GENERAL BOTHA DEAD

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 286, 29 August 1919, Page 7

GENERAL BOTHA DEAD

. 4 . I A VICTIM OF INFLUENZA PASSING OF A GREAT SOUTH AFRICAN 8y Telofrraph-Prees Association-Copyright (liec. August 28, 5.5 p.m.; Cape Town, August 28. General Botha died at midnight from influenza.—liquter. SKETCH OF A WONDERFUL CAREER In the late General Botha are presentad three distinct and remarkable careers. There is, first, his career as a capable ind honourable leader of tho Boer forces in the South African War against Britain: second, his career as a loyal and distinguished statesman of the Empire; and, third, his career as the invader and conqueror of German South-West Africa in the Great War. As a military commander his leadership was distinguished by a brilliant talent for strategy and the will to win. Botha's military methods were Napoleonic in their conceptionpatience and care in preparation for attack, a swift and powerful'thrust, and a thorough follow up of the retreating foe. There were few, if any, aftermaths with Bctha. The job wns finished and done with when he left the battlefield. _ His greatest asset in dealing with military crises was his power of initiative, .disconcerting rapidity of action, and uncompromising thoroughness in seeing it through. As a statesman, these qualities, transferred to the political forum, gave him command of tho situation during many difficult crises, and throughout his career as Premier of .the South African Union was distinguished by a high senso of loyalty and Imperial citizenship. Botha, the Boer Finhter. As a fighter, Botha, who was horn at Grtytown, Natal, in 1863, smelt gunpowder at a very early age. The Zulu chief Dinizulu was at that time engaged in a vigorous campaign against a powerful negro tribe in the vicinity of VTylieid, a district then being colonised by the Boers. A number of the colonists, including young Botha, enlisted under the Qa«' of Lucas Meyer, and fought on behalf of the Zulu chief. Vryheid was subsequently annexed by tho Boers as their reward. This territory was then called the New Republic, with Lucas Meyer as its first President, whilo Botha became a member of the Volksraad. The New Republic was merged into the Transvaal threo years later, and both Meyer and Botha.'became members of tho Volksraad at Pretoria, as representatives of the VryKeid district. Both men retained _their seats until tho outbreak of hostilities with Great Britain, and in the , many stormy scenes in the Vtillawiad during tho turbulent period immediately preceding the declaration of war, Botha took a conspicuous Btnnd on tho side of moderation. With a prophetic eye, he foresaw the awful devastation whioh must inevitably follow from tho presence in the country of a hostile army, and that m the end, tho long, long end, perhaps, tho vast resources of the British Empire must tell in tho struggle for supremacy. That which everybody regarded as inevitable happened at last. Tho tension snapped, tho call to arms sounded, and the memor-.| able struggle began. Botha laid aside his Parliamentary duties, and rejoined his old commando at Vryhoid, under Lucas Meyer. He was then a veldt-cornet. In s,ix months be became Commandant-Gen-eral of the Boer Forces. At the Tiwela River, Lucas' Meyer was compelled, though sickness, to retire lo Pretoria, and Botha was appointed Assistant Commandant under General Joubert. At the most critical period of the campaign, when the arrival of Sir Rcdvers Bnller with additional troops had shaken the confidence of the Boers very considerably,. Botha was appointed Acting Commandant--General, Joubert being then considered too old and broken in health for the trying responsibilities of his position, lhis was before tho first big fight, and Botha s position, was one of grave responsibility; He was face to face with a_ General .ot proved determination and ability. Experience-, men, and munitions of war wero on the British sido, overwhelming factors in the odds of battle. On the other hanfl, tho appalling character of the country wns. in Botlm'D strategic dispositions, con. verted into a terrible weapon on. tho Boer side. Here tho British sustained their first decisive check. Tho position taken' up by Botha showed consummate skill in generalship, and a thorough knowledge of the country. Tho battle of Colenso established Botha's fame as a military leader. The disastrous action at Spion Kop was very nearly a catastrophe for the Boers. General Schalk BuTger, for somo inexplicable reason, had vacated the splendid position he had been ordered to take up. Botha instantly grasped the situation, regained the position rawitwl by Burger, and turned the tide of battle in the opposite direction. When Commandant-General Jotfbert lay dying, he was asked, to name his successor, and without the slightest hesitation he gasped out tho name of Louis Botha. His nomination was afterwards confirmed at 'Pretoria, and from that time Botha was the paramount inilitary power in the Boer army. As Commandant-General, Botha took a prominent part in the subsequent negotiations for peace, and much of the success which attended those conferences was undoubtedly due to his pereonal influpnee. Botha was "a fine figure of a man." He stood about sft. 10in. in his stockings, blue-eyed, tho very type of healthy, vigorous manhood. He was the handsomest man in.the Boer army. CONQUEST OF SOUTHWEST AFRICA Immediately upon the declaration of war Botha'set about disposing of the German menace on his own borders. Here he had a difficult and extremely embarrassing task which taxed his initiative and energies to the utmost. German, machinations, coupled \yitli the revolutionary spirit of a certain disaffected section, headed by Hertzog and Beyers, combined to provoke a rebellion against the authority of the. Govern uent at the very time when Botha was orp;ahising the campaign against South-West Africa. He acted' with characteristic decision and energy, and completely surprised the. rebels by the rapidity with which he put his measures for suppressing the. rebellion into operation. Iho revolt was crushed, and Botha methodically turned to the main problem, _ a difficult and hazardous operation, involving skilful organisation, and a definite plan of operations. The result was the conquest of German South-West Africa with a completeness which evoked the admiration of the War Office, and stunned the Germans.. The history of his victorious march across the desert to the German stronghold at Windhoek is familiar to the public. BOTHA, STATESMAN IMPERIALIST When war broko out General Botha was engaged in laying tho foundations of one of the greatest pieces of constructive administration over attempted by ; any statesman, namely, a four years- progrnmmo of legislative and administrative action, which it was hoped would lead to the '"reshuffling" of tho white and coloured races in such a manner es to avoid for all time serious friction between the races of South Africa. Cynics remarked, and- continue to remark, that a man might succeed in walking in the footsteps- of eitlior Moses or but disaster would attend General Botha in his rolo of following Hoses and Joshua combined. It is characteristic of South Africa's Premier that when war and rebellion wen; added to his burden ho refused to abandon his great administrative reform, but witli clear \riwn postponed it i'or one year, and then, stamping out rebellion and conquering a territory a.s large as Germany, he resumed the work ho laid aside in the autumn of 1914. „ . When General Botha became Prime Minister of tho United States of South

