THE SCAPA SCUTTLERS

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 293, 6 September 1919, Page 7

THE SCAPA SCUTTLERS

: -4 : —- I.- VIEWS OF ADMIRAL VON SCHEER GERMAN PLANS FOR BIG SEA FIGHT ("Times" Correspondent.") "I rejoice over tho sinking of the German .fleet in Scapa Flow, 1 " said Admiral von Schce.r, the former Commander-in-Chief ol' the German High Seas Fleet, in an interview 'at Weimar with .Mr. Cyril. Brown, the correspondent'of .'the New York "World/' The Admiral, who, bc- -. aides voicing the satisfaction at tile treachery of his men in terms which are 1 a mixture of jubilation and insolent defiance, took the opportunity, as did General Liulciidoiil'.-iu a recent interview, to '• curry favour with America by 'making invidious comparisons Letweeiu her .motives and those of the other 'Allies in re- ! gard to liie fixing of the terms of peace, as well as her probable future attitude towards Germany. He also imitates his la to colleague in attempting to'sow'suspicion among the Allies through discussion of their future policies. Willi regard to the sinking of tho Gei-- ■ man Fleet, Admiral voil Sclicer said- his satisfaction arose from two causes. The first (ho declared) is that the fleet lias been prevented, from falling, permanently into the hands of the British. It would have been painful for our good ships, after sailing the seas -for years, to come miller enemy Hags. This humiliating and painlul sight is now spared us . by tho brave deeds at Scapa Flow. Tho , second reason why 1 rejoice is that the stain of surrender has been wiped from the escutcheon of the German Fleet. The sinking of the ships, has proved that tho • spirit of the tleet is not dead. This last act is true to the best .traditions of tho . German Navy. The deed was spontaneous, ,and, 1 am convinced, .was not ordered or inspired from Berlin'. Our seamenl were unwilling to.bear the filial disgrace or suiter- that the ships should be turned over to, tho Bri.lish. Why the Men Struck. ' More than this, the spirit of Scapr. Flow points a significant moral. . Our seamen, once removed from evil propaganda inHueneo and left to come' to their senses, again became mindful of their military honour.. ...The terms of peace brought men of our lleet to the .reaiisa-'. . tion, unfortunately.' too late, that they had bsen misled,, hoodwinked,, and-, de- ; oeived. Subtle revolutionary propaganda had persuaded them they could end the war quickly by going on strike. They wore-t01d,., and believed. • that'if' they- - struck tho seamen of tho enemy fleets would revolt also, and that tho war would thus be brought to an end automatically. In.this misguided belief they started a revolution. Too credulous, they made the mistake of not waiting to let the other I'elloivs striko iirst. Admiral von Scliqer then proceeded'to disclose the plans for a naval attack on, England, which had Ijcen -frustrated' by the mutiny of the sailors of the fleet;— It ivas nevor our intention (ho said) to solid the High Seas Fleet out to certain death. At tho beginning of ' tlm November revolt wo wero on the evo, of. undertaking a naval operation ■ from which wo promised ourselves the utmostsuccess. This operation, after nearly two year,?, had at last been made possible by the disconlinuaucc of our submarine .warfare during- the negotiations leading, up to-the armistice. For nearly two yeai« ; .wo'had been unable to'undertake ;in"operation on a largo sealo with the High Seas Fleet', iirst becauso the lleet was essential to protect the baso for our submarine warfare; and secondly, because, while our submarine warfare was., carried on we lacked .ill-strate-gic Hank protection for a loiig-dislaneo naval operation. Our fleet attack could proceed only frnm tho narrow Wet Triangle behind Heligoland. To this base -alone wo were • always forced to return. An operation of the High-.Sefls. Fleet against any point un the British coast l?tt 'hiiiii our . Hanks exposed Tlio Battle of Jutland proved thai, .wo wero . not afraid of encountering tlio British Grand Fleet on'a fair field.-* In an operation against the British coast our strategic left ilauk was always exposed to attack #by British naval forces- coming from the Channel) ami our right flank to attack from tho north-... With I he suspension of submarine warfare this unfavourable strategic situation suddenly changed. We now had plenty of submarines to use for the flank protection of our High Seas .Fleet. With our hands thus freed wo decided at tho be, ginning of. November that our fleet should strike a hard and perhaps,decisive lilow. We decided that while our armies' -were stubbornly and heroically resisting, our fleet should not remain idle. Our plan offered every chance of success. It was not one to send tho High Seas Fleet out to death, but to attack tho coast of lingland in tho direction -of tho month of | the Thames, employing submarines as flank protection. J3y this plan, we iioped to draw the British Grand Fleet out o[ its Scottish lair down towards the mouth tlie Thames to give Us battle, in which case tlio Grand Fleet would have; run into our flanking submarines. Our plan was carefully worked out and. offered-tho certainty of success if the Grand Fleet came out. - The one chance of failure wo foresaw was that (he British. Fleet might; not bo coaxed out by our Channel attack. Tho Admiral then entered on an elaborate explanation of the motives of the surrender of the German Fleet-.— Our plans for attack (he went, on) naturally could not be disclosed to tho men of the fleet, and from the preparations tor the operation they got the fatal idea into their propaganda-turned heads that the. fleet was about-to be sent out to i its death. "Why." (hev argued, "should I -we. die on tho Vbrge of 'peace, with negotiations for an armistice going our" Tn 1 this mis»uidc<( frame of mind they I mutinied and started the revolution ■ which they have since come to regret 1 bitterly. They thought, they wero doing ' right, aiid that liieir action, would .sepui;G. j a just and equitable peacefor tho,Father- ! laud. They-still thought so- when they ,' took tho ships to Seapa Flow to ho-in- I le.rned. I am convinced that not an I officer or a man would.have been willing i to lake the ships to Scapa Flow' if ho t had known how pcaco would utiniately i be imposed. i