A QUESTION OF TACT

Dominion, 14 August 1919, Page 5

A QUESTION OF TACT

WHAT CO-OPERATION MAY ACHIEVE IN ' RUSSIA NEW LIGHT ON THE PROBLEM I have just had a lonj conversation with a man who.arrived'in Paris two or threo days after a lon* stay in Russia (wrote tho Paris correspondent of the 'Westminster Gazette" recently). Ho is a Russian by. birth, but, unlike most educated Russians whom one encounters, lie has no political axe to grind. His opinions then, aro of more value, and at this moment, when the Allies seem to think that the recognition and support of liolchnlc are all that is nocessary to restore Russia, it was interesting lo 'hear him exclaim: "Neither Lenin nor Kolchak in auy way represents the people of Russia. The people care about neither oi them-they only care about realities." Kolchak too believes to be personally sincere, but the people behind him are political intriguers, who desire to impose their own reactionary Government upon Russia. Moreover, nil these armies, including the Bolshevik army, according to him, are not of tho real stuff of iHitiu2 men.

'"If you fhink," he said, "that you aro going to conquer Bussia with niackiiieff,lns you are wrong. It is useless to send old Allied officers, as you do, to advise the anti-Bolshevists.' They may 'understand their military business; they do not understand thai this is rather a iiuestion of tact and of propaganda. 1' believe that a thousand men who 'went straight ahead would get to Moscow, but it is useless, if you aro not sure of vour troops, to march forward; and if a 'propaganda in your rear may make the villages behind you 'hostile, what is the good of your advance? It is wrong to rcard tins as an ordinary war. Half your own troops niay.be Bolshevists, and half your opponents may he anti-Bolshevists, it is a matter of management, not of tactics'-f.-PS-ycliology, not of strategy; and the Allied ignorance of this truth is astonish, ing. You think that artillery can "do anything." AVith regard to the Soviets, he does not believe that they really count for much in the present condition of Bussia. "I do not talk of atrocities," he said, "they are not an essential part' of tho problem. The question is rather the daily--effect of Bolshevism on the life of the people. For me, the present Government is only another form of the autocratic government of' the Tsar. The personnel has changed just as it would change again if Knlchak or anyone else were' in Moscow. But their influence is not bo important as has been pretended. One has always lied about Bustiia. The old story that the Russian people thought of the Tsar as their 'Little Father,' made me smile. They had certainly no respect for him or for the pi'iests. All they wanted was to be left alone.

"They are now left alone Tnueh more than yon suppose. The socialisation of Bussia has lifcrdVy begun. As a' mnttcr of fact tho Soviets only control half per cent, of transactions controlled by the BoMicviste. The percentile of the foodstuffs controlled by the Government is twelve. In practice private speculators obtain and sell the greater part of foodflti;ffs in Bussia. To protect themselves from these private speculators the peoplo turn more and more to the bin 'cooperatives,' who now distribute 35 per «ent. of the food at reasonable rates.

"Thesf prhatf' speculators are neither Bolshevik nor anti-BolsheviV; they are like food speculators in all countries. They are content with the resimo which, allows them to accumulate their fortunes; and you must remember Ihnt ; f prices are high they are high all round. Thus, if I were hard,-" he snid. producing a nonlcet-knife, "1 could Pull this knife for 300 roubles, and live on it longer than, you could live en a tnifis in France. There are poor people who fitarre. and there are speculators who make fortunes. The Government is apparently powerless to prevent thesi» illicit dealings.

"The co-operative societies are in no wav hidden; they operate quite freely nnd do-an excellent work in checking tho operations of the unscrupulous profiteers. Th'ov have, in a practical sense, more power than the Government. The Government does not attempt to interfere with them. How could it, when they number so many members It would bo a bad thing to prevent the co-operatives from fighting the mere money-maker. Therefore the Soviets leave them alone.

"There is one consumer's society which has fifteen million' members, and no fewer than twenty-five thousand braches. In 1918. under the Bolsheviki, be it noted l it did 720,000,000 roubles worth of bmi ness. I believe '.hat tho co-operative societies may play a vital part in tho reorKanisation of Russia.

"Whoever is nominally in power cannot interfere with these organisations, and perhaps it is through them that salvation will come, and not through any political negotiations, any diplomatic combinations, or any military operations.

"Thus I do not consider it a matter of great importance, whether Lenin stays or not. What is of importance is that Russia should get bnck to work n:id have the mr-ni's of working, and that it should bo helped commercially, to oxchance certain things with it possesses against certain things which it does not possess." So far I have quoted as earefujly' as possible my informant, who slipds, in my opinion, a' new light on Russia. These statements, of course, should bo checked, but if they are substantially true, as 'I see no reason to doubt, tho deductions to be drawn aro fairly obvious. We b'avo relied upon the official way, of Government dealing with Government: and in tlio absence of any real Government in Russia, whether that means Van Government of Kolehak or of Lenin, we Jinvo found ourselves nonphisseiL Suppose that for a clumps we ignore Governments Jind dealt with Russia? Tho Nansen scheme, excellent as it was, failed because wo denlt with an unsatisfactory Government. Tl\o Kolehak adventiiro will r-rjually fail because we. are again dealing with an unsatisfactory Government. Why not deal directly with the co-operative societies? I am now' expressing a more personal view, but 1 make the suggestion with some confidence. Lenin dare not take tho responsibility of refusing (o allow tlio cooperatives to import food and raw mate™)?. If n guarantee is npces:>nry ho would be obligfd to give it to the cooperatives. Politics and clashing ambitions might well be left out of tho account, arid tlio essential business of restoration bo begun. Nothing produces a revolutionary atmosphere so surely as the isolation of Russia. When the frontiers are open Lenin will fall. If we do not resume relations directly with Russia, Germany ivill.