JUTLAND THROUGH GERMAN EYES

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 248, 14 July 1919, Page 5

JUTLAND THROUGH GERMAN EYES

ENEMY ADMIRAL'S CRITICISM CLAIMS TO "VICTORY" [Vice-Admiral Paul Behn.'ke, who -. commanded the Third Squadron of tho German Fleet at tho Battle of Jutland, has written the following review of Admiral Jellicoe's book, "The Grand Fleet," which appeared recently in the "Chicago Tribune," and was reprinted by the London . "Times."] . ■ ■.. The reading of Admiral Jellicoe's book, "The Grand' Fleet, 1914-16," allows us .to'understand why the High' Command of the British. Navy has been criticised Bo scvorely by his own countrymen, who want to belicvb that tho traditions of Nelson and other, great Sea Lords of England are still maintained, as well as by >rhe Allies, who demanded that a. strong English Fleet should tako an activo part in tho developments of the world war. As to why this did not take place, Admiral Jellieoe explains that the British Fleet, on which alone tho security and existence of the British Empire rested, had to he kept nnweakencd. That is why the leading idea of its employment was not the destruction of our Fleet by giving battle, _ but by the strangulation of our economic power by surveillance of the North Sea and blockade of all entrances to the North Sea. The final result justifies this line of conduct. Now England's naval power is stronger than ever before. ' , Yet it..is difficult even now to understand why England di'd not uso immediately at, the outbreak of war its great superiority- in- number and the inestimable advantage, of 'being mobilised— which Admiral Jellieoe himself says was the case—for a decisive stroke. By such ft decisive stroke England would have from the'beginning beeri able to influence the development of the world war in a conclusive 'manner. That this did not happen shows the high opinion England had of the fighting ability of tho German Fleet., Tins' feeling, inspired by our Navy, iinpDssu on England an enormous armament nt tremendous cost. It limited tho broad strategic handling of tho British ships. Besides this, it must not be overlooked that the command of the English Navy, though it violated ~ the rights of neutral nations very .sharply, and produced its greatest results on the non-fighting populations of' i Germany— the .women and children—still failed .of Its purpose. Effect of U-boat War. . But this, -policy brought England into great danger for four years; our Fleet, being left undisturbed, remained as a continual menace in support of the submarine boats, to whose warfare we could give our undivided attention. The deadly effe.ct. of our U-boat warfare, as wo hear now from Churchill and .ethers, caused England's fate to hang by a silken thread. ; The task that was given to the Grand Fleet of England for these four years was an ungrateful one. and'was executed under most difficult circumstances and in i unfavourable weather in the northern latitudes, as we, their enemies, must ourselves .acknowledge. We also acknow- 1 ledge their great endurance and snlendid seamanship. But the'fear of putting the Grand Fleet info jeopardy pressed the seal of extraordinary caution unon its employment, as well as upon all thoughts and decisions of Jellieoe. Fearing the German torpedo-boat", submarines and mines, .the. British, battleship fleet was tucked away far up to the north, sometimes even the west coast, and only came into the southern part of the North Sea when it could reinforce the_ smaller, lighter fleets on some expedition, or when working out a tactical nlan. In-all this it kept so far away from our const that a meeting with our fleet—which might no=sibly have resulted in a defeat of the British—was sedulousJy- avoided..;,,...' ; .-.- ...... , ■.-'-':. '~-. • The Battle of the Skngerak' was no.t-h' result of deliberate intention on-the part of Jellieoe. ,It be»an because : he unexpectedly met the German fleet, and during the night, when tlio first'opportunity was presented, he drew his shins out and sailed hack; We consider with justified ■pride the .repented bombardment of tho English coast and numerous raids on.the high seas which we, although the weaker of the two nations, made before and after tho battle of the Skagerak. The daring enterprise of the submarines, mine-laving boats, torpedo-boats, aircraft and pirate shins gives us pardonable pride in the recalling. ■ '■ Ostend andZeebrugge. The British, in the brilliant assault on the submarine base at Ostend and Zeebrugge, gave the.only example in the whole war of a real spirit of attack. Generally the English did not attack, except when they, knew they were superior' in number of ships. The spirit of attack was not.shown',by the English Admiral commanding the Allied Fleet in the Mediterranean when trying to forca the '. Dardanelles, whereas the German Fleet, in a similar- position'before Osef, forced the entrance of the Bay of Riga and the Moon Sound, which were locked by mines and coast defences. _ The defective organisation of tho British Grand Fleet, and the unreadiness av the principal bases for effective offensive action, were remarkable to a high degree at the beginning of the..war. Destroyers and 'minesweepers, first essentials in an attack, were''sadly wanting. Üboats and wireless telegraphy were bul slightf.y developed. Scapa ' Flow, the principal base in the Orkney Islands, had.absolutely no means of providing foi or repairing ships; the entrances were undefended and not blockaded. The situation for defensive preparation of other bases was not much' better. It was a long timo before there were docks at the disposition of the fleet. At Scapa Flow, where Jellieoe was Uv. ing in constant apprehension of our torpsdo and U-boats, I am forced to deny the very pleasant accusation that we were too chivalrous to attack.. We gave the English the credit of supposing they had protected their bases the same as we had. Our U-boats attacked, but the destroyers wo hnd at that timo eoulO. not attack the British beealise they wort, unable to make long trips to English bases unaided. Strength of the Fleets. In comparing the rival forces Jellicoo measures with two different standards. He is first under tho disadvantage or being forced to convince his countrymen that the extreme caution of tho Grand Fleet was justifiable- After, tho loss of Audacious on October 27, 1914, by running on a German mine, he gives tho number of the heaviest typo German ships at 20, and British shii>3 of tho same type as .22, but ho states~that he does not include seven of his own ships which were not in fighting condition at that time. But Admiral Jellieoe does not .state, that' tho Germans also had sevon ships not able to take their plnco in the line. Then, too, Jellieoe. gives his readers to understand that on our sido 88 torpedoboats were in commission, when, under our rules, two flotillas, or 22 boats, wero constantly in docks being overhauled. . ■ Admiral Jellieoe labours hard to' prove to (ho British peoplo that their security rested entirely on the Grand Fleet, yet Lord Nelson throw his little- fleet without hesitation in to" a battle that was bound to be decisive and with nothing behind him to go on with the war if defeated. But Jellieoe does' not mention the great reserve that was at the back of tho Grand Floet, or the Navies of the Allied nations supporting England, or that Hie Germans had, v,-hile confronting tho Grand Floet, had to fight against the Russian Fleet, in the Baltic. In n detailed discussion of (lie battk of the Skagerak, the favourable judgment of the English Admiral gives of our "ships, bolji as regards material am! personnel, is important, especially as a large part of both the- German and Allied Press havo been attacking Admiral von Tirpitz. Admissions of "Jellicoe's have further established that the well-armoured, seaworthy men-of-war of tho German navy had been so scientifically worked out under tho direction of Admiral von Tirpitz that they wero superior to tho British ships. 1 .Teltlcoe also says that Gorman fuses, *splosives, and arrangements for fighting their ships at night gave us an advantage. In a word, that our constructors and technician? wero in no wise inferior in knowledge and skill to the English.