.Africa lie found the lnnd hold by the white and coloured races under ovory form of title and no title at all-freehold, toehold, eqimtter, coinmiiiinl, individual, whito men on the black :nnn's land, and black men, with agreement nnd without agreement, on thnt of the whites—a greater confusion of title it is difficult to imagimv Confronted with this situation, General Botha decided to set in ■

motion a, movement which would lead ultimately to a separation of the white and coloured races. The Policy and Its Programme. General Botha's policy was set forth ■it his instruction by Mr. .Edward' Dower, Secretary for Native Aifiiire, in a letter dated February, 19U, to the President of tho Native Congress, and it has four.distinct features:— 1. Tho "gradual expropriation of lands owned by Europeans within defined native areas." 2. The settlement of natives on such hinds under, a regularised system. 3. Tho "gradual extension of the system of individual tenure wherever natives are sufficiently advanced to appreciate its advantages." 4. Native Councils "for the good government and the local administration of affairs in native areas." The legislative programme for the application of this policy, which was one of three parts, commenced in 3913, and was expected to pass' through its final stages in 1916. In the first place, General Botha passed the 1913 Land Act, whereby for a period it.became illegal for both whites and natives to sell or lease land within large specified areas. This Act also provided for the abolition of irregular forms of squatting. The provisions of the Act wore lo "operate temporarily pending further legislation based, upoji tne report" of n Commission. Tho next step was that of setting up a Commission of five members with. Sir William Beaumont as chairman, to report upon what furthor areas should be scheduled within which whites and natives respectively could, or could not, ob- ! tain leasehold and freehold titles—in short, to.mark out tentatively the areas in the Union which would ultimately becomo a "chequer board" occupation by rnees black arid white. This Commission was required in the Act to complet& its labours by Juno. 30, 1915, but owing to the war Parliamentary sanction was obtained to extend the period to Juno 30, 191 G. The Commission has now reported. This policy involves, in the first place, sotting aside much larger areas for the coloured people—the term "coloured" being used in a broad sense and not with tho technical South African meaning. This, in turn, demand? legislation for the ultimate expropriation of white landownors settled to-day in areas predominantly occupied by the coloured race?, and for the expropriation of coloured people occupying areas peopled largely by whites. The publication, of General Botha's 1913 Act and the subsequent correspondence led at once to a storm, of protest from many sections of the South African community. This arose partly from , ignorance of the" measure, not a littlo j from the unfortunate manner in which the Bill was rushed through the Legislature, and still more from a natural] prejudice due to the manner, in vhich j the natives have bee/i treated in the past, j Then "vested, interests" took alarm, fear- j ing' expropriation without adeqiiatocom-.i pcnsation. The missionary societies, ' with their long experience of wrongs in-' fjicted upon their native flocks, were very suspicious, and many of their missionaries denounced -tho measure. White men living in areas predominantly 00.-. cupied by coloured people anticipated a serious depreciation in'tho value of their land, and several of South Africa's ablest statesmen joined in the opposition; some because they believed General Botha was attempting, the impossible, some because they believed absolute segregation of the. races was intended, and 'others because they feared a prodigious cost might be incurred in settling for all time some' millions of people. But naturally the natives were, most alarmed; very few understood tho measure, and undoubtedly j more, than one educated native, either J could not grasp tho /main objects of the • Bill ajid the policy behind it or grossly. i misrepresented them. ' The following I passage taken from a recent book , by ] ono such native illustrates this feature. ,Mr. Sol Plaatje says:-". . . to crown all uur calamities, South Africa has by law ceased to bo the hoine of any of her. native children whose skins are dyed with the pigment that doss not conform with the regulation hue. We are told to foif give our enemies and not to let the sun I go down upon our wrath, so we breathe-I-the. prayer that ■pence may be to -tfte 'white races., .and that they, including our present persecutors of the .Unioii i Parliament, may never live to find tlwjin- | selves deprived of all occupation and proi porty rights in their native country, as I is now tho case with the native." ■ i This passage, like so much in Mr. I Plaatje's book, is' such a grotesque misi representation of th& Act and of General j Botha's policy that it can do the natives ! of South Africa nothing but harm, whilst i it gravely prejudices the efforts of thii j ever-increasing number of white nien. j both in South Africa<.and in this country, 1 who arc anxious to assist native races I within tho Empire to work out their own I salvation along sound lines.

