GERMAN HOPES

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 265, 5 August 1919, Page 2

GERMAN HOPES

ERZBERGER PREACHES A RECOVERY

AND FUTURE CONQUESTS ,

(From the Special Correspondent of tho London "Morning I-ost.")

Paris, llav 31. A translation of a letter sent by Hcrr Erzberger to some prominent Germans at tho end of April, 1919, and seized in tho post, contains the following passages

Tho world political position of Germany has Ri'eatly improved since tho Armistice. Six months ago wo wero faced by. a firm public opinion 011 the side of our enemies. Now, as was inevitable, the various elements of the Entente are working for their .individual interests at tho Pc'" Conference. Tho strength of union has long since disapjr ; Ws w*»7!iit,d and America have drive:i as competitors from tho world's lilf.rkets and havo 110 special interest to injure us further. France, in order not to lose lior place as a Groat Power, seeks. to strengthen it at our cost. Nevertheless, strong and influential factors are at work there for tho overthrow of the present Government. Throughout .the entire Entonto there is a growing tendency to unite tho tVilsonian principles with revolutionary Socialism. The result is a protest agairtst fui'ther pressures on Germany.

All this works in tho armies of the Entente and has great influence. AVe learn from good and reliable sources that pacifist propaganda will bo.pushed in every possible way in Entente countries, especially among demobilised soldiers. It is done quite 'openly. Newspapers spread tho ideas in question, pamphlets are printed, speeches made, and at meetings the tendency of the French War Cabinet will be fought. The simple return of. Alsace-Lorraino to Franco will be criticised and .a plebiscite set forth as the best solution of this problem. To-day, if the war should be resumed, anti-militarism would play quite a different role in Entente countries and armies than it did beforo the armistice; this is certain. It may also be affirmed that the Entente is essentially weakened in fighting strength. We have, it is true, a powerful enemy force against us theoretically, but havo arisen for us in the heart of this overpowering force.

A Fortunate Turn. There is no doubt that very hard and probably unacceptable peace terms will bo given us. Wo will not discuss here ivlmt the German people will do if the conditions are too severe. We will rather take the politics of the day, and make a standard by which to measure the worth and possibilities of various possible policies in regard to the future. For a war which has not been won, ono must pay and suiter. With what and how? These are the main questions for us. A fortunato turn has come for us.i Positive demands for territory have grown less, whereas damage dono is taking more prominent place. Abace-Lorraine and a part of the province of Posen must bo put down as lost, "but Germany will not die in consequence. The other frontiers which wore in danger are in a different position from that in which they were six months ago. Then tho French .dreamed of the annexation of the left bank of tho Rhine, the Poles already looked vpon West Prussia, the Masurian district in Prussia, and the entire Government of Oppeln as part of their future kingdom. There were Germans. and unfortunately not a few, who considered this a possibility. To-day, however, all these horrible pictures have passed into the background. True, the French still want permanent possession of the left bank of tho Rhine, but this is only a modest return of annexation desires. We must not, forget that from immemorial times, since, tho epoch of Charlemagne, passing by Louis XIV and Napoleon I, up to the last year of the war. the French" mind lias always seen tho natural eastern frontier in 't'.ie Rhine, and this' Rhino frontier ! has always had a prominent place in the folklore of the nation.. • Poets have sung of it. historians written of it. When our rationalist desires in ISTO joined Alsace

