The Dominion. TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1019. PACIFIC PROBLEMS

Dominion, Volume 13, Issue 28, 28 October 1919, Page 4

The Dominion. TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1019. PACIFIC PROBLEMS

The Prime Minister has stated that it will be left to the new Parliament to deal with Admiral Jelucoe's report on naval defence, since time will not permit of this important question being taken in hand during the present session. It is as well that action is to this extent delayed, for it is very necessary that each step New Zealand takes towards assuming its full naval responsibilities should he well considered. In the months that arc to intervene before policy decisions are reached, it will he open to the Government to do a good deal in the way of setting the whole question clearly before the people of the Dominion, and it is to he hoped that these months will not be wasted. The broad lines of naval policy this country ought to follow are already so established as hardly to admit of controversy, and Admiral Jelucoe's report has clone much to remove such uncertainties as remained. It is a matter of general agreement that Now Zealand must exchange a position of dependence for one of self-reliance where naval defence is concerned—that is to say, that the Dominion must contribute in full measure to the naval forces of the_ Empire—and the question of Imperial as against local control is hardly likely henceforth to irivc rise to serious controversy. There is everything to be said for an arrangement under which each Dominion will'maintain its own ships, but itwould be going manifestly to a vicious extreme to carry, this arrangement so far as to interfere with efficient co-operation in training, or with 'undivided control of the Imperial naval forces in time of war. It may be claimed, therefore, that in its proposal that each Dominion should take up its fair share of the naval burdens of tho Empire, and on the lines of the cooperation it suggests between the Dominions and the Mother Country, Loud .Teu.icoe's report raises no controversial issue.

_ It has to be recognised, however, that there are even larger aspects of _ naval policy than those with which Loud Jkllicoe has dealt so ably,_ and these aspects ought to ho considered very carefully in this country before it commits itself to a formal naval agreement. Lord JeTiLTCC-r has shown how a given expenditure by New Zealand may best be directed to establishing' and maintaining an effective naval force, the principal units of which would form an integral part of the proposed Far Eastern Fleet. His opinion on these matters carries all possible authority. ■ This country ought not to adopt his recommendations, however, until it is assured that the scheme of naval defence he proposes for the Pacific is approved in its entirety by the Admiralty and the British Government, and is regarded as an adequate but not extravagant provision for the security of the different countries of the Empire and the sea routes upon which they depend. Public opinion in New Zealand and in other parts of (•he Empire would certainly condemn any attempt to depart 'from the limits of a naval policy making for security, and enter upon a policy which could fairly bo regarded as provocative. Whatever may bo thought of the idea that "the centre •of naval gravity has moved from tho North Sea to the Pacific," the sound naval policy for the Empire is, as it has been, to maintain such naval fovce as will afford reasonable safeguards against invasion or interference with sea-borne trade, while carefully avoiding anything that could be regarded by other nations as a challenge or an invitation to engage in competitive armament building. It is self-evident also that in determining the due limits of naval development, the countries of the Empire ought to take full account of the new international conditions following on the war and of the possibilities raised of a general limitation of armaments. A particularly short-sighted view has obtained some currency of late that tho League of Nations, though it may in some remote future become an fsffeccive agency making for peace, is an absolutely negligible factor today. This is quite as foolish as it would 'be to go to the other extremo of assuming that the embryonic Leaguo affords ready-made a'complete substitute for defence preparation in the interests of national security.

It is somewhere between these, foolish extremes that the lino of sane policy must be expected to rim, and its direction was well indicated tho other day by Bam, JJeatty. Without placing undue dependence upon tho League of Nations, he yet regards it as a factor of weight, and ono which brings the. limitation of armaments into definite prospect. Insurance against national disaster Id the past (he said) had been effected by fabulous pxppndiliuro upon armaments, but new the peace-loving nations hud crushed the aggrresoM and we might hope thai the power and influence of tho League of Nations would provide a large measure of the necessary insurance, and enable a limit lo be placed upon naval armament'. .Britain niii<l still, however, moke greater provision for naval security than other nations, in view of her vital dependence upon the safely of her main sea communications linking up the Empire. This commends itself as a sound statement of naval policy, and ono that applies without reservation to the Pacific. In order that its coasts and trade, routes in this great ocean may he adeciiiatcly safeguarded, tho Empire needs undoubtedly a strong and well-organised Pacific fleet. The strength of the fleet ought to he determined, however, with full reference to international conditions and the possibility of extending international concord. The naval protection of sea-borne commerce and safeguards against invasion are in every way as necessary as the maintenance of efficient police forces on land, hut there ought to he no thought of creating such a force as would represent a menace and provocation to other nations. On the contrary, it should be the aim of Imperial policy to actively promote such relations with other nations as will at once make the possibility of war remote, and facilitate: a goneial reduction of armaments. If the. British Empire and the United States arc of one mind in regard' to

maintiiining the peace of Ihe Pacific —and there is no reason to fear that they will clash—it should not bo a difficult matter to present such a rase fur limitation oi armaments to the Asiatic and other races who share its dominion as would command their adhesion. In the last of a series of articles he'contributed recently to the London Times, Loud Fishbk put the position very bluntly: ''Can't the American and English navies dominate the world at any time' We simply say to all others: 'livild no more nr we. Jit/hl. you. ! We'll "Uopcnlwjeii' you here, and ■noirl'" The conditions envisaged by the veteran Admiral of the Fleet are extreme, but undoubtedly it iB sound policy for the Empire that adequate naval preparation in the Pacific, with the Dominions each taking their full part, should bo accompanied by action in the international field aiming at the mutual limitation of armaments and the maintenance of settled conditions of peace. It is only when they have received an explicit assurance that Imperial plans relating to the Pacific are framed from this that the people of this country will be in a position to fairly consider their naval obligations.