Thus General Botlui was beset on every hand, and it is probably true that during the early part of 1914 the current of public opinion wns running so' strongly against him that ho could not have earned through to its final stage the land policy upon which lie had so boldly embarked. Then canio war, followed by rebellion; peace returned to South Africa rith General Botha's position so unassa.labla that he was able to proceed to the final stage of his great policy with the certainty of ultimate triumph. The Franchise. "Will General Botha , « policy lead ultimately to a solution of the franchise problem for all civilised natives south of tile Zambesi?" asked Mr. John H. Harris in a. review article in the ''Fortnightly" of April, 1917. "The main fact to bear in mind is that there, is nothing in his policy which precludes the enfrancliitemont of the natives at the proper time; indeed, tho policy behind the Act seems to prepare the v way for such a step. General Botha had to frame a measure which, on the one hand, would not prejudice the enfranchised natives of' Cane Colony, whilst, on 'the other hand, it would -prepare the illiterate millions of the other provinces foil the day when they will justly claim similar privileges to those enjoyed by tho natives of Cape Colony. General Botha's proposal to set up nativo councils in all the scheduled ureas for the government of purely native affairs will provide just the training need, od for the. ultimate exercise it tho full privileges of citizenship—a far-off day none of us can yet see, but one which is Surely coming if General Botha's policy is allowed to maturs. , . , '. The 1913 Land Act of South Africa, tho Commissioners' report, the legislation foreshadowed in General Botha's letters and instructions lead one to believe that South Africa's first Premier intends to give material existence to an entrancing vision. The day when white men will live inhuge denned 'white areas' aud tho natives in s'ched lied 'native .ii'eas , ; segregation of ownership and occupancy for each, but a healthy intermingling for industrial purposesapproved white men trading in "native areas' and natives labouring in 'whito areas' to tho advantage of both; 'nativo areas' with contented populations enjoying the free play of every legitimate tribal institution, flocks and herds, pasture and crops, music and 6ong, everywhere abounding under the control of tribal chiefs; native councils composed of tho wisest chiefs governing the 'nativo areas' with advisory powers gradually leading on to executive functions, thereby training the younger generation to qualify for the electing of white representatives to Parliament, and, in the process of time, when race prejudice has been stifled by tho march of progress, complete franchise .and the fullest enjoyment of British citizenship in what will thon be in very Ituth-Tho United States of 'South Africa!" In 1917 a now Bill was tabled in South Africa covering tlio legislation foreshadowed for 1818. This Bill carried General Botha's policy to the next stage, and automatically invujved the repeal of the 1913 Act. The new proposals fortincd the main principles of tho initial legislation whilst leaving for future Parliamentary ex.wi'mtion and legislation the areas allotted to whites and natives respectively. . .