and nart of Lorrai.no to Germany, it was ssot so much .the French nationalist sentiments which were struck, as the Alsatians were of Germanic descent and speech; it was rather the feeling which hud been handed down from the Middle Ages to tho present time, the conception of the Charlemngian western kingdom extending from tho Rhine to the ocean. Behind all tho revenge literature wt must seek this underlying thought of recovery of this great Corftinental Power, as it had existed from Wittikind to Charlemagne the Great, and which' German Kultnr had victoriously joined to the Bismarkian and Wilhelmian Eastern Kingdom. Renaration for Damane. And now, when the old dream-wa# nearly realised, the Rhino frontier will, from • principle, no longer• be spoken of; it will bo occupied until the agricultural and economic damago done has been made good. One must compare the French feeling, which has been handed down to them, with their present stand, in order to appreciate tho situation. Tho estimate of damages has become more precise, aoid therefore more dangerous. We must protest against it with all the strength and all tho means in our power. Wo daro not oponly maie a difference between the territorial and economy claims of our enemies, or the spirit of tho Entente might bo influenced against us. Therefore wo must consider tho economic conditions with the Entente at tho timi of signing, as not finally settled. If we to-day have before us an Entente which is so greatly weakened in comparison with last autumn, what will it be in a few years, or in ten years? \\ ill the Entente then be anything more than an historical memory? Wo must, above all, keep before our eyes tho reason of this war. It is the strugglo for world domination between two great factors, the Continent aJiul tho Anglo-Saxon race, in England and the United States; between London and l.er-, lin we find the Bame game as formerly between Carthage and Rome. The continent against tho "Oversea. As, at that time, tho Continental Tower won, so 'will it once more gain the uppei hand. That lies in the essence; ot things. Tho struggle of the pants: » ever harder and longer. At tins time we may compare ourselves witn me Romans after tho Battle of Cannae, when Hannibal stood beforo the gates, frothing appeared to be lost. Anil jet Romans wero destined to oe yictoi, in this war for dominion for tho loner from beyond tho seas had in ltselt he seed of death. , Tho Romans know this. ■And it is the same with us. Uimanj must remember that the prawn war l, nothing else than an episode in the stiupglo with tho Anglo-Saxon race tor vorld dominion; an episode which has in a. manner winch is not i\iJoolute > our disadvantage. On contr«r>.«hen we count tho gams and los»e>, the present conditions in tho nrMwfm our standpoint, similar, and blance It is true, the Anglo-Saxons, on cluet enemies, have been strengthened through this war. Yet not directly. Indirectly it is (lie contrary. Without_ France, England is weak on the Coiilinont. where France is the strongest outpost. e l»\e so thoroughly weakened tho lnttoi thai she will neser be able to recover. Af ei such a blood-letting sic-Kiiess «i 111 sot in. The moro so since the Anglo-Saxons, tho British as well ns the Americans, are determined to hold the commerce of Allies in their owji hands.

A Weakened France. In cliilc of the intoxication of victory, France, in the coming years wil bo weaker than she was before lie wai. At anv rate, she will not be a danger to us. Quito different is it, even it not unfavourable to us, with the second cornerstone of tho Anglo-Saxons on tho Conlinent, tlife Poles. Thanks to our eon-tury-long, wiso Eastern policy, this second factor existed merely 111 theory before tho war. Tho Polish kingdom was stricken from the list of States. No one in Europo troubled about tho I'oles, ami only tho determination of this tenacious rac'o kept them from being lost in the German Empire, at least tho part inhabited by Prussians. Tho bonds with France, strengthened for hundreds of years by community of interests against 'us, were overcome. Uussia, during the post ton years, had gained considerable influence. but this was not really antiGcrmnn nor anti-Prussian. Wo still had great intluenco among tho Poles. He-

member, 6inco the beginning of tlie war, the Russian Court Party and then its opposite, tlio, Bolshovilii. The Poles, as outpost for Anglo-French policies, did not exist before the war, and are now about to be pushed 'buck to their former place. Here our position bus nndoubtedy weakened, but even hero much Ims developed to favour iifi. It was very satisfactory to us that our deadly enemies, the Czechs, should fight tho Poles in Teschen. Tho Poles were naturally enraged, and the result is that we need havo no i'eur of an alliance between tlieso two races, both enemies of Ola's. This advantage came to us quite unexpectedly, ami may be placed on the sido of.clear winnings.- And there is another anti-Polish element! in the East, which we worked for, niul in which we have put capital: tlio Ukrainians. Wa must give the Austriuns the credit for having stirred up tlio Ukrainians, but tha support and the entire structure came from Germany, both before and during the war. Without us, the Ukrainians would not to-day be against tlio Poles, it is to tho lasting credit of the "Ostmai'keuveroines" that, even when the immediate breaking out of war was not thought of, they always insisted upon the necessity of not taking measures against tho Poles in Prussia, but to raise up enemies for them in the Bast, 011 the borders of tlio former Polish kingdom..

