VON JAGOW'S BOOK

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 244, 9 July 1919, Page 7

VON JAGOW'S BOOK

HIS ACCOUNT OF HOW THE WAR BEGAN

NOBODY RESPONSIBLE

' Tho London "Times" recently gavo a two-column eummary of "Caused and Outbreak of the World AVar," which Herr Gottlieg von Jagow lias writlen us a defence of tho Jierlin Government's war policy in 1011. lierr von Jagow was German Ambassador in Homo when, in January, 1913, lie was appointed to succeed Hcrr von Jviderlcn-WaecJiter as loreigu Secretary under the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Betlnnann-Hollweg ftiid remained at the Wilhelmstrassc until November, 1910, when, after helping to formulate (lib notorious German "peaco offer," ho suddenly retired from oifico and from public'life in order to devote himself to ambulance work in Courland.

Tho main thesis of Herr von Jngovv's book, says "The Times," is nn attempt to attribute tho present world-catas-trophe to the historic conflict between tho Slav and Germanic races, and to exhibit Russia as the aggressor. Prince Bulow, who is immeasurably better qualified to speak on thn subject, had alrea.ly before tho war laid down in unmistakable terms tho principles of what i o conceived to bo Prussia-Germany's national duty" in Eastern Europe, The Muscovite Peril. Herr von Jagoiv takes credit t.o himself for demonstrating that Prussia-Ger-many was quick to comprehend tho Muscovite peril, which was timed to materialise for Germany in 1917, and that if sho has succumbed in the world war against the Western Powers and America, she has "saved" Europe by her repulse of Russia. But for tho treachery of England, who stabbed Prussia-Germany in tho back, tho latter would have been ablo to reap tho full fruits of victory over the Slav. Herr von Jagow's disquisitions on "European solidarity" aro reinforced by familiar appeals to iho lessons of Bismarckiair statecraft as reflected in the first Chancellor's correspondence with Lord Salisbury. Herr von Jagow essays to construct a more or less connected account of tho events of the fateful month of July that led up to tho outbreak of war. This account, ho says, is based chiefly upon his own recollection, holped out with a few personal notes. Where his memory fails him he is frank enough to say that he cannot remember. In other eases he Dither omits to be specific or declares that ho never knew. This method has lis conveniences. Thuii, in describing the interview in June, 1911, between,, tho Kaiser and Francis Ferdinana in the rose gardens of Konopisht, Herr von Jogow eays that, "as'l subsequently learned, tho conversations, in so far ae they partook at all of a political character, dealt almost entirely with the internal circumstances of Austria-Hungary." Happly, as the "Tim?s" remarks, the outsido world has not had to depend solely upon Herr von Jagow for its knowledge of what happened at this interview.. Crown Council Denied. Similarly Herr von Jagow once more denies that a "Crown Council" took placo on July 5 at Potsdam. But ho. admits that on that day 'tho Kaiser, after receiving from tho Austro-Hungar-ian Ambassador, Count Szoegyeny, the autograph letter from Francis Joseph conveyed to Berlin by Count Itqyos, summoned to Potsdam the Imperial Chancellor and tho Under-Secretary who was in chargo of tho Wilhelmstrasso during Herr voniJngow's absence on his honeymoon on the Lac des Quntra Cantons. Whether the Kaiser conferred with other personnges, says Herr von Jagow, "I do not know." All that Herr von Jagow knows is that on July (i the Kaiser, whose reputation as the "Prince . of Peace" had, of course, to be preserved in view of later eventualities, was bundled off on his annual northern cruise in order that President Poincurc's almost simultaneous visit to Petrograd might not bo made tho' occasion by France and Russia for concerting defensive measures. With an eyo to every contingency, moreover,. Hcrr von Jagow, immediately after his return to Berlin, caused a discreet suggestion to bu made through the German Embassy in Vienna to the effect that a prospect of acquiring Trentino might with advantage be held out to Jtaly. Herr von Jagow premises that the maintenance of Austria-Hungary as a "Great Power" w«s vital to the existence of Germany, and that anything that touched eve,n the prestige of Germany's ally was bound ultimately to recoil upon herself. In this solicitude