy onghfc to evolve. It is a matter of common agreement that the experience of the war has made it inevitable that naval development should proceed apace in various directions which were untried, or had been tried only_ tentatively, prior to 1914. For instance airoraft and submersiblcs, together with methods and_ appliances designed to defeat air or underwater attack, are bound to take lienceforth_ n place of growing importance in any efficient naval organisation. This is conceded freely even by those who hold that tho .capital ship is destined to retain its present pre-eminence and by those who Consider that the relativo importance of air a'nd underwater craft in comparison with other elements of naval fighting force is still uncertain. With this measure of agreement, however, there is an absolute division on vital points of sea policy between two schools of naval thought in' Great Britain each of which counts notable adherents. One school, that t,6 which Lord Jellicor beloncs, holds that the capital ship still has a long life of usefulness before it and is an essential means of establishing command of the sea in the event of war. Tho rival school holds generally that tho capital ship has hecome an expensive white elephant and that it is upon other forms of armament that sea power must henceforth be based. The views of this latter school are stoutly upheld by Admiral Sir Percy Scott in a book some brief extracts from which are cabled to ; day. They liavo been I expressed with much point and emphasis also by Loud Fisher, who was First Sea Lord from 1904 to 1910, and was recalled to that offico in the opening stage of the war. Condemnation by such an authority of the plans ntfw being developed by the Admiralty obviously raises very serious issues. It will be impossible for the ordinary layman and taxpayer in the Mother Country or j in the Dominions to look with much confidence on current naval policy until there is at least a nearer approach than at present to agreement between those who speak on the subject from a standpoint of expert knowledge and experience. In tho observations which are ouotcd to-day Sir Percy _ Scott "emphasises the vulnerability of battleships now costing eight millions, and suggests the construction of manv aeroplane-carrying ships." Both ships and aeroplanes, ho adds, could be used in peacc time for the narriaeo of passengers. Loud Ftshep. is at least as uncomnromising in his criticism of the existing order and as drastic in his proposals of change. In a series of articles whieh he contributed in September to the London Tim** he maintained, amongst other things, that the power of submersibility must be givr>n to all ships in time of war.

Air fiflhtin.d [he. wrofej dominates future war, both by land and sea. It is not mv business to discuss the land, but bv sea the onlv way to avoid the air is to act under the water. So you aro driven to flic interna! combustion engine and oil. why I keep on emphasising that the ' whole Navy has to be scranped. For nearly a wliolo year after the armistice wo aro spending nearlv W0 millions on a scrapped Nnvy. Get rid of the spendthrift crew! Scrap the lot! Stop the money!

In tho course of his articles, Lord Fisher had-much to say about the enormous advantages of oil over coal as a source of power and about the "prodigious developments" in aircraft. He considers that it may be vital to have submersible merchantmen as well as _ warships, "These types of submersible vessels of every size and character," he observes, " '''instantly require great studv and research and much experiment. _ The only reliable exnerimenfc is on a scale of twelvo inches to the foot." The former First Sea Lord expressly abstains from submitting definite and detailed plans of naval development, but he'iivfjcs as the British formula :

KuiM few anfi build fast. Tlacli otim l>oltcr tlinn thp last. Tho countcr-arcup.ients to those employed by the Fisher-Scott school aro succinctly stated by Anmm JeUiICOf. in his receipt report to tlio New Zealand Government. 4fter detailitiß tho measures by which the capital ship has been enabled to copc with and withstand one new form of attack after another, he remarked that:

The country wlicse fast capital ships and their complementary units are not .-.nutained or lndd by similar enemy's ships can, with these vessels, swecn enemy's vessels and sea-borne trade olf the seas The living ahc,' the submarine enthusiasts of In-day are following in I he footsteps of the explosive shell, the torpedo, and tho mini! enthu-iafts who preceded them: whilst lliiko i>ho recognise the necossitv for I lie Capital Ship are devisina. successfully, means to counter each fresh menace to its existence. Lord .7ki,mom's final observation on the. subject is that The elfeelive life of a capital ship is, ofrlriii.-.. fiireen years, and the time lo Imild a Iron I' two year-'. There is at prewtll no apparent pro'speot <>i' the siibmnrii>c II" the aircraft defeating I lie Capital Shin in the ne.U seventeen years. It i« I In re fore sound and imperative to con. liinuo lo build capital ships while such a condition of affni'-s exists. Obviously, if Lord Jei.mccr and those who think with him arc right, Lotta Fisheii and his school are wrnnp. II 'S equally obvious that no layman can attempt to judge between the two schools. I here aic some 'suggestive facts in evidence, as for iustance that Sir PliliCY

Scott's pre-war prediction (hat the submarine would drive surface ships off the seas was not, verified in an actual test. But it is hardJJo say what might have happened if I lie Germans had made better us:: <>t their submarines—if they had possessed such officers and men as time and again carried British submarines through the Dardanelles and inio the Baltic. It has to lio considered also that the submarine is developing rapidlv in speed and power and is capable of indefinite development. Lord Fisher mentions in one of his articles that Britain had a 12-inch 51111 submersible in commission before the war ended. Only the expert can say how far the develonment of the submarine is O'' is likely to be neutralised by the. development of antisubmarine devices. LotU) Fishki; himself has not escaped criticism of his naval administration which if it were fully sustained would somewhat weaken his own authority ns a critic. He has been blamed in connection with the inferiorifv of British armour-piercing shells which Was disclosed at _fhc BatfJ' of Jutland, and also with shortcomings in. fire, control and some other details of fighting organisation. It is difficult, however, to say just bow far Lnrn Fisher was really a t fault in these matters. The one point which stands out clearly meantime is that naval authorities of high repute are _ seriously at odds in regard to vital aspects of naval policy. The remedy seems to lie in full and frank consultation between recognised authorities and nn orderly examination of evidence. The matter is primarily one for the British Government, _ but the Governments of the Dominions arc entitled lo urge that nothing should be left undone in that direction.