The Dominion MONDAY, JUNE 9, 1919. THE ESSENTIALS OF PEACE

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 218, 9 June 1919, Page 4

The Dominion MONDAY, JUNE 9, 1919. THE ESSENTIALS OF PEACE

No doubt the protracted deliberations of the Peace Conference behind closed doors are regarded as essential and inevitable by the representatives of the leading Allied nations there assembled, but it is .only too plain that this state of.affairs holds, and to some extent creates, its own dangers. In particular it lends .itself to an unsettlement of opinion in Allied countries, and even to a certain amount of wavering in regard to the'only-conditions that will ensure a sound and lasting peace. The preoccupation of the Allied leaders and' the more pr less unguided state of the people they represent have given Germany exceptional scope and opportunity tor propaganda in favour of- toning down'the terms of settlement, and it is sufficiently evident m the news i of the last week or two that tno I weapon of propaganda has not been used altogether without effect, ine dangers thus raised are, of course, accentuated by a considerable extension of the period of grace, a; tot granted to Germany m which, to sign the Peace Treaty. .The extent to which enemy propaganda has achieved its purpose in these days of doubtful rumour and delay is perhaps best exemplified in the fact that the question of making, concessions to Germany is now being discussed in some quarters as if it were separate and independent-as if, that is to say, it might reasonably be considered without reference to the circumstances in which the war arose and ran its course. In observations typical of much else that has appeared in recent days a Daily Graphic' correspondent' at Pans says that the question, which has arisen is whether the iron hand or the velvet glove should be employed at this stage. It is here inferred that the Allies are in a position to determine, from a detached standpoint, whether to be harsh or lenient with Germany. This distorts.the actual position only less seriously than the special pleading of men like Scheidemann and Rantzau which is getting so much more prominence than it deserves. 1 The Allies most emphatically are not in a position' to deal with Germany as if they were conducting a speculative experiment. They have positive facts of decisive weight to proceed upon. It is their duty primarily to inflict the most. exemplary punishment which circumstances will permit upon a nation guilty of colossal crimes and to exact from her such guarantees for the future as may reasonably be demanded from, a nation which was only arrested in its evil course by the exercise of force without ' stint and could not have been arrested in any other way. It has been argued not only by Germans, but by some people in Allied countries, that unless such "moderate" terms are granted to Germany as will in some degree conciliate German public opinion the peace, when it is concluded, will be nothing better than a truce and will be in itself a provocation of future war. This amounts simply to an assertion that the best way to reform a criminal' is to grant him the utmost possible immunity for his crimes. Put forward in the name of high-souled morality, it is in fact as destructive and immoral a plea as was ever advanced. Unless, the Allies are strangely misled, 'their policy to the end wili be determined not by the fear of ruffling German, susceptibilities, but by the necessity as a simple matter of justice of securing what reparation is possible for infamous crimes. At best, and with the peace terras enforced to the last iota as they were presented, the nations Germany outraged will still.be penalised terribly for generations to come. The Allies cannot soften these terms in any material particular without inflicting foul injustice either upon some one of their own number or upon some subject nationality now heartened, by the hope of permanent redemption. These considerations are obvious enough to those who refuse to allow their attention to be diverted from the central issues of the war and the peace settlement, but there is no doubt that in the situation created by the long-continued and unreported deliberations of the Peace Conference the Allied nations have to somo extent lowered the impenetrable guard they ought to be opposing to enemy propaganda. ,If it is made in as firm terms as it ought to he. tho early reply the Council of Four is said to contemplate to the German counter-proposals will serve a purpose only less important in renewing and stiffening the resolution of Allied nations than in convincing tho enemy that bluff and guile have failed to accomplish what was hoped of them.