for the welfare of Austria-Hungary the Berlin Government, as Herr von Jagow puts it, advised tho Vienna Cabinet, after the Sarajevo murder, to make appropriate representations in Belgrade with all .possible dispatch, before- tho world in general should have recovered from its horror at the crime, and before political considerations in favour of Serbia should have had time to assert themselves in this or that quarter. Unhappily, in Herr von Jagow's opinion, Austria-Hun-gary allowed a wholo month to elapse before sho made her provocative demarche at Belgrade. By tho middle of July all hope had passed of "localising" the conflict (i.e. , , of confining it to such Powers as Germany and Austria between , them would have felt secure in challenging). All Europe was alert. With the exception of occasional outbursts like these, prompted by the recollection of Austrian dilatoriness or sceretiveness, Horr von Jagow seeks (says "The Times") to convey tho impression that Germany and Austria walked hand in hand, and that Germany invariably restrained her ally whenever tho latter tried to break into a run. Berlin abounded in counsels of moderation, especially during tho decisive month of July. This contention, as "The Times" ehows by quotation, is traversed in tho most conclusive manner by two remarkable telegrams dated July 25 and 27, 19H, from Count Szoegyeny to his chief in Vienna, Count Berehtold, Hie text of which was reproduced in "The Times" on March 11 of this year. : Tho news of this disclosure reached Herr von Jagow at the moment when his book was about to go to press. He seeks to dispose of it in a characteristic footnote, in which he blames Count Szoe.rgyeny, who, "owing to the weight of his years and bodily indisposition . '. . no longer showed the necessary application of mind." Prince Lichnowsky. "Count Szoogycny is dead, says "Tho Times," and Herr von Jagow may well feel secure in making these imputations. Ho resorts to similar tactics in discussing Prince Liclmowsky's work in London. In the case of the latter, Herr von Jagow unconvincingly parados for l'riuco Liehnoweky's confusion tho "misunderstanding" tnat is alleged to have arisen over the telephone conversation between tho German Ambassador and Sir Edward Grey during the forenoon of August) 1, IDU. But oven so, Herr von Jagow declares, even if there had been a misunderstanding as regards a British proposal, • tho Kaisers suggestion (that lingfand should guarantee French neutrality) atforded England an opportunity of honestly proving.her love of peace and (« preventing war botweou Germany and France. If France was not lobe restrained from making war against us, whero lay England's obligation to take up her stand and fight by tho side of 1 ranee? In tho Belgian question British interests wero sulliciently safeguarded by our promise that the integrity of Belgium would be preserved and tliat she would be indemnified. ~ „ From first to last, adds the limes in conclusion, Herr von Jagow exhibits himself as Ihe apologist of a discredited diplomacy, of its quibbles and equivocations, and above all of ils agent*. J Jβ dwells with complacency upon the methods by which the Wilhelmslrasso assured to itself, the communication of tho oMilidential correspondence between tho l;itc Uussiah AmbitsMidor in London, Count Benckemlorir, and M. SazonolF, in Pelrogrnd. When the copies of this correspondence reached Berlin they wero entrusted for translation into German to Professor Schicmann, whose sense of duty to his paymasters does not seem to have precluded him from making and preserving copious notes for his own purposes. Tho Kaiecr was not informed of those transactions, in order that Herr vou Bethmann Hollweg might lake credit

for unusual sagacily in his ■"presentiments" concerning Russia. In Herr vou Jugow's judgment, it is impossible to assiyn specific responsibilitv for ll'.e H-orld-ivar. The heavens had lonu , been overcast, and it wiis the "Gerinun oak" Hint llic thunderbolts threatened to strike. Germany, in solf-defence, had to act, nnd to act Quickly. Hcrr von Jagow passes lightly over the fateful decision that brought America into the war, as he passes over much else that is essential. In the end, Germany collapsed, committed "suicide," and went under. Although Germany must take her defeat into account, her armies were not vanquished, and so long as hope remains it is not all over with her.