CENTRAL POWERS IN THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 263, 2 August 1919, Page 7

CENTRAL POWERS IN THE WAR

/ AUSTRO-GERMAN SQUABBLE

STAFF OFFICER'S REVELATIONS

(From a Special. Correspondent of tho '•'Morning Post.") Copenhagen, May 24. " The unity of tho German-Austrian command during tho war, of which tho Gorman Press often boasted and which Entente critics lamented, was.'not an unqualified fact. There were several attempts to achieve unity, and for a time almost complete unity was achieved; but Germany. and her Allies never achieved the complete subordination to- which tho Entente and America subjected themselves, at a very late stage, it is true, when Marshal Foch was given supreme command. The inner facts about tho German-Austrian leadership are revealed in an article by an anonymous Austrian Staff officer (published in "Danzers Armee-Zeituug," of which the original is not here available. The following is a summary of a Danish translation prepared by Major-General Niowenhuis for the "Berlingske Tidende" of this city: Before the world war broke out, writes .the Austrian officer, Germany and Austria, of course, had their common plan of campaign, which included, among ■ other things, the dispatch of Austria's Italian troops to the Vosges. But- the two Powers could not bring. themselves to accept a single command; Instead, as the war developed itself, "war councils" were to bo held. After the Marne defeat, ' due, it is stated, to "Moltke's nerves or forces not being strong: enough to withstand the French attack," and after Austria succumbed to the first Bussian assault, in Gnlicia,-Hindenburg was sent from .East Prussia to South Poland, end German and Austrian troops fought side by side. But thore was no common command. "Hindenburg had to work in accord, with tho'Austrian leaders," but he did .not get command; and to that the Austrian'officer ascribes the failuro of the first march on Warsaw. After that, Falkonhayri and Conrad von Hoetzendorf met at Breslau, and a modus vivendi was arrived at. The two Goneral Staffs were .to prepare .common plans, which the German Commander .on tho spot would'execute. This-system was maintained for two.years, with, or. the whole, good results, though . friction occasionally arose owing to differences .of character and ase between Falkonhayn and Conrad von •Hoetzenldorf. Conrad found difficulty in giving way to his colleague, twelvo years younger, and Falkonhayn was nettled by Conrad's use of words meaning "request" and "beg" in a different 6ense from those -understood by the German Staff. From.-tb.iß friction operations did not suffer, because it had been expressly stipulated that Austria should follow the -German decisions, and during the campaigns in Eusaia and Serbia the collaboration between the two armies was idea!.

-Dispute Oyer Salonika. After Serbia's defeat differences arose. Austria, with her Bulgaria, wished to pusli the offensive as far u» Salonika, to put an end to tho Entente's uncomfortable presence there, and at the. sometime to subjugate Montenegro and Albania;' while Germany, whoso position in France was growing more and mora difficult, declared that with the forces avaiiaolo a march to Salonika could not be carried through- "At Christmas, 3915, therefore,. the relations between the Central Powers were anything but jjood. For several weeks all verbal intercuu-'so ceased. In the meantime Austria herself conquered Montenegro and Durazzo; and after that she was entirely unshakeable against sending troops to France, which' Falkenheyn wished. As the result each, of the Central Powers went its own way. Tlie Crown Prince of Germany was to conquer 'Verdun, and Conrad von Hoetzendorf was to take the offensive in "North Italy on the AdigcBrenta." Neither aim was attained; instead, Austria suffered her terrible, do feat of the summor of 1911) at fjrusiloff'a hands. "The Central Powers' military position was such that the question of a new command canio into the foreground.. In Germany' discontent was felt with Falkonhayn, whom the Kaiser fa\oured in crder to keep Hindenburg at a dishnee. But Wilhebn had to give way, in that the old Marshal with his Chief, of Stall. Ludendorff, was put'at thehead of the vhole Eastern'front as.far as the Dneister. ; But jvith an eye to the Slavs in the DoublerMonarchy, the Archduke Karl (afterwards Emperor) .was given command over the troops south of that river. Jhe necessary co-ordination between the two groups was achieved by appointing Mackensen's Chief of Staff von Seccht to the. -Vrchduke's headquarters. But this did net" satisfy -Germany. War with Ku mania impended. Tho Kaiser wished to have command of the Austrian, Bulgarian, and Turkish forces. At tne same time Falkenhayn should be.removed,and Hindenburg. and Ludendorff should take his place. The old Emperor Fran;-. Josef vas not inclined to give the Prussian such great authority, but his objections were abandoned 'for the -sake ot the great cause.'