German Intrigues. True. Russia directed her Polish policy in our favour and often under our direct influence, but that might change. At any rate, tho forethought for tho UkrainianLithuanian work was, during the ivar, proved to have been excellent. Both Lithuania and Ukrainia refused to b&< coino part of the former Polish kingdom. Our active assistance has torn from tho Poles almost tho whole of East Galicia and deliverf.it it to our Eastern partisans# Publicati ins c all kinds, in various languages, i\ 1 ■ Ito the Lithuanian arid Ukrainia 1 q .ion, will, through us, be spread .throughout neutral and enemy countries. In certain Eutente countries, especially, naturally, in America, the sources are those which form public opinion by general news on the Lithu.v nia.ll and Ukrainian question. The great succvss of our efforts on this territory permits to hope for attainment of our ends. What German State philosophers ingeniously created as theories, as well as all that has boon brought into practical being by German politicians, both from Vieniia and Berfin, in the territory of publicity is still young. The conception of the "Poles" is very old. For r/ timo stricken from State dictionaries, it need only be freshened. It is no nowcomer on the European political horizon. Most countries need merely look back in their archives in order to learn tlio rolo ptyyed b>; tho Pole 3. It is .different with our r.ewly.crcated Allies, the Lithuanians, and especially tho Ukranians, It is an immense gam for us that they have been created, and also that they not only are not unitc-1 1 with, the Poles in policy, but "are against thorn. But we must not forget that them voung and promising plants must be well cared for and supported, if they a/o to bo further developed. Our propaganda /must not stop for an instant in strength, ening the 6elf-consciousness of this creation and to turn it a<aiust the Polish element. This will not rest on single, energetic action on our part. This will also come into consideration, ni, for instance, the attack on tho Poles iu East Galicia, which was and still will bo wisely raid energetically supported by us. But the main thing is constant propaganda for years ■& como. Ihe signing of peace, which may be formally done, does not, of course, mean an end to tho development of our political ends. Tha Lithuanians and Ukraniau affairs wiil ulways bo of great' importance to us. It is a question of two points of support for oiir policy -in regard to Eucsia.

Great Russian Problem. In all these Eastern questions we must not iorget that they all bang together<«d each ill itself is, merely a part of tho great Russian problem ior us, just os this is merely the last step in the account to be settled with tho AngloSaxons and towards _ the world <ioMimoii. VVs ?ioed Lithuania, and Ckrania as German outposts as Poiau' l must bo weakened. -As l'ranco in'tlie West, so Poland in tho Last )fr tiio corner-stone of Angi)-!.!axor enfeil power, Poland guarded, ~ to Russia, is closed. If wo s\>. ''-v m keeping Poland down it will men.* er.orniqua gains lor us. 11l tho first place, France's position on tile Continent is, in tho, long run, untenable. Second, tho wav to Russia is then open. That is, oven for a'blind man, Germany's tuturc. Russia is now ripe, if planted with German seed, to come into the great; ueiman future. Nothing must disturb us in tho great problem before us. ioland is tho solo but a very powerful obstacle.. Therefore it is important not io lose courage, but to keep in mind that things might be much worse than they are; on tho other hnnd, however, we must continue our work ceaselessly in the Last and ever keep before our eyes the gigantic reward which we hope to obtain. If we succeed in hindering the building up of a strong Poland, then the future Is quite clear for. «s. Then the AngloSaxons cannot close the Russia to us. We will- undertake the restoi.v tion of Russia, and in possession o such support wo will be rendv, vithin . fifteen years, to bring France, w lL.iont any difficulty, into our power Tho march towards Paris will be easier then than m 19U. The last step but one towards the world dominion will ihen.be "ached. The Continent is ours. Afterwards viU follow the last stage, the closing struggle, between tho Continent and the Oier- ! seas." '