Supreme Command at Last. "In September, 1916, the Central Powers supreme (i'.c.' single) command became a. reality. The German Staff was given the command. But it pledged itself to obtain in advance the approval of the commanders of ;the three other armies for everv decision, and not to interfere with ttieir 'higher administration. • tho Kaiser had. to pledge himself to watch over Austria's territories with the same care as over Germany's. The defeat c£ •Rumania, iras the .'Supreme .Command's first achievement. "But after Franz Josef's death Ihe Emperor Karl demanded that he should take personal command'of his,.army, oJid despite Conrad's opposition he'.had his way. The .'Supreme Command's' podtion was weakened somewhat by a secret supplementary article which provided :> 'Operations aro to be. planned by the two armies' -General -Staff;; • should these not agree, the question is to bo submitted to the two Emperors, of whom the German will have the final, decision.'' ■ "On the-whole the leadership remained 'unchanged;--and if nevertheless it, was criticised a' good deal in Austria, the causo was the bad leadership in foreign policy. . . .This wa.<> in particular seen in the Central Powers', policy, towards revolutionary Russia. As against this both Powers agreed that an offensive mlist be undertaken against Italy in the autumn of: 1017 in order, to prevent the 'los* of Trieste, whose fall seemed lo bo impending, However, Germany's offer of help in this enterprise was very nearly rejected ■■ by Austria for reasons of prestige, but as the result of action by General.von Arz .this .rejection did not Jake, place, and the result exceeded all expectations. • .

Collaboration" Fails. "In the lust war year, however, the fruitful collaboration' ilii'led. Ludendorff wished first and foremost to win on theAVcstern front; with' the aim of putting an-end to the war. Nohing wuu.d have be'en moro natural than that Austria should help toward? this aim- by sending a big contingent, of troops. .But for political reasons ''the Government was obdurately against this; and Ludendorff did not count, much' upon the Austrian troops ability, to fight/against Frenchmen and- Englishmen.. So no Austrians came to the French front, with Hie exception of thpse who Accompanied the heavy artillery, and of these, u great many were sent home. The- supreme leadership' did not operate any longer; and, after tho unsuccessful. issue of jiu'de-ndorff's offensive in' France, and of the Austrians' attacks on Italy on the Piave-Asiago . front, the military collaboration ceased entirely. The cause was simply that Germany had no longer at her disposal the reserves necessary for bringing about a cortain-equilibrium, particularly upon the .Eastern front. All Bulgaria's'and Turkey's cries for help remained unanswered: and I he result, was the coinplote col'lapso of these two countries and afterwards of the tivo KaiserStates," Poor Foreion Policy, In conclusion, the Austrian Staff officer remarks: "In many respects the Central Powers' military collaboration was not complete— a natural consorjueuco of the fact that euch collaboration between Allies is always difficult. But ono must absolutely deny the story that the collaboration was bad.. How long had theKntento to wait hofore it achieved unity of 'command P As against this, tho leader-

ship of our foreign policy was very freely iuferiof -to that of the Entente; in fact, it was simply wretched. Wo understood eo little what we were about riial" we felt relief on learning that the Czechoslovak nation liatl been recognised by the Entente a3 a belligerent, State; and wo had not: tlio least understanding of Iho fact, that this was a dagger-thrust at our own heart."